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“The world is full of international institutions. Disagreement about 
definitions, about how old or new the phenomenon, and about its exact 
impact cannot mask the reality of a growing number and role of 
international institutions.” 
(Stein, 2008) 
 
 
“(…) drug control efforts have rarely proceeded according to plan. To that 
effect there have been reversals and set-backs, surprising developments and 
unintended consequences. (…) But then, very little has been simple or 
smooth about developments in international affairs over the last century.” 
(UNODC, 2009) 
 
 
"Drug control is as much a matter of banning and illicit substances and 
reducing cocaine supply, as it is of reducing demand in consumer countries, 
and also of preventing coca cultivation through more ambitious alternative 
and rural development programs in the source countries.“ 
(International Crisis Group. 2008) 
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Relevance of the Investigation 
International organizations can be found in nearly every thematical and geographical area in 
our global system. That includes the long established Unites Nations as much as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), or 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). International relations 
research is gathering solid knowledge about international institutions: their role, qualities and 
functioning within in the continuously changing global system and about problems of 
international interdependence they are facing. 
 
One problem of global outreach combated by the international community is illicit crop 
cultivation, the later trade and final consumption. Since single states are not able to resolve 
this problem on their own they are willing to cooperate within the framework of international 
organizations in order to secure the provision of security and welfare to their citizens. The 
mutual interest to eliminate illicit crop cultivation is combining a range of global actors, 
particularly states, within the context of alternative development programmes. 
 
However, the actual qualifications, limitations, and performance of international organizations 
implementing alternative development projects and programmes in the 21st century have 
sparely been identified so far. Neither could a catalogue of key elements regarding the design 
and implementation of alternative development programmes and projects be found, nor of 
existing challenges limiting the work of international organizations. In order to gather solid 
knowledge and valuable data on these issues the current academic discussion on the role of 
international organizations, alternative development, and counter-drug measures will be 
illustrated and discussed before two UNODC alternative development projects in Colombia 
serving as a case study will be analyzed. 
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Research Objective, Questions and Hypothesis 
The following research is based on stable research questions and further on pre-elaborated 
hypothesis which I hope will be validated and would be both explanatory and predictive. 
 
The main objectives are the evaluation of qualifications and eligibility of international 
organizations as the main implementation agency of alternative development projects, as well 
as the identification of existing challenges and indispensable elements within the design and 
implementation of alternative development strategies and projects. For this purpose two 
UNODC alternative development projects in Colombia will be analysed in a case study. 
Research Objective 
 
 
Research Questions 
RQ1 What level of importance is and should be given to Alternative Development within 
current counter-drug strategies? 
 
RQ2 What special requirements have to be met during the implementation of Alternative 
Development strategies and projects? Are these elements successfully incorporated in 
the analyzed alternative development projects? 
 
RQ3 What abilities offers an International Organization such as UNODC as the 
implementing agency of alternative development projects compared to other actors 
within the global system? 
 
RQ4 What interests are pursued and actions taken by UNODC, the donors and the 
counterparts during the project cycle? 
 
 
Hypothesis: 
H1 If national states face problems of international interdependence and are not able to 
resolve it on their own, then they are willing to cooperate within the framework of 
international organizations. 
 
H2 If national states intend to secure the provision of security and welfare to their 
citizens’ within the framework of international organizations, then they act both 
according to their self-interest and in compliance with common objectives. 
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H3 If alternative development projects are implemented in an unsound socio-economic 
environment, then the establishment of a well-designed socio-economic infrastructure 
in equal partnership with the project beneficiaries are essential for the projects’ 
effectiveness and sustainability. 
 
H4 If strong emphasis is put on alternative development and broader development efforts 
in illicit crop cultivating countries, then endeavours in the fight against drugs 
undertaken by the international community can be effective. 
Methodology 
The present study is methodogically divided into three parts: 
I. 
II. 
Literature Research 
III. 
Document Research 
 
Expert Interviews 
Ad III) Qualitative Interviews1
The qualitative interview is because of the fact, that information can be gathered in “status 
nascendi”, are unwrapped authentic, are intersujectively comprehensible, and can be 
reproduced any time a popular method in the collection of data. The interview is a 
conversation situation that is established intentionally and purposefully by the people 
involved in order to gather information. The following table should demonstrate the different 
forms of interviews: 
 
Dimensions of Differentiation Forms and Denotation 
1. Intention of the Interview Investigative or Educational 
2. Standardization Standardized, Half- standardized,  Or Non- standardized 
3. Structure of  
Interview Partner(s) 
Single Interview 
Group (Possibly Group Discussion) 
4. Form of Communication Verbal or Written 
5. Stile of Communication 
(Interview conduction) 
Hard, Soft,  
or Neutral 
6. Nature of Questions Closed or Open 
7. Communication Media for  
Verbal Interviews 
Face to face 
By Telephone 
Figure 1: Forms of Interviews 
A very important criterion for differentiation is also the intended direction of the information 
flow. It can be differentiated between the investigative interview and the educational 
                                                 
1 The following description is, if not indicated otherwise, an adopted quotation from: Lamnek, Siegfried (1995). 
Qualitative Sozialforschung. Band2. Methoden und Techniken. Belz: Weinheim. P. 35-56.  
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interview. In the investigative interview the interviewed person is regarded as having 
recallable information that is of interest for the interviewer. In the educational interview the 
interviewed person is target of an informational or influential communication.  
In the case of the present investigation qualitative expert interviews were conducted. The 
intention of the interviews is the gathering of information that is relevant for the answering of 
the research questions. The interviews were conducted in verbal form and face to face. The 
structure will be single interviews and the communication stile was kept neutral. The 
interviews were based on half-standardized questionnaires consisting of open questions and it 
was recorded by a dictaphone. The interviews were of investigative nature and the 
information flow was directed one-sided from the interviewed person, the expert, to the 
interviewer. Though there are diverse forms of investigative interviews a precise 
differentiation has to be made: Informative, analytical and diagnostical interviews can be 
distinguished. In the present study informative interviews were conducted that aim at 
comprehending and capturing the knowledge and facts out of the expertise of the interviewed 
person in a descriptive manner. The interviewed person is regarded as an expert that can, 
because of their technical knowledge, provide information on special thematical areas that are 
of interest to the investigator. The form of half-standardised questionnaires was selected in 
order to both not constrain the answer’s amplitude and depth and permit certain flexibility 
during the conduction while still guaranteeing the comparison of the individual answers or 
respectively the gathered information. 
- Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. 
UNODC. 
Planned Interview Partners: 
- Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. 
- Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. 
UNODC. 
- Mollinedo Claros, Julio. Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in 
Vienna. 
- Montano Duran, Javier. Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer. Latin America and 
the Caribbean Unit. UNODC. 
- Philip De Andres, Amado. Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer. Latin America 
and the Caribbean Unit. UNODC. 
- Rios, Jorge Eduardo. Chief. Sustainable Livelihoods Unit. UNODC. 
 
 10 
1. Theoretical Approach 
Concerning the methological international relations approach to my research subject I chose 
the traditional one as I wish to understand and describe the complexity of international 
cooperation and the various actors including their interests and positions involved in a 
humanistic way by reaching inside the field. I aspire to understand the role of the decision-
makers and the institutions they act in, attempting to comprehend the both moral and political 
dilemmas in the undertaking to secure human health, welfare and security. The history and 
practice of diplomacy will also be of high interest in this regard.2
1.1 Liberal Belief: The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number
 
3
The emergence and establishment of liberal theories is in close connection with the rise of the 
modern liberal state in the 17th century and was regarded as a great potential for human 
progress by liberal philosophers such as John Locke. Modernity was associated with a higher 
level of welfare, free of authoritarian governments, and build a basis for the liberal belief in 
progress. In addition modernization constantly increases the scope and the need for 
cooperation
 
4 and will strengthen long run cooperation based on mutual interests.5
I 
 
A positive view of human nature 
II A conviction that international relations can be cooperative rather than conflictual 
III A belief in progress 
Figure 2: Basic Liberal Assumptions I 
According to liberal thinkers rational principles can be applied to international affairs. 
Although individuals place their own interest above others’ and are let by competitive 
thinking, they share many interests and can engage in collaboration and cooperation which 
increases the individual benefits. Liberals belief that human reason can triumph over human 
                                                 
2 See Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007). Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York. P. 40sqq. 
3 „The greatest happiness principle“ is one of Jeremy Bentham’s three principal characteristics of which 
constitutes the basis of his moral and political philosophy. Jeremy Bentham was an English philosopher and 
political radical. He is primarily known today for his moral philosophy which reflects what he calls at different 
times "the greatest happiness principle": what is morally obligatory is that which produces the greatest amount of 
happiness for the greatest number of people. The modern liberal state invokes a political and economic system 
that will bring such happiness. In: http://www.utm.edu./research/iep/b/bentham.htm 
4 Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.99 cit from Zacher, M.W./Matthew, R.A. (1995). Liberal International Theory. 
Common Threats, Divergent Strands. P119. in: Kegley, C.W.Jr. (1995). Controversies in International Relations. 
Realism and Neoliberal Challenge. St. Martin’s Press: New York. 107-150.  
5 Ibid. P. 98. 
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fear and the desire for power. Consequently conflict and war are evitable when people employ 
their reason and apply it to international affairs and cooperation across international 
boundaries.6
As mentioned before the belief in progress is one of the three main liberal assumptions but 
also a point of debate among liberals. Differentiations are discussed concerning the limits of 
progress, the beneficiaries
 
7  of progress, or the area of progress. Progress is always for 
individuals as the core concern of liberals is the happiness of individual human beings.8
 
 
Figure 3: Basic Liberal Assumptions II9
Important early liberal thinkers that laid the base for today’s academic discussion are John 
Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and Immanuel Kant. 
 
 
In the liberal view of world order liberty, freedom is core elements. Differentiation can be 
made between positive and negative liberty. Positive liberty is the liberty of taking one’s own 
decisions based on the existence of certain conditions, such as being healthy, the possession 
of economic resources, education, etc. Negative liberty implicates the guarantee of an 
individual sphere of autonomy, meaning the non-interference of state authority in any kind. 
Negative liberalism emphasizes a Liberalism of Restrains, including international institution-
building and international laws. Of course Liberalism aims at sorting out problems via 
negotiation and cooperation and via dialogue rather then military or otherwise aggressive 
interference.10
 
 
After the end of the cold war there was a new upsurge of liberal thinking based on the defeat 
of communism and the victory of liberal democracies and Fukuyama’s concept of “the end of 
history”11
                                                 
6 Ibid. P.97sqq. 
 in the academic world. However, the new threats to peace and security faced by the 
international community, the national state, and individuals in the 21st century as a result of 
7 Beneficiaries can be both geographical areas and single states or specific social classes within states or the 
global system. 
8 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.99 
9 Ibid. P.100 
10 Ibid. P.123sqq. 
11 Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History?. National Interest. 16. And: Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of 
History and the Last Man. Avon: New York. 
 
Human Progress 
 
Human Reason Cooperation 
The Process of Modernization: Development of the Modern State 
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the terrorist attacks in New York, London, Madrid, Mumbai and elsewhere, are a setback for 
liberal ideas and the sound optimism at the end of the previous century.12
1.2 Neoliberalism: The Debate between Liberalism and Realism continues 
 
Neoliberalism, also known as post-war liberalism, is the renewed liberal approach that was 
developed in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s when the at that time present East-West rivalry and 
the experiences of two devastating world wars lent itself easily to the then established realist 
interpretation of the world. Realists trace their intellectual roots to Thucydides13 and see states 
as the primary actors in an anarchic world system where power is the central factor. 14 
However new international structures and relations in the fields of trade and investment, 
communication and travel provided the basis for a new attempt by liberals to formulate an 
alternative to realist thinking. In the 1950s a process of regional integration was getting under 
way in Western Europe and was referred to as a particularly intensive form of international 
integration by neoliberal scholars.15 Consequently there was a broad-scale effort to support 
and benefit from this integration and several international institutions such as the United 
Nations, the World Bank16, the International Monetary Fund and the European Economic 
Community were established. 17  Focus of their study was either, how certain functional 
activities across border offered mutually advantageous long-term cooperation, or how 
cooperation in one transactional area paved the way for the cooperation in an other18
                                                 
12 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.99 
. The 
concept and definition of the analyzed international organization moved from: “a formal 
arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of 
institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, 
13 Thucydides was is a greek historian in the 5th century B.C. and the author of the History of the Peloponnesian 
War. He developed high standards of evidence-gathering and analysis in terms of cause and effect and is also 
referred to as being the father of political realism. He constituted the relations between nations as being based on 
might rather than right and his interest in human nature in order to explain behaviour such as crisis and civil war. 
See Stammen, T./Riescher, G./ Hofmann, W. (1997). Hauptwerke der Politischen Theorie. Alfred Kröner 
Verlag: Stuttgart. P. 491sqq. 
14 Stein, A. Neoliberal Institutionalism. In:Reus-Smit, C./Snidal, D. (2008). The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations. Oxford University Press: New York. P. 206 
15 See Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007). Introduction to International Relations. Theories and 
approaches. Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York. P. 42sq. 
16 Originally established as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
17 See Stein. 2008. P. 202sq. 
18 Relevant literature: Haas, E.B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-
1957. Stanford University Press: Stanford.; Keohane, R.O./ Nye, J.S. (1975). International Interdependence and 
Integration. In: Greenstein, F./Polsby, N. (1975). Handbook of Political Science. International Politics. Reading. 
Addison-Wesley: Massachusetts. P.363-414. 
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social, or related fields”19, to a broadened one focusing on regimes in the 1980s: “principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a 
given issue-area”20
In the following two decades four new streams of Neoliberalism managed to establish itself in 
international relations theory: 
. 
Sociological Liberalism Cross-border flows, common values 
Interdependence Liberalism Transactions stimulate cooperation 
Institutional Liberalism International institutions, regimes 
Republican Liberalism Liberal democracies living in peace with each other 
Figure 4: Neoliberalism: Progress and Cooperation21
The different streams of Neoliberalism all support and promote the idea of a peaceful and 
cooperative international system and stand as a challenge to the realist approach to 
international relations
 
22 and focused on the cooperation and post World War II international 
arrangements and the expected change and improvement.23
1.2.1 Sociological, Interdependence, and Republican Liberalism 
 
Due to the limited research focus of the present study only institutional liberalism will be 
subject to an in-depth discussion in the following chapter. However the mentioned other three 
approaches will be very shortly presented below. 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s Europe and Japan developed mass-consumption societies with a 
higher level of trade, communication, cultural exchange and other cross-border relations. Karl 
Deutsch argued that such interconnecting activities helped create common values and 
identities among the people of Europe
Sociological Liberalism: 
24
 
.  
In the 1970s Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed Deutsch’s idea further into the 
interdependence liberalism approach and are among the main contributors to this line of 
Interdependence Liberalism: 
                                                 
19 Stein. 2008. P. 203 cit from Plano, J.C./Olton, R. (1979). The International Relations Dictionary. New Issues: 
Kalamazoo. P.288. 
20 Ibid. P. 203 cit from Krasner, S.D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences. Regimes as intervening 
variables. International Organizations: 35. P.185. 
21 Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007). Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York. P. 44. 
22 Ibid. P.44sq 
23 See Stein. 2008. P. 204 
24 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.43 cit from Deutsch, K.W. et al. (1957). Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
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thinking. They focused on the verified forms of connections, interactions and relations 
between societies besides the traditional political relations of governments. The situation in 
international relations is described as a high complex interdependence between powers and 
the absence of hierarchy among issues, such as the non dominant status of military security or 
military power.25
 
 
The main idea is that liberal democracies enhance peace because they do not go to war against 
each other and has been strongly influenced by the rapid spread of democratization in the late 
1980s, especially after the end of the Cold War when former Soviet satellite countries 
transformed into democracies. According to Michael Doyle this “democratic peace”
Republican Liberalism: 
26  is 
based on three pillars: 1) Peaceful conflict solution between democratic states; 2) common 
values among democratic states; 3) a common moral foundation; 4) economic cooperation 
among democracies.27
1.2.2 Institutional Liberalism -From a Jungle to a Zoo? 
 
After the First World War former US President Woodrow Wilson had the vision about 
transforming international relations “from a jungle to a zoo”. This was to be achieved through 
the establishment of international organizations, in particular the League of Nations. 
According to early liberal idealists, traditional power politics is a chaotic ruthless “jungle”, 
whereas within the framework of an international organization, such as the League of 
Nations, have the ability to transform the jungle into a “zoo” by providing relatively 
restrained conditions based on international law.28 At the first half of the 20th century the 
research focused on international organizations and the literature was largely descriptive and 
normative.29
Contemporary institutional liberals pursue a less optimistic approach. They argue that 
international institutions enable an easier cooperation, but don’t poses the ability to transform 
international relation effectively form the discussed “jungle” to a “zoo” because powerful 
states won’t be easily constrained. However, a high level of institutionalization strongly 
supports the stabilization of international structures and negative effects caused by the revival 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid. P.44, 97. 
26 Doyle, M.W. (1983). Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. Pts 1 and 2. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
12/3: 205-235 and 12/4: 323-354. 
27 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.44, 97. 
28 Ibid. P. 34,108. 
29 See Stein. 2008. P. 202. 
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of multi-polarity in the global system. That’s because institutions support the development of 
trust between states or other relevant actors due to the facilitation of transparency through the 
provision and information and the provision of a forum for negotiation. Governments are able 
to monitor others’ compliance and to implement their own commitments.30
In order to evaluate the role of international institutions in the promotion of and agreement to 
international cooperation institutional liberalist developed a behaviouralistic scientific 
approach. The extent of institutionalization among states and their role in the advancement of 
institutionalization is the focus of the analysis and can be measured according to its depth and 
scope
 
31. One way of assessing the mentioned scope and depth of institutionalization is to look 
at a group of states where we assume a high level of institutionalization and then evaluate the 
ways in which institutional matter. Current research on international institutions pursues the 
following two aims: 1) the collection of data on existing regimes in various issue areas of 
international relations; 2) the study of specific theoretical questions 32 that require further 
research.33
1.2.3 Neoliberalism versus Neorealism
 
34
One way of assessing the qualities of the (neo) liberal theory and its developed approaches is 
to compare it with its main contender, the (neo) realist view. 
 
In the 1970s neoliberal thinkers regarded their approach as the future dominant theory in the 
discipline. However a reformulation of realism 35  and the development of neorealist 
approaches re-established the balance. 36
                                                 
30 See Jackson/Sorensen.2007. P.108-111. 
 While previous debates between realism and 
31 Depth can be measured through its 1) commonality (the degree to which expectations about appropriate 
behaviour and understanding about how to interpret action are shared by participants in the system.), 2) 
specificity (the degree to which these expectations are clearly specified in the form of rules.), and 3) autonomy 
(the extent to which the institution can alter its own rules rather than depending on outside agents, such as the 
national state.). Scope concerns the number of issue areas in which there are institutions. Jackson/Sorensen. 
2007. P.108sq cit from Keohane, R.O. (1989). International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International 
Relations Theory. Westview Press: Boulder. P.4 
32 Important questions: Under what conditions and through what mechanisms do international regimes come into 
existence? Do regimes persist even when the circumstances in which they came into existence change? What 
consequences of regimes for state behaviour and problem solving can we observe? What long-term effects do 
regimes have on national political systems and the structure of world politics? Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.109 cit 
form Levy et al. (1995). The Study ig International Relations. European Journal of International Relations. 1/3. 
P. 268. 
33 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.109sq 
34 A deeper discussion on peace and war and the different positions and arguments of Neorealists and 
Neoliberals won’t be presented due to the focus and limitation of the present study. 
35 Leading scholar was Kenneth Waltz: Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill: 
New York. 
36 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.44sq. 
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liberalism discussed the human nature 37  and its internal moral qualities and capabilities, 
present discussions focus on observable facts and measurable data in the external social and 
political world. As pointed out before neorealists account the global system as being anarchic. 
This anarchic structure is the reason for the new instabilities and insecurities that exist in the 
now multi-polar global system. Institutions don’t play an important role in international 
politics because such institutions can only work in “low politics”, areas of lesser importance, 
and not in “high politics” such as national security. According to Mearsheimer, institutions 
would only constitute a “false promise”38. In addition institutions only reflect the power and 
interests of the member states and therefore have no chance to act independently. Moreover 
realists claim that institutions are only created by the powerful to serve the powerful and only 
exists as long as the purpose of its establishment is still valid. However, following example 
should prove the contrary: NATO, whose purpose was to contain Soviet power continued to 
function after the End of the Cold War and even expanded its membership and tasks.39
As pointed out before for liberals history is potentially progressive with new and often better 
social or economic conditions coming up, while realists argue that conditions, such as 
increased international cooperation and relations in the 1970s, have existed for a long time
 
40 
without being able to prevent two world wars. History is the same damn things over and over 
again, so Layne41. Even in international institutions, so the realist view, state act according to 
their self-interest and own decisions. In short, there is no escape from self-help and the 
security dilemma.42 However, liberalists respond to the realists’ arguments and according to 
their new position they can be divided in two groups: weak liberals and strong liberals43
 
. 
Weak liberals accept several realist claims including the view of the world system as being 
anarchic, whilst strong liberals claim that the present fundamental changes in the global 
system, world politics and the international society are in line with the liberal expectations. 
Robert Keohane is one of the most important scholars in the debate between neoliberals and 
                                                 
37 „You have misunderstood politics because you misestimated human nature“, so Waltz. Jackson/Sorensen. 
2007. P.115 cit form Waltz, K.N. (1959). Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis. Columbia University 
Press: New York. P.40. 
38 Stein. 2008. P. 206 cit from Mearsheimer, J.J.(1994).The false promise of international institutions. 
International Security:19. P.5-49. 
39 Ibid. P. 206 
40 Especially in the field of economic interdependence, as for example world exports in the 1960s or 1970s were 
below the level at the end of the 19th century. 
41 Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.116 cit form Layne, C. (1994). Kant or Cant. The Myth of the Democratic Peace. 
International Security. 19/2. P.5-49 
42 Ibid. P.115sqq. 
43 Weak and strong indicates different degrees of disagreement with realism and not the solidity of the 
arguments. 
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neorealists. In his analysis on international institutions he applied a clearly realist starting 
point, assuming that states are the major actors in our anarchic international system where the 
power for states is of great importance. However, international institutional posses the ability 
to facilitate cooperation and make it less likely that states mistrust or cheat on each other.44 
Even if international institutions are a self-interested creation of states, they can be 
constructed easily if there is little conflict of interest. In addition states experience 
collaboration problems in which their autonomous self-interest behaviour results in poorer or 
even deficient outcomes. Additionally states may also create institutions in order the reduce 
the transaction or governance cost resulting from autonomous decision-making or action.45
Realists on the other side claim that Keohane overlooked the one crucial point: relative 
gains
 
46, which means that states have distributional concerns and have to worry about the 
relatively higher or greater benefits for their cooperation partners and consequently are a 
source of inhibitions for closer cooperation. Therefore cooperation would be more difficult to 
achieve and sustain because states would give up potential gains if the cooperation that 
brought them these gains meant that others gained even more47. Keohane deled with these 
neorealist arguments by stating that the conditions for cooperation between states defines its 
qualification. The single most important condition is the existence of common interests 
between states48. If states pursue a common interest or objective them won’t be worrying 
about relative gains as they won’t be able to reach their goal at all on their own. Of course in 
the case of absence of such common interests states will act competitive, sceptically or even 
fearful and institutions won’t be a big help.49 Of course states differ in power and this power 
is used in to structure the choices for others in the construction of institutions and is reflected 
in their bargaining power to obtain certain outcomes. However, this doesn’t reduce the 
importance of institutions and voluntaristic agreements. And the fact of their foundation in 
order to improve outcomes for member states provides no assurance that they actually 
accomplish their objective. The participating actors simply have different endowments, 
possibilities and bargaining powers that determine outcomes.50
                                                 
44 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.117sq. 
 Keohane also points out, that 
45 See Stein. 2008. P. 208sq 
46 Gains are benefits that accrue to participants that cooperate. 
47 Stein. 2008. P. 210 cit from Grieco, J.M.(1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation. A realist critique of the 
newest liberal institutionalism. International Organization: 42. P.485-507 
48 Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.118 cit from Keohane. 1989. P.3; Keohane. 1993. P.277. In: Baldwin. 1993. P.269-
301. 
49 Ibid. P.117sq. 
50 Stein. 2008. P.210sq. 
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“realists and institutionalists agree that without a basis either of hegemonic dominance or 
common interests, international institutions cannot long survive.”51
This neoliberal position enables the understanding of successful cooperation in an anarchic 
global system, but it is also leading liberalism away from its genuine origin. Still, despite 
these new institutional assumptions and approach emphasize self-interest, draw on 
microeconomics and agree to the global system as being anarchic as realists do, they were 
labelled neoliberalism and neoinstitutional liberalism because of its emphasis on cooperation 
and institutions
 
52
The faction of strong neoliberals
. 
53 argue that history isn’t “the same damn things over and 
over again” as realists state, because today’s close economic interdependences concerning 
production, consumption, financial flows, and so on, make it almost impossible for states to 
opt out54 of the system and the resulting cooperation. Strong liberals don’t deny the anarchy 
of our world system, but in their view it is by far more complex than recognized by 
neorealists and they question the conclusion neorealists draw from its existence. Of course 
there is no single world government or such thing, but there are significant elements of 
legitimate and effective authority in international politics even though the existence of 
anarchy. Neoliberals also state, that anarchy doesn’t necessarily produce the insecurity 
pointed out by neorealists. Despite anarchy genuine progress is possible and currently taking 
place in many regions in the world and in several areas states have managed to change and 
establish new governance structures within the “not so raw any more anarchy”.55 Summing up 
both the neorealist and neoliberal approaches finally agree on the existence of anarchy. The 
key element of debate has shifted to its meaning and implications and the extent to which 
development if institutions such as the United Nations can transcend the basic structural 
characteristics of the existing anarchy in the global system.56
When it comes to studying this change, neoliberals seam to provide the better tools than 
neorealists. Unfortunately neoliberals are short of instruments and arguments when it come to 
explain lack of progress or retrogress, such as it is happening in the third world where a 
 
                                                 
51 Dougherty, J./Pfaltzgraff, R. (2001). Contending Theories of International Relations. A Comprehensive 
Survey. Longman: New York. P.68. cit from Keohane. 1993. In: Baldwin. 1993. P. 294-295. 
52 Stein. 2008. P. 205. 
53 Strong Liberals include J. Burton, K. Deutsch, M. W. Doyle, R. Rosecrance, J. N. Rosenau, B. M. Russett and 
M. Zürn. 
54 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.119 cit form Holm, H.-H./Sorensen, G. (1995). Whose World Order? Uneven 
Globalization and the End of the Cold War. Westview Press: Boulder. 
55 Ibid. P.118-123. 
56 See Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff. 2001. P.68 
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number of very poor countries have failed to develop successfully or even experience state 
collapse.57
1.3 Present Focus of Research 
 
As a result of the end of the Cold War certain traditional liberal research issues gained new 
relevance, such as the securing of democratic peace. Karl Deutsch’s security community also 
requires further development in order to apply to the present threats and circumstances. 
Further focus of research is the gathering of solid knowledge about international institutions: 
newer institutions such as the OSCE and WTO that play a central role in the present global 
system. Or older established institutions such as NATO or the UN, that need to change and 
changed significantly since their foundation after the Second World War due to the constantly 
new challenged and problems they have to face. 58  The circumstances under which 
international institutions were established mostly change substantially, so can the distribution 
of power and the constellation of interest. Facing new political, social or economic problems 
member states can extend the scope of and reform existing institutions or even create new 
ones.59 Important is also the fact, that institutions have become more and more intrusive and 
constraining over time. Today states more or less expect and generally tolerate such strong 
involvement in their internal affairs60
At present great attention is given to the assessment of the impact, or effectiveness, of 
international institutions
. 
61. Scholars have also focused on state compliance with international 
institutions. Surprisingly states mostly comply with the agreements they make, at times even 
without enforcement mechanisms. This can be explained the following way: the compliance 
results “from the fact that most treaties require states to make only modest departures from 
what they would have done in the absence of an agreement62. That is one of the reasons why 
it remains difficult to assess to impact of institutions.63
Without doubt and as indicated earlier the new threats to international security above all 
resulting from the terrorist attacks in New York, London, Madrid, Mumbai and elsewhere, 
 
                                                 
57 See Jackson/Sorensen, 2007. P.123. 
58 Ibid. 123sq. 
59 See Stein. 2008. P. 215sq. 
60 Ibid. P. 216 cit from Stein, A.A. (2001). Constrained Sovereignty. The growth of international intrusiveness. 
P.261-281. In: Rosecrance, R./Lanham, (2001). The new great power coalition. Toward a World Concert of 
Nations. Rowman and Littlefield: Md. 
61 Mostly by economists assessing the impact of regional or global trade arrangements, or of the effectiveness of 
international environmental regimes. 
62 Stein. 2008. P. 212 cit from Downs, G.W./ Rocke, D.M./Barsoom, P.N. (1996). Is the Good News about 
Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization:50. P.380. 
63 Ibid. P. 212sq. 
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embody a great challenge to liberal international relations theory. Greater security at 
international borders, the demand for more police and intelligence and control and less 
openness in general interferes with the liberal ideas. However, such developments can also 
strengthen or establish new international cooperation and collaboration in order to pursue 
their common interests concerning the provision of security to their citizens.64 Moreover the 
neorealist-neoliberal debate has moved away from the sharp delineation that existed during 
the utopian-realist era to an effort towards synthesis, which will hopefully provide a basis for 
further progress in international relations theory.65
1.4 Research Focus on International Organizations 
 
1.4.1 The Concept of IOs 
The term “international organization” was recognized in the political vocabulary long after 
organizations that would be labelled as international organizations today were founded at the 
end of the 19th century. Not until the founding of the League of Nations after the First World 
War was the term international organization widely known as only a mix of different terms 
such as international public union or commission existed before. It took about 30 years till the 
term was finally established in the political thesaurus.66
An international organization is a certain class of an international institution. An other central 
class would be an international regime. Two important differentiations can be made between 
the two: First, regimes always focus on a single thematical problem, such as human rights, 
while international organizations can focus on one area or can also act in various over-lapping 
fields. Second, international organizational possess the ability to be an independent actor 
while international regimes possess no such quality.
 
67
International Organizations can be described and regarded in three different ways: as an 
instrument, an arena, or an actor
 
68
                                                 
64 See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. 123-126. 
. As an instrument of national diplomacy the core objective 
of member states is the realization of self-interests and the exercise of power. International 
organization as an arena provides the forum or stage for intergovernmental negotiations. This 
includes informational exchange, issue setting or the expression of demands. According to the 
image of international organizations as an instrument or arena doesn’t include the possibility 
65 See Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff. 2001. P.69. 
66 See Rittberger, V./Zangl, B. (2005). Internationale Organisationen. Politik und Geschichte. 3. Ed. Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden. P.21sq. 
67 Ibid. P.25 
68 Ibid. P.23 cit from Rittberger, V./Mogler, M./Zangl, B. (1997). Vereinte Nationen und Weltordnung. 
Zivilisierung der Internationalen Politik? Leske+Budrich: Opladen. 
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of overcoming the anarchy in the global system. As pointed our before an international 
organization possess the ability to be an independent actor in the global system. Without 
doubt IOs are a collective of states acting within a certain frame. However, there is something 
very specific about this decision-making or corporate action when sovereign states act 
according to formalized rules and procedures within and through international organizations: 
it is the fact that without this certain organization and its organs the action or decision 
wouldn’t have taken place/ been taken.69
Important for the classification of international organizations is the facilitated and established 
political linkage, which can be identified with the following five criteria: membership, 
mandate, function within the development process of politics
 
70, decision-making power, and 
decision-making scope.71
1.4.2 Core Actors, Interests and Exercise of Influence in IOs 
 
The elaboration of politics in international organizations is regulated by their normative 
frameworks and after all determined by the various interests, resources and influences of 
actors involved in the decision-making process. According to Rittberger five classes of actors 
can be distinguished: 1) representatives of governments or member states, 2) administerial 
staff72
 
, 3) parliamentary assemblies, 4) organized interests and public opinion, 5) experts with 
politics-consulting functions. 
Figure 5: The political System of International Organizations (Input)73
1.4.3 Motivations and Characteristics of Decision Makers 
 
Basically there are two types of motivation: “in-order-to” motives and “because-of” 
motives74
                                                 
69 Ibid. P. 23sqq 
. The first are conscious and articulable, as the decision-makers are taking this 
70 Focus of work or role within this process. 
71 Ibid. P. 28-32. 
72 In particular high ranked leading positions. 
73 Ibid. P.116 
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particular decision in-order-to accomplish a specific objective (with a certain outcome) of the 
state they serve. The second are unconscious or semiconscious motives or even impulses 
arising out of previous life experiences or moral values or interests of the particular decision-
maker. According to the classic model of decision-making, policymakers make a calculation 
in two basic dimensions: utility and probability. Assuming that they are rational, they aim at 
maximizing the resulting utility. Of course decision-makers act according to clear preferences, 
which result form the rules of the organizational system, shared organizational experience, 
information available and biographies of individuals 75. However, decision-making theory 
does not necessarily assume the rationality of decision-makers. Modern theorists of 
governmental decision-making assume purposeful behaviour and explicit motivation. The 
decision-making process combines rational elements, value considerations in which the 
rational can mix up with the nonrational, the irrational or the suprarational. Last three results 
from the psychic condition of the policymaker and emerge for stress or anxiety 76 . The 
scholars Braybrook and Lindblom point out that every solution addressed by policymakers 
must be limited by several factors such as the individual’s problem-solving capacities, the 
amount of information available, the cost of analysis and of course the practical inseparability 
of fact and value77. According to the minimum standards of acceptability by Herbert Simon 
people just keep rejecting unsatisfactory solutions until they find one that they can agree is 
sufficient to enable them to act in a satisfactory way. Furthermore it is evident that foreign 
policy decision-making, especially in crisis situations and matters of national security, is 
influenced by domestic politics and political forces. In particular realists such as Kenneth 
Waltz endorse this statement. It has been made clear that the dichotomy between assumptions 
of rationality and irrationality in the behaviour of individuals, groups and governments is one 
of the most persistent dimensions in the field of international relations theory. In particular in 
non-western societies and states today’s decision-making theory is very little developed and 
lacks of sufficient theoretical approaches in connection with the international relations 
dimension.78
                                                                                                                                                        
74 Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff. 2001. P. 559 cit form Snyder, R.C. et al. (1963). Foreign Policy Decision-Making. Free 
Press: New York P.144. 
 
75 Ibid. cit form Snyder. 2002. P.176. 
76 Ibid. P. 561 cit form Singer, D. (1963). Inter-Nation Influence. A Formal Model. American Political Science 
Review: LXII. P.428-430. 
77 Ibid. P. 561 cit form Braybrooke, D./ Lindblom, C.E. (1963). A Strategy of Decision. Free Press: New York. 
P.40 
78 Ibid. P. 559-562, 598sqq. 
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2. Illicit Crops in Latin America 
“A decade after the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the world drug 
problem79, illicit drugs, drug trafficking and related crime continues to threaten peace and 
stability around the globe. (…). After ten years of intense efforts to curb cocaine in the three 
Andean source countries80 and to reduce the amount trafficked to, and consumed in , the U.S. 
and Europe, but more recently also increasingly in former transit countries (…), results are 
meagre at best.”81
 
 
This chapter is dedicated to take a closer and critical look at the drug problem arising from 
and in Latin America and assess if the results are truly meagre at best. 
2.1 Scope of Cultivation, Trafficking and Consumption 
2.1.1 Cultivation 
Over the last years there had been a constant up and down in the regions different cultivation 
centres, but the overall situation has been quite stable. So was a decrease in coca cultivation in 
Bolivia and Peru accompanied by an increase in Colombia82, and then vice versa in the 
following year83
According to UNODC, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, some encouraging 
reduction of cocaine can be recognized at the global level in the year 2008. The coca 
cultivation in Colombia, which is of interest to the present research, increased about 18%, 
while the trends in other production countries are mixed. Taken into account that data can 
never be complete enough to give a precise statements or even a forecast it can be pointed out 
that the total coca production did in fact decrease. Despite small increases in Bolivia (6%) and 
Peru (4%) the total coca cultivation declined (8%) in the year 2008 due to the high decrease in 
Colombia (18%). Despite this significant decrease Colombia remains the leading coca 
. Of course long term trends are by far more meaningful than short term 
fluctuations and single dat. However, some facts should be additionally presented in this 
subchapter in order to show a more concrete picture. 
                                                 
79 The UNGASS on the world drug problem and the decided action plan will be discussed in chapter 4.2.1. 
80 Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. 
81 International Crisis Group (2008a). Latin American Drugs I. Losing the Fight. Latin America Report No.25: 
Brussels, Bogota. P.1. 
82 There is also coca cultivation in marginal amounts in Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. 
83 UNODC (2007). Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region. A survey of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 
P.III. 
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cultivator in the world (81,000 ha). The total area under coca cultivation fell to 167,600 ha 
which is the average level between 2002 and 2008 and most importantly blow the high 1090s 
levels. Also the cocaine production decrease by 15% down to around 845 mt.84 
 
Figure 6: Coca Cultivation in Latin America 1994-200885
However, according to the White House’s drug office (ONDCP) around 198,500 ha of coca 
crops could be detected in 2005 and 177,800 ha to 254,800 ha in 2006. This variation is due 
to methodologies. UNODC uses commercial satellite imagery, with frequent view and 
continuous recording but comparatively low resolution, over all of Colombia, fifteen coca-
growing regions in Peru and Bolivia’s Yungas and Chapare regions, combined with high 
resolution airplane photo and video imagery and field verification. The U.S. uses higher 
resolution satellites, its own sampling and extrapolations, but its methodology has been 
criticised for not including statistically more rigorous accuracy assessment and terrain and 
atmosphere correction.
 
86
 
 
As was pointed out in an Crisis Group Report in 2008 several years of efforts to reduce coca 
crops in the Andean region have had little success87, but according to UNODC the overall 
situation is stable, yet fragile and there has been some substantial decrease in the last two 
years. Needs to be questions if this is the beginning of a positive and promising trend or only 
a fluctuation in a dreadful odyssey. However, progress is possible as shown in the Golden 
Triangle88 of South East Asia that was far and wide known for its vast opium cultivation and 
became almost opium free in the last two decades.89
                                                 
84 UNODC (2009). World Drug Report. United Nations Publication: New York. P.9sqq, 63sq. 
 
85 Ibid. P.11 
86 International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.2 cit from Crisis Group interviews, coca survey expert and Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) officials, Bogota and Washington DC, 19 October 2007 and 14 January 2008. 
87 Ibid. P.31 
88 Myanmar (Burma), Laos, Vietnam and Thailand. 
89 See UNODC. 2007. P.III. 
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2.1.2 Drug Trafficking and Cocaine Seizure 
In 2007 the global seizure of cocaine base, salts and crack cocaine fell slightly compared to 
the year before but halts the strong upward trend of the last years90. Central America and the 
Caribbean remain the two major transit areas: cocaine trafficked to North America usually 
originates in Colombia and reaches the US through Mexico.91 Unfortunately no reliable data 
on how much cocaine enters Mexico from South America and gets trafficked to the U.S. is 
available. But a 90% of the cocaine entering the United States is estimated to come through 
Mexico. Europe is after the United States the second largest cocaine consumer market 
globally.92 In the 2007 and 2008 declines of cocaine trafficking into the United States and 
Europe could be detected. But unfortunately drug trafficking through Western Africa had 
been increasing since in the last decade while the seizure is still at a very low percentage 
compared to the likely cocaine trafficking flows affecting the continent. 93  Very weak 
governance and enforcement structures build the basis of the ongoing boom of drug 
trafficking 94 . Both UNODC and Crisis Group agree that it needs to be realized that 
transnational trafficking organizations and cocaine retailers across the globe have not been 
controlled successfully. Better coordination between the U.S., European and Latin American 
approaches and actions in the fight against drugs is urgently required as transnational 
trafficking organizations adapt rapidly and continue making extreme profits in this destructive 
business.95
2.1.3 Consumption 
 
Unfortunately but as a matter of consequence drug problem effects all regions in the world. 
Either as cultivation area, consuming society or trafficking route. Concerning the case of 
Latin America it can be illustrated as below: 
                                                 
90 The immense financial scope of drug trafficking can be illustrated with the seizure of 80 million US$ worth of 
dollars, Euros and gold in one single operation based on DEA intelligence made by the Colombian police in 
2007. See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.6 according to Crisis Group interviews, DEA officials: 
Washington D.C. 9 January 2008. 
91 See UNODC. 2009. P.70. 
92 International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.23-29. 
93 See UNODC. 2009. P.71-74. 
94 See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.34 
95 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.1,9. 
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Figure 7: Drug Cultivation-Trafficking-Consumption 
The number of drug users96  at a global level has remained basically stable within the late four 
years at around 4, 7 to 5, 0% of the world’s population. Cocaine users increased in the last 
two years up to 16 to 21 million people, about 0, 37% percent of the world’s population. The 
cocaine market is forecast to stabilize in the medium tern as production levels and 
consumption continues to ever decline, such it is the case in the North America, or flatten 
such it is the case in Western Europe.97. According to recent surveys in Western Europe, North 
America and Oceania, cocaine markets are calculated in total shrinking or at least stabilized at 
a high level98 ,however “there are no data to suggest a significant fall in drug use”99. The 
largest market remains North America100, followed y West and Central Europe and South 
America. After declines in youth drug use throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, drug use in 
the United States had rebounded and has finally been decreasing again in the last years in 
North America, especially the United States101. Europe markets, following strong increases in 
recent years102, appear to be stabilizing in recent times, whereas cocaine use still appears to be 
increasing in South America103. However, the consumption level remains dangerously high 
and new markets can always emerge as it is initiating along the trafficking routes through 
Central America and Western Africa104. Some African countries, notably in Western and 
Southern Africa, already show rising levels of cocaine use, although data are spear and no 
predictions can be made yet.105
                                                 
96 The term drug users refers to the drug consuming population aged 15 to 64. 
 
97 UNODC. 2008. P-30-34. 
98 International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.31. 
99 EU drugs strategy 2005-2012. P.4 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index6790EN.html 
100 See also International Crisis Group (2008b). Latin American Drugs II. Improving Policy and Reducing Harm. 
Latin America Report No.26: Brussels, Bogota. P.2 
101 See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008 Annual Report. Office of National Drug Control Policy: 
Washington D.C. P. 1 at: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/  
102 See also European Monitorig Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction- EMCDDA at: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index190EN.html  
103 See also: International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.1 
104 See also: UNODC (2007). Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa. The Threat to Stability and Development. 
105 UNODC. 2009. P.9, 15, 80 sq. 
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2.2 Drug Caused Problems 
Illegal drugs and crime are inexorably linked to each other as most countries prohibit the 
cultivation, manufacturing, possession, use, purchase, sale, distribution, import or export of 
drugs and the laundering of the proceeds. Consequently the quantity of people committing 
drug related crime is significant. The most commonly associated criminal activities are a) 
acquisitive crimes motivated by drug use, such as burglary and robbery, used to pay for drugs; 
b) trade linked to drug use, such as street sex work; c) crimes committed under the influence 
of drugs, a result of the effects of drugs on the mind; and d) crimes related to drug markets, 
for example territory wars.106
It is easy to realize that the established international drug control system produced unintended 
consequences such as the creation of a highly lucrative black market for drugs and the 
violence and corruption it generates. Of course there have been demands for the abolition of 
the system, and legalized and tax substances like cannabis or cocaine in order to stop the often 
extreme violence that comes along. That means the core problem is not the costs or 
effectiveness of the system, but the resulting violence and corruption. Abandoning the 
counter- drug system would also require undoing the UN Conventions
 
107 dealing with the 
drug problem by global consensus. But on very few issues in international relations have been 
that much positive consensus as on drug control. However illegal substances such as cocaine 
are kept illegal for the purpose of protection citizens from the dangerous and adverse effects 
of drug use and addition. It’s a fact that more people die from the use of legal substances such 
as tobacco than of illegal ones every year. But not because they are more harmful, rather 
because they are almost universally available. Consequently if currently illegal substances 
would be accessible their popularity would rise and so the victims of their destruction. 
Moreover treatment and the capacity to collect taxes are very limited in the developing world 
where people are already very vulnerable to addictive legal substances such as alcohol and 
tobacco. Therefore the international community needs both to control drugs and to reduce the 
violence and crime linked to it. However, drug control efforts have rarely proceeded 
according to plan. To that effect there have been reversals and set-backs and surprising 
developments. But then, very little has been simple or smooth about developments in 
international affairs over the last century.108
                                                 
106 See Hughes, R./ Lart, R./ Higate, P. (2006). Drugs. Policy and Politics. Open University Press: Maidenhead. 
P. 75sq 
 
107 The UN Conventions dealing with the drug problem will be further discussed in chapter 4.1.2.  
108 See UNODC. 2009. P.18sq, 163sqq. Also see: Jelsma. 2002. P.23. 
 28 
As partly brought up before illicit drug business, especially drug trafficking, often leads to 1) 
the undermining of institutions and democracy; 2) the fuelling of armed and civic conflict; 3) 
the weakening of local governance and development; and the obstruction of international 
cooperation. Especially in Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Haiti courts and police are 
infiltrated, officials are corrupted at all levels of government, and even elections are tainted at 
times. Mexico has a long history of corruption and criminal infiltration and in particular 
police forces have been vulnerable, but also military and members of federal government. In 
many cases politicians have turned a blind eye to trafficking in order to avoid or limit drug 
trafficking caused violence109
2.3 Counter Drug Strategies 
. Strongly in big cities of Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina so 
called wars between criminal groups to control drug distribution are raising street violence to 
extreme levels and constitute a very serious threat to public security. 
Counter-drug strategies have been recognized by observers and even privately by many 
policy-makers and police chiefs as being ineffective so far.110
2.3.1 U.S., EU and Colombian Strategies 
 
In the past decade, both great efforts and resources have been invested in the global fight 
against drugs. These efforts include crop eradication, interdiction, institutional strengthening 
and law enforcement, domestic demand reduction harm reduction programmes and alternative 
development111. But they have proved ineffective and overall demand and supply levels have 
not changed for the better112
 
. 
The United States can account around 35 years of “war on drugs” based on former U.S. 
President Richard Nixon’s declaration back in 1971. The global drug trade has been viewed 
as a serious threat, having the capacity to “destabilize democratic and friendly governments, 
undermining U.S. foreign policy objectives, and generate violence and human suffering 
                                                 
109 International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.36 according to Crisis Group Interview, Political analyst. Mexico City. 
26 November 2007. 
110 Ibid. P.35 
111 Ibid. P.I,1. 
112 For a more detailed illustration of the present scope of coca cultivation and cocaine consumption see 
subchapter 2.1.1 and 2.1.3. 
 29 
(…)”113. Its priority has been given to supply reduction measures with a strong component of 
law enforcement against traffickers on one side and to coca crop eradication on the other114
Washington has always been focusing on the first three stages of drug supply: cultivation, 
processing and transit, and combating drug trafficking has been a primary foreign policy 
objective since the mid 1990s and about 50% of all U.S. foreign assistance has be invested in 
this field. Since 2002 the National Drug Control Strategy has set three priorities within the 
fight against drugs: 1) stopping drugs before use, through prevention measures and the 
enhancement of a cultural shift away from drug use, focusing on youth; 2) intervening and 
healing America’s drug users, including treatment for drug users and addicts; and 3) 
disruption of the market for illegal drugs in order to reduce the supply.
.  
115
 
 
With reference to the focus of the present study, eradication of illicit crops has been 
encouraged through cash investments, alternative crops and, only most recently, community 
infrastructure projects. But the bigger part of eradication has been realized through areal 
spraying, and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (INL) continue to argue that “crop control is the most cost-effective means of cutting 
supply”.116
State Department assistance in the field strengthening judicial and financial institutions, 
including transparency and efficiency, usually focuses on units in Colombia that are directly 
dedicated to combating drugs and have no broader development approach as USAID 
programmes.
 
117
 
 That way, leaders and facilitator involved in drug trafficking, money 
laundering or other illicit groups, but will most probably not commit to a sustainable change 
in the Colombian drug scene and the resulting problems. 
The National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) has been emphasizing the importance of 
balanced demand and supply reduction interventions at home and abroad, but up until now 
this has only been rhetoric, as policy responses and resources still focus largely on law 
enforcement, interdiction and incarceration of users and traffickers, but a public health 
                                                 
113 National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.34 
114 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.2 according to Crisis Group Interview. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) officials: Washington DC. 14 January 2008.  
115 See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.1-5 
116 But see: International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.4 according to Rubin, B./Sherman, J. (2008). Counter- 
Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan. The False Promise of Crop Eradication. P.5 At: 
www.cic.nyu.edu/afghanistan/docs/counternarcoticsfinal.pdf. In Afghanistan the U.S. supports poppy 
eradication in order to deprive the Taliban insurgency of funding, but eradication raises the price of opium and 
consequently ensures equally high income through drug business and encourages farmers to move to other illicit 
crop cultivation areas. 
117 Ibid. P.6 according to Crisis Group Interview. U.S. official: Cartagena. 19 November 2007. 
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approach to demand reduction is still missing. For the year 2009 the federal drug control 
spending is divided into a) 3,830,9$ million for interdiction; b) 3,763,3$ million for domestic 
law enforcement; c) 3,402,8$ million for treatment; d) 1,609,8$ million for international; and 
e) only 1,507,1$ million for prevention.118 Concerning U.S. spending and focus on fighting 
drugs within “Plan Colombia” virtually security through military and law enforcement is the 
key element119
Plan Colombia was launched ten year ago in 1999 as a joint effort between the Colombian 
government and the United States to fight the global drug problem through fighting 
trafficking, the promotion of economic growth, social development, and the strengthening of 
democratic institutions. A significant amount of resources and efforts is allocated into security 
in order to persecute drug traffickers and terrorist organizations and to prevent the illegal drug 
flow into the U.S. for which organizations such as FARC, ELN and former AUC groups
. 
120 
are made responsible for. Complementary efforts such as eradication, interdiction, extradition 
and persecution have also played a vital role, so do social programs that provide opportunities 
to displaced people and those affected by the conflict.121 According to the National Drug 
Control Strategy’s Annual Report 2008 eradication, interdiction, and organizational reform 
have facilitated progress in alternative development. Judicial reform, and the establishment of 
democratic institutions since the launch of Plan Colombia122
But regarding the distribution of financial resources and activities having taken and taking 
place it is clear that Plan Colombia is focusing on security and is leaving social and economic 
development behind
. 
123 . AD investments have been small and merely serve to justify 
“voluntary eradication”, where farmers have to eliminate all coca in return for financial 
compensation in order to avoid aerial spraying. The limited success of such undertakings is 
evident, despite the good intentions, as it leaves the rural population which no choice but to 
cooperate and does not provide the necessary settings for sustainable coca eliminating unless 
infrastructural improvement are ensured before the crop substitution.124
                                                 
118 See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.5. Also see International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.7. These figures 
do not include the enormous U.S. spending on military and law enforcement within Plan Colombia. 
 
119 Also see Heinz, W. S. (2002). The Potential of Alternative Development in Conflict management. Paper 
prepared for the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and 
Development Cooperation: Feldafing. P. 11. 
120 The involvement of these organizations will be discussed in chapter 5.1 
121 See Embassy of Colombia. Plan Colombia at: 
http://colombiaemb.org/index.php?id=82&option=com_content&task=view 
122 National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P. 51 sq. 
123 See Center for International Policy. Erasing the Lines. Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 
at: http://www.ciponline.org/facts/0512eras.pdf 
124 See Jelsma. 2002. P. 21. 
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As a response to Plan Colombia, which Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa characterized as 
militaristic and violent, he announced the launch of a plan of peace, justice, and development 
called Plan Ecuador in 2007, and offered assistance to Colombians in Ecuador displaced by 
the armed conflict. Further, following a tense exchange at the UN International Court of 
Justice, where Ecuadorian Foreign Affairs Minister María Fernanda Espinosa accused 
Colombia of violating an agreement not to fumigate illicit crops in areas close to their shared 
border, Colombian Prosident Àlvaro Uribe announced that the Colombian government would 
compensate Ecuadorians who could prove that their crops were damaged by fumigation.125
 
 
The Ecuadorian experience demonstrates one example of strong criticism against aerial 
spraying and the request for peaceful development measures. 
Unfortunately this war against drugs production is also a war against peasant communities 
involved on growing cannabis, coca or opium. Because every war has its motivation, its 
excuse and if you want to fight your “enemies”, you have to justify yourself and criminalize 
the people you fight against. That means, if you want to spend billions in military operations 
you need to prove that your target group can be held responsible for certain damage done to 
society and that it is their choice to do so.126
 
 Well, this can be critiqued in various ways as it 
does not include the peasant communities’ perspective and does not support development. 
The issue of illicit crop cultivation is rooted in social and economic problems that need 
solutions people benefit, not suffer from. 
The United States is also and especially closely cooperating with the Mexican government. 
The Merida Initiative127 is a multiyear security cooperation program and a regional effort 
designed to support and strengthen U.S., Mexican and Central American enforcement 
capacities. The Mexican government itself, especially the government of President Felipe 
Calderon, has employed forces from seven government agencies, spending 2, 5$ billion to 
improve security and reduce drug-related violence in 2007 and is implementing anti-
corruption initiatives and institutional reforms128
It is worth mentioning the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy sounds like a most positive 
and compact concept to counter the drug problem and refers to the success made so far for 
.  
                                                 
125 See UNODC. Quarterly Report. April-June 2007. P. 1 sq.  
126 See Oomen, J. (2002). The Fight for Development. An Overview of three Evaluations of Alternative 
Development in the Andean Region. Paper submitted at the International Conference on The Role of Alternative 
Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation. 
127 For more information see: U.S. Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs. Merida Initiative at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/merida/ 
128 See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.46sq. 
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instance dramatically as “ (…) hundreds of thousands of people are spared from addiction and 
lives are saved”129
 
 which from a scientific view sounds quite dramatic and less analytical. 
However, even if counter-drug policies could not efficiently reduce drug consumption and 
supply, U.S. policy makers believe that Plan Colombia has helped to stabilize the country, to 
strengthen the state and to improve public security130. The at present lowest homicide rates in 
30 years, lowest unemployment and poverty rates in a decade, and constant economic growth 
illustrate the importance of counter-drug and development efforts and leave them 
unquestionable131
 
. 
Around 15 years ago the European Union and Latin America pointed out the importance of 
and strengthened the cooperation and coordination on drugs and trafficking between the them 
based on the High-Level Specialised Dialogue on Drugs between the EU and the Community 
of Andean Nations132 in 1995 and the Ministerial Meeting of the Rio Group133 and the EU in 
1996. However, coordination and cooperation is still unsatisfying within the EU member 
states. “European policy at home and abroad resembles less a mosaic in which a number of 
initiatives from a coherent picture than a patchwork of many, often divergent programs”134. 
Currently the EU is working to streamline the member state’s different approaches to deal 
with illegal drugs.135 It is hard to analysis or discuss European counter-drug policies since it is 
an area, which until recently did not really exist. Formally this is actually true. No EU policy 
on drugs does exist as there simply is no legal basis existing for policy development in this 
area because the subsidiarity principle is applied and there are no competencies given to 
supranational authorities. However the evolution of the beginning of a European policy 
perspective on drugs has already started and although no formal EU policy exists, the EU can 
take international action with a combination of political initiatives, like action plans, as well 
as assisting through development programmes.136
                                                 
129 National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.2. 
 There is a corporate EU Drugs Strategy for 
130 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.3 
131 Embassy of Colombia. Plan Colombia. 
132 Community of the Andean Nations-CAN: members are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Venezuela 
announced its withdrawal in April 2006. 
133 Rio Group: An international Organization of Latin American and some Caribbean countries created in 1986 
as an alternative body to the Organization of American States (OAS). Members are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
134 International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.8 
135 Ibid. P.8. See also: Crisis Group Interviews, European Council and Commission officials: Brussels. 21 
September, 3 October,9 November 2007. 
136 See Hughes, R./ Lart, R./ Higate, P. (2006). Drugs. Policy and Politics. Open University Press: Maidenhead. 
P. 113sq, 121sq. 
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2005-2012 serving as a basis for the EU action plan on drugs for 2005- 2008, and 2009-2012. 
The eight years strategy is based on the respective UN conventions137 and aims at adding 
value to the various national strategies of EU member states. It acknowledges the EU’s 
responsibility for the global drug problem and calls for a balanced approach combining 
demand and supply reduction and including consultation with a broad group of partners such 
as scientific centres, NGOs or civil society. The Union’s strategy in the field of international 
cooperation focuses on improvement of cooperation between its member states and between 
them and the Commission and on the promotion of a balance approach in international 
institutions. Also pointed out in a coordinated and more visible appearance of the EU on 
world stage, especially in international organizations. 138  The Unions drugs action plan 
identifies five priorities, and seems quite detailed and output oriented when presenting 
concrete objectives, actions, timetables, responsibilities, indicators and assessment tools. The 
five priorities are set on 1) improving coordination, cooperation and raising public awareness 
at both European and national level; 2) reducing demand for drugs, i.e. prevention, treatment 
and harm reduction; 3) reducing the supply for drugs through more effective law enforcement 
at EU level and better use of Europol and other EU structures, such as multidisciplinary law 
enforcement operations or establishment of regional security platforms; 4) improving 
international cooperation, including the promotion and implementation of alternative 
development ,and strengthening of cooperation within the EU and European Neighbourhood 
Policy countries; and 5) improving understanding of the problem through research, gathering 
of data of drug-related crime and supply market.139
 
 
As illustrated above the EU is currently very much focusing on the improvement of 
coordination and cooperation between EU member states and within the EU itself is of higher 
importance than cooperation efforts with the U.S. or other countries140. Attention is given to 
the development and establishment of a common approach to what has become a common 
problem. This is a good step, but it is uncertain how far this ongoing process will go. 
Cooperation on supply reduction and border control has become more complex but also more 
pressing.141
                                                 
137 Relevant UN Conventions will be presented in subchapter 4.1. 
 The current status quo of the Union’s common policy is simply not enough when 
facing the great extent of the global drug problem. 
138 See EU drugs strategy 2005-2012. P. 2-17. 
139 See EU drugs Action Plan for 2009-2012 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index66221EN.html  
140 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.9 
141 See Hughes, R./ Lart, R./ Higate, P. (2006). Drugs. Policy and Politics. Open University Press: Maidenhead. 
P. 122sq. 
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The current Counter-drug policy in Colombia is strongly linked to President Uribe’s 
Democratic Security Policy (DSP) and to the bilateral undertaking “Plan Colombia”, whose 
priorities had been addressed previously. Besides the “Direccion Nacional de 
Estupefacientes” 142 plays an important role in Colombian drug control as it coordinates and 
partly executes the central governments drug control efforts.143 Unfortunately and likely not 
to effectively support the overall development of the country and the provision of basic gods 
and alternative income for the rural population, around 10, 7$ billion were invested by the 
Colombian and U.S. government from 1999 to 2005 mainly for coca crops eradication 
through aerial spraying or manual means, the modernization of the security forces and the 
strengthening of institutions144. While only 863$ million were provided to USAID 2000-2007 
for alternative development and democracy programmes145
 
. 
The involvement of NGOs in the governments’ counter-drug efforts, in the assessment of the 
drug problem, the identification of solutions, and the implementation of policies and 
programmes is strongly encouraged by the UN General Assembly. It is highly recognized that 
NGOs play a key role in raising awareness, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and social re-
integration activities. According to the report of “Beyond 2008”146
                                                 
142 Direccion Nacional de Estupefacientes- National Directorate for Narcotic Drugs- is part of the Colombian 
Ministry of Interior and Justice. 
, a global forum on the 
1998-2008 of the UNGASS on illicit drugs, 37% of the partaking NGOs reported having been 
consulted or involved at some point in the preparation of a national drug strategy. 
Significantly fewer were involved in the monitoring or evaluation arrangements. Those who 
were provided epidemiological data and completed monitoring questionnaires, were 
represented in the monitoring group, or were invited to comment and respond to the 
monitoring report. As the actual situation at national and sub-national level almost in every 
case varies significantly local drug control strategies are developed at city, state, country or 
143 Its Plan Estrategico 2008-2010 focuses on a) strengthening of institutions; b) supply reduction through 
fighting money laundering, strengthening of international cooperation, analysis of cultivation, trafficking and 
eradication, and the improvement of information systems; and c) on demand reduction through public 
information.See Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia. Direccion de Estupefacientes. Planes at: 
http://www.dne.gov.co/?idcategoria=650 
144 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.16 according to Departamento Nacional de Planeacion (2006). 
Balance Plan Colombia 1999-2005. P. 11 at: 
www.dnp.gov.co/archivos/documentos/GCRP_Otros/BALANCE%20PLAN%20COLOMBIA%20%20septiemb
re%202006.pdf  
145 Ibid. P.16 according to Center for International Policy. Colombia Program. US Aid to Colombia since 1997. 
at: http://ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm  
146 For more information see: Vienna NGO Committee on Narcotic Drugs. Beyond 2008. at: 
http://www.vngoc.org/details.php?id_cat=8&id_cnt=27 
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regional levels. NGO often can contribute to this elaboration with certain assets that the 
central state might not possess as they gain first hand information and witness the impact of 
implemented strategies at the very first. According to the partaking NGOs in the “Beyond 
2008” summit certain strengths and weaknesses of the drug strategies in place in their country 
can be identified. There was considerably praise for the identification of specific target 
groups, the assessment of the drug problem, the clear statement of policy objectives, and for 
the consultation process during the preparation of the strategy. Less satisfaction was showed 
regarding clear allocation of responsibilities, and the adaption for changing needs. Significant 
insufficiencies were indicated concerning the allocation of resources needed to implement the 
strategy, the coordination between key partners, the involvement of identified target groups, 
and the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. NGOs also pointed out, that there is still an 
over-focus on dug supply reduction while demand reduction would still not be given the 
required attention and resources.147
 
 
A lot has been done so far. Numerous strategies, programmes and initiatives have been 
developed and implemented. However, both the U.S. and the European approach including 
Plan Colombia and the EU Drugs Strategy could not find the right mix of supply and demand 
reduction measures to fight and control the world drug problem effectively and the aspired 
objectives could not be realized. Concerning the EU it needs to be realized that as long as 
cooperation within the EU member states in still work in progress no solid and powerful 
cooperation between a second party such as Latin America can be successful.  
 
It has been made clear that a long term reduction of the world’s supply of coca depends not 
only on effective law enforcement, but also on eradicating poverty that makes farmers 
vulnerable to the temptation of growing lucrative illicit crops148
 
 or even forces them to do so 
as it is only possibility of income in order to provide the basic goods for their families. Such 
poverty reduction need to be planned an implemented in sustainable ways and will be 
discussed in the following chapter in the form of alternative development.  
It is required to deal with this serious problem with mutual actions. As reaffirmed during the 
63rd session of the 3rd committee of the UN General Assembly, “countering the world drug 
                                                 
147 See Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-
Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 
20th special Session of the General Assembly. at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-
Session51/CND-UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP12.pdf. P.3-8, 16sq. 
148 UNODC. 2007. P.III 
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problem is a common and shared responsibility (…) requires an integrated an balanced 
approach and must be carries out (…) with full respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of States (…) and for all human rights and fundamental freedoms (…)149. Interventions can 
only be successful if they are based on the recognition that North and South have a shared 
responsibility and may obtain shared benefits.150
 
 
Unfortunately “policy coordination between the U.S., Europe and Latin America is severely 
hampered by the marked differences on both how best to address the world’s overall drug 
problem and how to reduce cocaine supply, as well as by unrelated political disputes”151 as 
their perception of the problem differs largely between drugs as a law enforcement issue (US) 
and as a public health issue (EU).152 Tri-continental cooperation is required between North 
America, South America and Europe, but as pointed out in a crisis group report, Latin 
American countries are not much part of the debate about how counter-drug policy might be 
reformed and also turn a blind eye to the grave impact of increasing domestic use at home153. 
This needs to be changed in order to enable progress and sustainable achievement.154
 
 
As occurring by far too often in politics, national interests and priorities hinder the elaboration 
and realization of corporate initiatives. Shared experiences focusing on problems occurred or 
in attendance should be exchanged at a global level. According to the International Crisis 
Group, the United Nations should “conduct a rigorous and transparent evaluation, with civil 
society participation“155 in order to present and discuss the progress or regress made so far 
since the UNGASS156 on the world drug problem in 1998. Besides the UN would be able to 
serve as a forum and should focus on the promotion of the “establishment of new policy 
consensus (…) and strengthening cooperation and policy coordination between the U.S., 
Europe and Latin America source (…)” 157
                                                 
149 UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N08/591/67/PDF/N0859167.pdf?OpenElement. P. 3. 
. A strong involvement of international 
organizations and international cooperation is also pointed out in the EU drugs strategy 2005-
2012: “The global nature of the drugs problem calls for regional, international and multilateral 
150 Oomen. 2002. P. 3. 
151 International Crisis Group. 2008b. P. 1. 
152 Ibid. P. 40. 
153 International Crisis Group. 2008a. P. 2. 
154 Also see: National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P. 56 sq 
155 International Crisis Group. 2008b. P. IV. 
156 The United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the world drug problem in 1998 will be further 
discussed in subchapter 4.2.1. 
157 International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.IV. 
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approaches. (…) cooperation needs to be intensified, both bilaterally (between the Union and 
third countries) and within international organisations and fora”158
It needs to be kept in mind that counter-drug strategies, especially fighting trafficking should 
not be at the expense of the strengthening of state institutions and democracy, nor of the 
enhancement of human rights. That is because strong democracies can achieve more lasting 
results than weak and corrupt state systems and can build on the trust of their citizens.
. 
159
2.3.2 International Relations Theory meets Reality 
 
It is a fact that most of the time states cooperate with each other for mutual advantage. They 
carry on diplomatic relations and exchange knowledge and collaborate in order to make a 
strategic contribution to international freedom and progress and to deal with various common 
problems, such as the cultivation of and trafficking in illegal drugs. In that regard they 
commit themselves to international treaties and interact in accordance with norms of 
reciprocity.160
 
 
This can be explained the following way: the compliance results “from the fact that most 
treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the 
absence of an agreement161
 
. 
International relations have domestic roots and domestic consequences. That is why domestic 
politics, problems or requirements are of high importance to international institutions. There 
are often domestic requisites to joining or certain effects on internal arrangements 162 . 
Becoming a member of an international institution has the effect both of locking in domestic 
changes and of making credible a domestic commitment to a particular policy path163
                                                 
158 EU drugs strategy. 2005-2012. P.16 
 such as 
the commitment to counter-drug strategies. In addition international institutions, especially if 
159 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.37. 
160 See Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007). Introduction to International Relations. Theories and 
approaches. Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York. P. 26. 
161 Stein. 2008. P. 212 cit from Downs, G.W./ Rocke, D.M./Barsoom, P.N. (1996). Is the Good News about 
Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization:50. P.380. 
162 Ibid. P. 214 cit from Skalnes, L.S. (1998). From the outside in, form the inside out. NATO expansion and 
international relations theory. Security Studies: 7. P. 44-87. ; Kelley, J. (2004). International actors on the 
domestic scene. Membership conditionality and socialization by international institutions. International 
Organization: 58. P. 425-457. 
163 Stein. 2008. P. 215 cit from Pevehouse, J.C. (2002). With a little help form my friends? Regional 
organizations and the consolidation of democracy. American Journal of Political Science: 46. P.611-626. 
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they are part of the UN family, may provide a degree of legitimacy164 and make difficult 
domestic changes more palatable by providing political cover165
 
. 
Despite the traditionally realist view of our global system and the position taken by the United 
States government166 the importance of cooperation and co-working is pointed out in the 
annual report of the National Drug Control Strategy that “the old divisions between drug-
producing, transit, and consuming nations have broken down in today’s globalized world”.167
 
 
                                                 
164 Ibid. P. 215 cit from Franck, T.M. (1988). Legitimacy in the international system. American Journal of 
International Law: 82. P.705-759. 
165 Ibid. P. 215 cit from Vreeland, J.R. (2003). Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? 
Statistically selected cases. International Political Science Review: 24. P.321-343. 
166 Especially during the George W. Bush administration under which the discussed National Drug Control 
Strategy Report was elaborated. 
167 National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.56 
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3. Alternative Development 
As discussed earlier in chapter 2 drug control is not only about banning illicit substances and 
reducing cocaine demand and supply, but also and more importantly about offering 
sustainable ways in preventing coca cultivation through more ambitious alternative and rural 
development programs in the source countries. 
 
“(…) defining alternative development as a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit 
cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through 
specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national 
economic growth and sustainable development efforts (…) within the framework of a 
comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.”
Definition of Alternative Development: 
168
3.1 A Very Short History of AD 
 
Back in the 1970s the first alternative development projects where crop substituting ones, 
searching for more profitable licit crops, but unfortunately had very little success. By the mid 
1980s the concept was broadened to integral rural development, focusing on alternative 
income and local infrastructure, health, and education improvements. “Shared responsibility” 
between the north and the south was also a term of central importance the required 
strengthened efforts in demand reduction, money laundering and synthetic drug 
production. 169  CICAD 170  argued for multi-sectoral programmes and underlined the 
importance of the trust of the population and the need for complementary education 
programmes. Correspondingly early AD 171  programmes included the identification of 
subsidizing crops, technical assistance to process and market those crops, preservation of the 
environment, the development of infrastructure in coca growing regions, community 
development and employment programmes.172
                                                 
168 United Nations General Assembly (1998). 20th Special Session. 8-10 June 1998. World Drug Problem. 
 The 1990s showed the failure of AD efforts in 
the last decades as both consumption and production figures had risen dramatically. These 
169 See Jelsma. 2002. P. 14 sq. 
170 CICAD- the Organization of American States Drug Control Commission 
171 AD= Alternative Development 
172 See Thoumi, F. E.(2002). The Profitability of Illicit Crops and Alternative Development in Latin America. 
Paper presented at the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and 
Development Cooperation. 7-12 January 2002. P. 7 sq. 
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trends resulted in a polarization between supporter of a re-assessment of existing anti-drug 
policies and of re-affirmation of the agreed policies and its principles. It was then when 
today’s AD concept had been developed, that underlined the importance of a participatory 
approach. The local population should be incorporated in the decision-making process in 
order to assure the identification and consideration of specific needs. In addition the overall 
AD efforts should be linked to broader sustainable development goals. 173  Francisco 
Thoumi174 points out, that in the late 1990s many analysts agreed that AD programmes did 
not and do not contribute to lower drug production but they are necessary to appease coca 
farmers and are politically useful175
3.2 UNGASS Action Plan on Alternative Development 
. Farmers might not have stopped cultivating illicit drops, 
but they might have diversified their portfolio in order to minimize the risk. 
The necessity of “shared responsibility” had been pointed out continuously previous to and 
during the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the World Drug 
Problem in 1998. Producer and consumer countries should co-work in a balance approach and 
independent evaluation was needed. The main outcome and consequences for the AD field 
were 1) the “Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimination 176” (SCOPE), and 2) the 
“Action Plan on International Cooperation on Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on 
Alternative Development177
                                                 
173 See Jelsma. 2002. P.15. 
”. Originally SCOPE called for a balanced approach between law 
enforcement, alternative development and demand reduction, and aimed at eliminating the 
worldwide cultivation of coca bush and opium poppy within 10 years. The Action Plan had 
been elaborated on the basis of drafts from Colombia, the United States and the European 
Union. Meaning that, in respect to the present study, all important stakeholders on both the 
supply and demand side were involved in the elaboration. Besides as some coca growers do 
not completely abandon production voluntarily even if AD projects are successful they have 
to see the risk associated with illicit cultivation. Therefore law enforcement needs to be an 
174 Francisco E. Thoumi is professor at the Latin American and Caribbean Centre at Florida International 
University. 
175 Thoumi. 2002. P.8 cit from Joel, C. (1999). Tamanio y efecto macroeconomico de la industria de la 
coca/cocaine en la economia boliviana. In: Gamarra, E./Thoumi, F. eds. (1999). Drogsa ilicitas en Bolivia. 
UNDP: La Paz. And: Lee, R. III/ Clawson, P. (1993). Crop Substitution in the Andes. Office of National Drug 
Policy Control. 
176 Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimination- SCOPE- at: 
http://www.ungassondrugs.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=124&Itemid=78 
177 Action Plan on International Cooperation on Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative 
Development at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/alternative-development/UNGASSActionPlanAD.pdf 
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involved element.178
In addition the official statement of UNGASS on drugs does not make any special reference 
to local people’s empowerment in the context of AD. “(…) development efforts in countries 
taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular socio-cultural characteristics of the 
target communities and groups (…)”
 Unfortunately the dates set during UNGASS 1998 regarding successful 
illicit crop elimination already passed by and the aimed goals clearly could not be met. 
179. It rather points away from empowerment by defining 
local people as target groups, and the state remains responsible for national drug crop 
reduction programmes and plans.180
About a decade has pasted by since UNGASS in 1998 and the concept of AD has been 
adjusted within evident limitations as old and new challenges have to be met and certain 
elements had to become part of AD strategies. During the 51st session of the CND, ten years 
after UNGASS 1998, the international community assessed the progress made so far and 
discussed possible future steps
 
181
3.3 Assumptions, Elements and Challenges 
. Central documents and discussed issues will be discussed 
later on in this chapter. 
3.3.1 Basic Assumptions about Illicit Crop Cultivation and AD 
Originally Alternative Development has been formulated under several assumptions182
a. Farmers grow illicit crops because they are poor and have no alternative, 
: 
b. Farmers would forgo the illicit drug profits if they had a an other licit crop, 
c. Illicit crop growers are often victims of extreme poverty and inequality, 
d. Many have been displaced by economic crisis. 
However these assumptions might only be valid for some farmers and don’t explain why 
illicit crops are grown in certain countries at a certain time and in others not. For example is 
Colombia by far richer than Peru, Bolivia or Ecuador and nevertheless is the biggest 
cultivator and cocaine producer. Fact is that some large coca farmers are relatively rich183
                                                 
178 See Jelsma. 2002. 17 sqq. 
 and 
179 See UNGASS 1998. Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on 
Alternative Development. A/RES/S-20/4. General Assembly Special Session on Drugs: New York at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/20sp/a20spr04.htm 
180 Gebert/Rerkasem. 2002. P. 3. 
181 See UNGASS Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on 
Alternative Development. At: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/ungas-action-plan-
on-eradication-and-alternative-development.html  
182 Thoumi, F. 2002. P.1 according to: Thoumi, F. (1997). Drogas Illicitas en Colombia. Su impacto economico, 
politico y social. Direcion Nacional de Estupefacientes y PNUD- Editorial Planeta: Bogota 
183 Ibid. P.1 cit from Uribe, S. (1997). Los cultivso illicitos en Colombia. Evaluacion. Extension, tecnicas y 
tecnologias para la produccion y rendimientos y magnitud de la industria. In: Thoumi. 1997. 
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most people behind the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of cocaine are well educated and 
would have employment alternatives in the legal economy 184 . Of course poverty and 
inequality contribute to the growth of illicit crops but they are not the only or main 
determining factor. So was Colombia in the 1980s the only country in Latin America and the 
Caribbean that could avoid the external debt crisis faced by the region but nonetheless it was 
in Colombia where the big international trafficking organizations developed. According to 
this poverty and illicit behaviour are not necessarily linked one-to-one.185
So why are illicit crops cultivated and why not? The availability of natural resources 
determines whether a country can produce agriculture products like coffee, rice or wheat and 
almost every country cultivates the respective products that are within their possibilities. In 
contrast to these common or legal products numerous more country could grow illicit crops 
but don’t do so. From a purely economic perspective, the limited cultivation of illicit crops is 
quiet remarkable since it produces uncommonly high profits. According to standard 
economics and international trade theory models, any production process requires a set of 
factors of production. Such factors would be various types of capital and labour, natural 
resources and technology and their relative abundance determine what products can or should 
be produced.
 
186
In order to explain the spatial distributions of coca cultivation it is necessary to focus on the 
differences between illicit and licit products and their organizational environment: Isolation, 
underdevelopment and poverty, lack of markets, possible ethnic unrest, and absence of basic 
infrastructure are the reality of illicit crop growing areas
 
187
                                                 
184 Ibid. P.1 cit from Hernandez, M. (1997). Comportamientos y busquedas alrededor del narcotrafico. In: 
Thoumi. 1997. 
 and almost a precondition to it. In 
addition there are certain tasks required by the people involved in the illicit cultivation that is 
not required in the licit one such as undetected growing of illicit crops, successful trading and 
smuggling of illicit products, developing of drug manufacturing systems or laundering of 
illegal obtained funds. These tasks require special illegal skills and the development of illegal 
business organizations which is almost impossible in most countries where the social, 
political and economic system is controlled and secured by the central state. What is of central 
importance in the comparison of licit and illicit crop production and business is that 
profitability and the availability of natural resources are necessary elements for both but not 
necessarily sufficient in the case of illicit crops. That way the existence of massive illicit crop 
185 Ibid. P.1 sqq. 
186 Ibid. P.3 sqq. 
187 UNGASS Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on 
Alternative Development. At: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/ungas-action-plan-on-
eradication-and-alternative-development.html  
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cultivation is only manageable in countries where the central state has no control over its 
territory or countries with open civic conflict.188 Drugs are produced in areas where political 
framework conditions are not met, the state has very weak or no control, as it is the case in 
areas inhabited by ethnic minorities in Pakistan and Southeast Asia or in Colombia, where 
guerrilla groups developed their activities in those parts of the country where state presence 
was and is lacking.189
3.3.2 Core Elements of AD 
 
As the combination of violence, corruption, patronage systems and poor economic conditions 
often result in dependence of rural population on illicit crop cultivation 190
1. Local/ Regional focused Strategies, 
, a number of 
requirements need to be met in order to limit cultivation and to secure effective production 
and marketing of AD products: 
2. Participatory Approach and Trust between Beneficiaries and Implementing Agencies, 
3. Rural and Community Development, 
4. Agro-Industrial Development and Product Marketing, 
5. Strengthening the State, 
6. Environmental Protection, 
7. Harm Reduction Approach, 
8. Monitoring and Evaluation 
As there is no clear correlation between poverty, inequality, economic crisis, corruption and 
development the development of sustainable and wide-ranging alternative development 
strategies faces big difficulties. Any anti-drug policy should be based on the understanding of 
the institutions and social structure of the respective country where it is applied
Ad 1) Local/ Regional focused Strategies 
191
 
 and has to 
be as diverse as the communities they are assisting. 
As pointed out before AD is about creating the economic and social conditions under which 
farmers or rural population can attain an acceptable standard of living- a standard acceptable 
Ad 2) Participatory Approach and Trust between Beneficiaries and Implementing Agencies 
                                                 
188 Ibid. P. 6. 
189 Heinz, W. S. (2002). The Potential of Alternative Development in Conflict management. Paper prepared for 
the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development 
Cooperation: Feldafing. P. 5, 11. 
190 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P. 39. 
191 See Thoumi. 2002. P. 6 sq. 
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for them- without having to cultivate illicit crops. But these households should have choices 
and control during the substitution and development process and should be part of the 
decision-making processes that determine their future lives. They should be empowered. 
Unfortunately empowerment is a very slippery concept and not easy to apply in concrete and 
efficient measures. However, a crucial aspect of it is the implicit idea of disempowering those 
who already have power to exercise adequate choices in their lives. This can and should 
happen at different levels, starting from the individual, a group, the community, up to 
institutions. Participation can also happen in a passive way by simply complying with certain 
activities and strategies. But participation should be active, including the marginalized and 
most vulnerable, and determine the activities of a project, the planning and evaluation, and the 
respective policy frameworks. Both the failures and successes of AD so far demonstrate the 
need for participation and empowerment in the beneficiaries’ community. As empowerment is 
about people, they need to have direct and effective say about their socio-economic 
development, about the goals and timeframes of AD. But these components have already been 
fixed by governments and donors on higher political levels, so that people are left with very 
little choice. Even if schedules and activities are decided or agreed by leaders of local 
institutions it doesn’t mean that they represent a majority of the AD beneficiaries. 
Consequently the room for community participation and empowerment is very limited.192 
“Traditional cultivators need to be given the time to decide for themselves if they want to 
reduce cultivation (…) and what constitutes an acceptable quality of living”193
According to the final report of a global thematic evaluation of AD carried out by the UN in 
2005, “AD policies had been more efficient when all major stakeholders, including 
governments, donors, non-governmental organizations and beneficiaries had been involved in 
their formulation and when those policies allowed for decentralised decision-making, 
empowering local communities and were flexible enough to adapt to local contexts”
. 
194 . 
Especially a broad participation of the local population, being peasant federations, producers’ 
associations, or social organizations need to be part of the design and implementation of 
projects.195
                                                 
192 See Gebert, R./Rerkasem, K. (2002). Community Empowerment in Alternative Development. Prerequisite for 
Success or Mutually Exclusive Concepts? Paper for the International Conference on The Role of Alternative 
Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation. 7-12 January 2002: Berlin, Chiang Mai. P. 1-6.  
 However, unfortunately, “despite all rhetoric such programmes arrive usually top-
193 Ibid. P. 7. 
194 UN Economic and Social Council (2008). The World Drug Problem. Fifth Report of the Executive Director. 
Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Crops and on Alternative Development. at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V07/892/21/PDF/V0789221.pdf?OpenElement. P. 10 sq. according 
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195 Oomen. 2002. P. 2. 
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down in an ambiguous context of sticks and carrots (meaning eradication, interdiction, 
penalisation of consumers, ect.)”196
 
. 
According to an interview hold with USAID officials by the Crisis Group 197  effective 
alternative development and rural development requires the full cooperation of peasant 
families. Critics argue that alternative development has suffered form eradication operations 
rather than acting as a complement in the same overalls strategy, that project’s objectives have 
been short-sighted and isolated from overall development efforts, and that local organizations 
have not been considered as a partner.198 Unfortunately aerial spraying does most likely result 
in resistance. It is no secret that aerial spraying has also eradicated legal crops near coca 
growing areas and resulted in farmers abandoning their land, and repeatedly migrating to coca 
growing regions.199It is easy to see the negative side of aerial spraying, the often negative 
consequences for the rural population 200
The United Nations Drug Control Programme already warned in the late 1990s that “the 
relationship of trust that must exist in any development process between the stimulating 
agents and the beneficiaries (...) requires that, in the field, AD and prohibition are separate 
although the general link between them is recognized”
, and the problem of the balloon effect. Forced 
eradication can be an effective tool deployment in regions controlled by FARC and 
paramilitary groups when it comes to short term limitation of coca cultivation and 
consequently of available financial resources, but it is simply contra productive to the 
building of trust and the necessary cooperation between citizens and government entities or 
third actors. The caused threats or even violent image of foreign development aid that can 
evolve from forced eradication with law enforcement and military involvement needs to be 
prevented as they cause nothing but fierce resistance from beneficiaries and do only hinder 
possible change. 
201
Besides or maybe because the problematic of aerial spraying and its negative consequences to 
trust in government agencies, cooperation with civil society and NGOs in AD programmes is 
. 
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198 Oomen. 2002. P. 3. 
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a key element for the of building of a strong partnership and trust202. NGOs can provide 
unique inputs to the elaboration of AD strategies and their implementation as they face reality 
at the grass roots level and witness first hand the impact of national strategies, laws and 
policies.203 It is necessary not to mix repression with development as development is hardly 
possible when imposed upon people.204
 
 
Of course it is possible to motivate people to eradicate their coca cultivation via negative 
incentives such as law enforcement or the military. This would be the good old “carrot and 
stick” approach. But this is neither empowering, nor does it require or help build up 
community institutions. But community development is one of the most important 
components and requirements for AD and development in general. Beneficiaries must have 
shared, positive visions and goals of what they want to achieve in their communities. They 
need to be given more space to decide how they want to organize and represent themselves. 
NGOs and activist academics that are at the forefront are often very qualified to assist local 
people and their communities to open a dialogue with their government and policy-makers 
and bring the community to a larger region and the nation
Ad 3) Rural and Community Development 
205. Target groups not only need to 
have greater voice within AD projects, but also in the larger socio-political and economic 
context.206 To support and assure these essentials, a structured assessment of local needs, the 
application of a tested theoretical model, and clear objectives and beneficiaries are 
required.207
 
 This issue will be further discussed in point 7, local/ regional focused strategies. 
Institutions and mechanisms to support community-based drug control need to be create or 
strengthened as weak institutional capacities, infrastructure and coordination between public 
and private sector are considered both as cause and consequence of illicit cultivation.208
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Taking a look at the lessons learned and experiences in the past one has to admit that the 
negative lessons unfortunately outweigh the positive as AD efforts have largely been 
accompanied by the threat of enforcement, the so-called carrot and stick approach, which is 
largely demeaning and manipulative. Obviously it did not result in the building of social 
capital or a strengthened society.209
 
 
Concerning the economic dimension of alternative development it needs to be considered that 
coca growing regions are usually very far from established markets and any larger city, and 
they have to face high transportation costs. This is especially a problem in Colombia where 
very little infrastructure is available. In addition many products require special handling, 
refrigeration or likewise. Unluckily rural development and the provision of infrastructure not 
only assist and benefit legal AD production but also illicit production at the same time.210
 
 
The existence and further development of communal organizations are central to agro-
industrial development, but unfortunately very less developed in Colombia. “Products in 
Colombia must build such organizations virtually from scratch”
Ad 4) Agro-Industrial Development and Product Marketing 
211
 
. 
According to Mr. Jorge Rios, Chief of the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit, UNODC, and the 
alternative development world has progressed. Slowly, but has. The marketing component is 
of highest importance of the assurance of sustainability and effectiveness. Otherwise some 
person here at UNODC headquarters in Vienna who designs projects will say: “Ok, let’s do 
an AD project in Colombia. Let’s have the farmers in San Jose grow Egyptian tomatoes 
instead of coca. Let’s give money for that.” so Mr. Jorge Rios. Consequently the basics: 
market driven products and possibilities in the field became very significant.212
 
 
Unfortunately, from a marketing point of view coca poppy is by far more attractive than any 
other licit product. This makes a substitution especially difficult. In that respect CICAD 
pointed out that “if alternative development programmes were to succeed, it was necessary to 
study the markets for their products”213
                                                 
209 See Gebert/ Rerkasem. 2002. P. 12 sq. 
. Consequently it is essential to promote productive 
activities that are market-oriented, but take into account those products that are known to the 
210 See Thoumi. 2002. P. 9 sqq. 
211 Ibid. P.11 cit from Lee/Clawson. 1993. P. 9. 
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local population and relate to their culture and experience. Simultaneously the capacity of the 
local, regional and national market should be strengthened before export-oriented initiatives 
can be considered214. That also means, that crops should be promoted that are consumed in 
the local and regional markets.215 Later on, states not effected by illicit drug crop cultivation 
and the private sector should provide better access to markets for AD products216 and perhaps 
microcredit for illicit crop growers attempting to switch to legal crops can be provided as part 
of alternative development programmes217
 
. 
Colombia faces the most obstacles in AD than other countries in the Andean region for a 
number of reasons. Illicit crops grow often extremely far from existing markets and there is 
very little infrastructure for transportation. In addition many coca cultivation regions are 
under guerrilla or paramilitary control. Consequently the strengthening of the central state in 
Colombia has to be a core element in any AD strategy designed for Colombia. 
Ad 5) Strengthening the State 
 
Illicit crop cultivation and drug production have many negative effects on the environment, 
such as overexploitation of forest resources and the pouring of waste products into rivers. 
Therefore AD projects should include environmental restoration components and need to 
incorporate environmental sustainability and protection into their projects aiming at 
developing economic and social infrastructure.
Ad 6) Environmental Protection 
218
 
 
Through harm reduction measures AD can be de-linked from the most repressive parts of 
drug control on the supply side. Most importantly it needs to be realized, that illicit crop 
Ad 7) Harm Reduction Approach 
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215 Oomen. 2002. P. 2. 
216 UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 30. 
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og illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 3. 
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cultivation will continue to stay as long as demand exists. The goal of eradication and 
counter-drug strategies should not be the quantitative elimination of coca cultivation, but the 
reduction of harm associated with it. New spaces of dialogue with the involved communities 
have to be opened in order to elaborate ways of gradual reduction of illicit cultivation 
accompanied with activities that reduce the harm of monodependence or of problems related 
to local abuse. The environmental dimension and the damages done by illicit cultivation 
should also be taken into consideration -harm reduction can also be applied there. Moreover 
there are currently various ideas of linking harm reduction on the demand and the supply side. 
Accordingly raw materials from indigenous communities could supply the heroin 
maintenance programmes in Europe, further it could be differentiated between specific 
substances and their possible harm, allowing coca products to be exported to international 
markets.219
According to Mr. Julio Mollinedo Claros, Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the 
United Nation in Vienna, the use of the coca plant for the production of legal products, and 
for the use of drugs in drug substitution programmes in consumer countries is a very good 
idea. Unfortunately, the coca leave is illegal and banned based on the UN Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs
 
220 from 1961. The convention is binding for all countries and its content is 
neither questioned nor discussed at the moment. Consequently, until the coca leave is made 
legal the import or export of the coca leave is prohibited on a global level any such 
undertakings are unfeasible. 221
 
 
Monitoring of the project is an indispensible element of effective project implementation as it 
enables the detection of intended and unintended consequences of project activities.
Ad 8) Monitoring and Evaluation 
222
The evaluation of any kind of project is a central key to the success of future activities and 
need to be incorporated into every alternative development project. An assessment of the 
success or failure of AD projects should normally be based on data collected among their 
main target group: coca growing farmers. The increase, stabilization or decrease of life 
standards, taking into account that an increase is the main reason for initiating the 
collaboration, should be identified.
 
223
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223 See Oomen. 2002. 
 50 
According to an analysis presented at the 51st session of the CND 23 of 105 reporting states 
(2006-2007), compared to 17 states (1998-2000), indicated having systems to monitor and 
evaluate the qualitative and quantitative impact of programmes for AD and the eradication of 
illicit crops. The central reasons for not having such systems are the lack of technical 
expertise and of financial resources, so the reporting states. Concerning the assessment of AD 
programmes it has been recommended 224  to use socio-economic parameters. Human 
development indicators, including education, health, employment, the environment, 
institution-building and governmental capacity, have to be part of national and internationally 
agreed action plans in order to get a picture of the actual development progress made so far.225
 
 
According to the discussed literature all this special requirements have been identified already 
about a decade ago. But due to various obstacles and problems in the design and 
implementation process of alternative development programmes and strategies present AD 
projects have not performed especially well on these criteria .The aspired change takes time as 
it is the case in most development efforts. 
3.3.3 Core Challenges and Problems 
The following chapter will present the most important challenges and problems to an efficient 
and sustainable implementation of AD in the Andean region with special focus on Colombia. 
There are a great number of obstacles that need to be overcome:226
1. Identification of Adequate Licit Crops 
 
2. Sustainment of Licit Cultivation 
3. Lack of Trust in Government or Project Partner 
4. Complex Conflicts 
5. Lack of Security for All Actors Involved 
6. Financial Constrains 
It is difficult to identify licit crops or rural activities that would generate the same income 
level as illicit crops. In addition illegal crops have a secure market without great fluctuations 
Ad 1) Identification of Adequate Licit Crops 
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and almost no competition. Moreover AD programmes require investments in regions where 
businesses would normally not invest and farmers do not have the necessary economic skills. 
For instance are farmers not used to care about sophisticated packing or handling or strict 
quality control techniques.227
 
 
Even if eradication and crop substitution are successful, illegal coca prices just go up and 
generate new cultivations elsewhere which is knows as balloon effect. And even if a suitable 
and profitable licit crop is found traffickers can increase the crop price since coca costs 
account for less than one percent of the cocaine street price in the U.S. In addition crop 
substitution is very vulnerable to a reversal due to the short nature of the coca crop.
Ad 2) Sustainment of Licit Cultivation 
228
 
 
Besides, law enforcement efforts possess the ability to weaken trafficking structures and have 
impact on cultivation patterns and price developments within a region. However, they cause 
only temporary disruptions in the illicit economy and cultivation displacements due to high 
flexibility of the illicit drug market.229
 
 
Coca farmers do not trust the government or strangers and often need to be talked into 
planting and to them alien crop. In addition illicit crop substitution is often executed through 
law enforcement, which is often associated with repressive measures. One alternative would 
be to target drug-law enforcement more clearly at improving governance, including the rule of 
law, human rights, transparency and accountability or the control of organized crime. 
Otherwise, and currently happening, the fight against drugs can be used to move against 
political opponents or delay political reforms and cause the limitation of human rights
Ad 3) Lack of Trust in Government or Project Partner 
230.231 
The ideal situation would be to “ensure that law enforcement activities in illicit crop 
cultivation areas contribute to the building of trust between the local communities and the 
authorities (…) law enforcement should be considered a supportive factor in the context of 
overall socio-economic development”232
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However this is only an idea which is currently far away from reality since aerial spraying can 
cause serious negative side effects as illustrated in the following example: On 2 august 2001, 
two interesting news items appeared in the same edition of the daily “El Espectador”233: U.S. 
ambassador Annie Patterson warned that fumigation of coca plants should not be stopped 
because this might lead many in Congress to demand the termination of the U.S. aid package, 
while in the same edition the German embassy is reported to have drawn attention of the 
Colombian government to the fact that GTZ two projects had suffered again from fumigation, 
which constitutes a serious risk for the continuation of the projects234
 
. 
In an alternative development context four general types of conflict can be distinguished. 
Ad 4) Complex Conflicts 
1. Conflict around AD programmes as a consequence of differences of opinion on 
implementation, on certain program activities, on state repression, or on distribution of 
program benefits, etc. This probably the main area for conflict management. Differences 
in the assessment of project progress, or distribution of benefits can be emerge and need 
to be solved expeditiously in order not to threaten the overall project success or its 
continuation. 
2. Selective violence by social movements in the context of social vindication. Here the 
obvious link can be made to protests of coca peasants, e.g. in Colombia or Bolivia, 
which try to negotiate policies that differ from government programs. 
3. Violence in the context of organized crime and crime. Drug prevention programmes can 
help to lower crime rates. It is estimated that about 90% of violent deaths in Colombia 
are non-political cases. Among different potential target groups, work with youth and 
different sectors of women is promising. 
4. Armed conflict with objective to bring down the government and/or to control territory. 
Here focus should be given to the strengthening of local organization of communities 
through capacity building, improved infrastructure, and productive activities. The role of 
technical cooperation is to 1) provide direct support for state institutions, NGOs and 
communities active in this environment, and 2) support internally displaced people and 
victims of violence, as well as re-integration of members of violent groups (guerrilla, 
etc.).235
                                                 
233 El Espectador at: http://www.elespectador.com/  
 
234 Heinz. 2002. P. 13 according to El Espectador. 02.08.2001 at: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias. 
235 Ibid. P. 6 sq., 17 sqq.; P. 19 according to Anderson, M. B. (1999). Do not harm. How Aid can support Peace- 
or War. Boulder: Co. 
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Currently there is a definite lack of security available for people involved with alternative 
development. Especially rural population and NGO staff is victims to threats made against 
them from drug trafficking and organized crime groups.
Ad 5) Lack of Security for All Actors Involved 
236  Even members of involved 
government authorities and international organizations staff that are under the supervision of 
special security mechanisms237
 
 are subject to security risks and sometimes even harm. The 
risk for unprotected individuals is consequently relatively high and sometimes limits their 
possibilities and the intensity of their engagement. 
In the mentioned analysis presented at the 51st session of the CND 31% of the respondents 
cited financial constraints as being the greatest obstacle to the implementation of alternative 
development programmes. In the cited analysis 32 states indicated financial constrains a as 
difficulty, but only 10 reported having negotiated financial assistance for AD and eradication 
programmes with international financial institutions or regional development banks. And only 
5 cited receiving actually support. According to the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
Commission of the Organization of American States (CICAD
Ad 6) Financial Constrains 
238) various factors, including 
the unreliability of funding sources, had affected the implementation and sustainability of AD 
programmes in the region. In addition the lack of coordination of AD policies in the region 
was another common problem.239
Apparently the distribution and provision of financial resources for the substitution and 
eradication of illicit crops regarding its scope on an international level has been focusing on 
law enforcement, interdiction, especially in the case of Colombia with extremely high 
financial assistance coming form to U.S. through Plan Colombia. However, financial 
shortfalls are not the central problem or reason for inefficiency and the continuation of past 
and present problems faced in the implementation of AD. 
 
 
Considering all these challenges to AD, coca cultivation is just the easier thing. Consequently 
it requires very strong and sharp efforts and strategies to achieve and secure sustainable 
                                                 
236 Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-
Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 
20th special Session of the General Assembly. P. 10. 
237 For more information see: UN Department of Safety and Security at: https://dss.un.org/dssweb/  
238 Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Commission- CICAD at: http://www.cicad.oas.org/ 
239 UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 14 sqq. 
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development and efficient substitution of coca crops. Of course this can not be the duty of the 
cultivation country or even the local government alone, but rather the responsibility of the 
global community. Not because of our moral responsibility, but because of the great 
dimension of this undertaking and anything but a corporate approach to coca cultivation and 
the illicit businesses connected to it would result in pure failure as history has repeatedly 
proven. 
3.4 Present AD Strategies in International Cooperation 
3.4.1 Present AD Strategies of Core Actors 
As illustrated in chapter 2.4 the United States have always been focusing on counter-drug-
supply strategies, focusing on the eradication of coca crops and strong law enforcement 
components. Its alternative development efforts have been of mediocre importance. However, 
AD programmes financed by the U.S. Agency for International development (USAID240) 
include community infrastructure, education and health and voluntary agreements to not grow 
coca and eradicate existing fields. USAID programme in Colombia builds on the three pillars: 
economic growth, agriculture and trade and runs a budget of about 80,000,000 USD per year. 
USAID's alternative development program focus on the provision of licit income and 
employment opportunities for farmers engaged in illicit crop cultivation and the provision of 
assistance for the development of social and productive infrastructure as a means for 
improving access to markets and services. The programme includes the following major 
assistance areas241
- Develop and Expand Economic and Social Alternatives (about 55% of budget): 
Agricultural and non-agricultural economic alternatives that provide legal income and 
employment alternatives are provided through technical assistance. Non-agricultural 
activities will include support to small and medium-sized private enterprises to generate 
employment and to help them become more competitive, thus increasing their capacity 
to create licit employment. 
: 
- Expand and Improve Rural Economic and Social Infrastructure: Technical and financial 
support is provided to build or rehabilitate infrastructure such as local rural roads and 
associated bridges, school facilities, rural health clinics, and potable water systems in 
remote regions of the country to generate new jobs and improve access to basic 
services. 
                                                 
240 USAID at: http://www.usaid.gov/ 
241 The following assistance areas are listed according to the size of budget in decreasing order. 
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- Improve Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Environment: Sustainable 
production through agro-forestry systems is provided through technical assistance and 
training. Activities are implemented in or near national parks to improve the overall 
management of the Colombian park system to better protect its resources and improve 
visitor services, and also continues to work with indigenous communities in protecting 
the environment and indigenous cultures. 
- Support Democratic Local Government and Decentralization: The local governance 
program provides technical assistance to enhance the capacity of municipalities to 
deliver services and to strengthen their fiscal conditions by increasing their revenues 
through the updating of cadastres and municipal tax codes. 
- Strengthen National and Local Economic Institutions: The overall objective is the 
promotion of a strengthened Government of Colombia's National Alternative 
Development Plan in the areas of planning, implementing, monitoring, and 
evaluating.242
 
 
Further it seams that the U.S. has somehow realized the importance of AD and former U.S. 
President George W. Bush signed a law as part of an omnibus appropriations bill, that 
provides a near 50% increase in alternative development funding for Colombia beyond the 
administration’s request, with a commensurate reduction in military aid funds and also very 
important a number of additional conditions for the use of aerial spraying243. At the same time 
is was argued that Colombia’s own budget for rural poverty reduction are too low, especially 
in areas with coca cultivation244
 
.  
The European Union is currently focusing on alternative development in cooperation with 
third countries, strengthening communities and income generating programmes in the Andean 
drug source countries Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. According to the current EU Drugs Action 
Plan the financial support for the implementation of AD projects and programmes should be 
increased and should be included into the broader development agenda of EU member states. 
Further should third countries be encouraged to integrate AD in their development policies, 
                                                 
242 See USAID Alternative Development Programme for Colombia at: 
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/pdf/co514-008.pdf 
243 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.4 according to Foreign Operations and Related Programs FY 2008. 
Congressional Research Service Report for the Congress. At: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34023.pdf.  
244 Ibid. P. 4 according. to World Bank (2005). Beyond the City. The Rural Contribution to Development. At: 
http://web.worldbank.org  
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and new initiatives, including legal support and sustainable livelihoods, should be formulated 
in order to reduce poverty, conflict and vulnerability.245
 
 
However, according to interviews made by crisis group with European Council and 
Commission officials this is “important but in the final analysis not much more than a drop in 
the ocean”246. Unlike the United States the EC247 and EU member states do not support and 
execute forces eradication of coca cultivation but focus on the identification of secure 
alternative income for farmers and the development of social and economic infrastructure 
through alternative development248.249
The European Commission Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 is focusing at the 
following priorities: a) economic and social development and poverty alleviation, b) 
alternative development, c) support for the reform of the judicial system, d) support for the 
promotion of human rights, and e) humanitarian aid for victims of the internal conflict. The 
current strategy aims to combat drugs via alternative development programmes, programmes 
for peace and greater political dialogue. It points out, that development is also conditional on 
economic and commercial development. Consequently the EU strategy will support the 
process of reactivating the Colombian economy and integrating it into the world economy. 
Measures to promote competitiveness in the rural environment and projects in the fields of 
alternative development, and technology transfer will be applied in this undertaking. Integral 
Local Development, building institutional capacity, support for basic infrastructure, culture of 
legality and social and human development to encourage job creation at local level and 
alternative development in areas where illicit crops are cultivated is one of the core elements. 
According to the strategy, alternative development measures will be promoted to become an 
important component of the peace and economic development initiatives. Of course they need 
to be accompanied by the provision of outlets for products emanating from alternative 
development areas where production projects are set up to combat illicit crops. In addition the 
environmental impact needs to be taking into account as anti-drug measures could have, 
particularly in cases where deforestation and pesticides are used, long-lasting negative side 
  
                                                 
245 See EU drugs action plan 2009-2012. P.15 
246 International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.9 according to Crisis Group interview. European Council and 
Commission officials: Brussels. 21 September and 3 October 2007. 
247 EC- European Commission 
248 Crisis Group Interview. European Commission official: Brussels. 3 October 2007. Besides: For 2007-2013 
the EC allocated 160€ million for Colombia, consisting of  70% for the promotion of peace and stability, 
including alternative development and a third peace laboratory, and 30% for human rights, justice, and 
productivity, competitivness and trade initiatives. 
249 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.9-12. 
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effects. To the effect environment concerns have formed an integral part of the alternative 
development projects.250
 
 
As pointed out in the mentioned analysis presented in the 5th report of the Executive Director 
during the 51st session of the CND, an increased proportion of states compared to the first 
reporting period for 1998-2000 indicated that their AD programmes supported participatory 
approaches, incorporated the gender dimension and environmental considerations, gave 
consideration to the poorest and most vulnerable and included measures to reduce illicit drug 
demand.251
 
 This is positive notice, but unfortunately such rates tend to fluctuate and can not 
be taken as indicators for the meeting of programme objectives and the aspired change in 
society. 
According to the thematic debate of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its 49th session, 
UNODC’s strategy should follow “an integrated approach that required a mixture of 
comprehensive activities including sustainable development efforts, demand reduction, 
interdiction and law enforcement measures, in compliance with human rights obligations”252. 
As already indicated before the UN and its drug control programme253
3.4.2 International Cooperation 
 has been criticized in 
the scholastic discussion for its support of law enforcement and interdiction as certain illicit 
crop substitution or eradication concept regard such measures as being repressive and 
unsustainable. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s strategy, programme and its work in the 
field of alternative development will be examined closer in chapter 4. 
Despite the title of the present study “Multilateral Cooperation in Alternative Development” 
the following subchapter will present and discuss cooperation on a global level in general as 
knowledge about existing cooperation forms enables comparison and understanding of the 
greater context, and provides a basis for further considerations. 
 
                                                 
250 See European Commission. Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/colombia/csp/07_13_en.pdf 
251 UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 16.  
252 Ibid. P. 11 sq. according to Official Records of the Economic and Social Council (2006). Supplement No. 8 
(E/2006/28). Chap. II. Para18 at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V06/526/23/PDF/V0652623.pdf?OpenElement 
253 UNDCP is part of UNODC. 
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During the 51st session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs254 an analysis based on reports 
questionnaires provided by UN member states on international cooperation on the eradication 
of illicit drug crops and on alternative development was presented. 105 responses were 
submitted by member states from all world regions. 42% of respondents stated that they had 
national plans or programmes including alternative development to reduce and eliminate 
illicit crop cultivation. Compared with the first reporting period 1998-2000 that represented 
an increase of 13%255. Concerning international cooperation efforts in AD 21 states reported 
to having provided assistance to in AD to other states on a bilateral, regional or multilateral 
basis during the years 2006 and 2007. UNODC has been the central UN organization 
providing multilateral AD assistance256. In recent year so called emerging national donors 
such as Bolivia, Colombia and Peru have substantially increased their national budget 
allocations for AD programmes. Besides financial assistance for AD programmes several 
states cooperate and assist through the sharing of information or other cooperation 
agreements.257
 
 
Regarding Colombia, it is recognized both at the regional and the global level that the 
country’s problems are of international importance. The Colombian agenda coincides with the 
international agenda that there is great need to address the critical human rights situation, 
environmental ravages, violent human displacement, and the global drugs problem. In the 
Latin American region neighbouring countries have increasingly voiced concerns about the 
cross-border effects of these issues, and the consequences of the Colombian drug problem. 
For instance has Venezuela become the main corridor for illegal trafficking, as well as a 
destination for injured guerrillas and paramilitaries requiring hospital treatment. The 
Venezuelan government has however refused to contribute to interdiction efforts. Brazil, and 
to a lesser degree Peru have experienced problems relating to the drug trade and local 
guerrilla activity, and Ecuador has also recently been accused of allowing the supply of arms, 
munitions and explosives to the guerrillas and paramilitaries.258
 
 
                                                 
254 51st Commission on Narcotic Drugs at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/session/51.html 
255 The remaining 58% reported not having such programmes or plans, however some of these states indicated 
that the question was not applicable because there is no illicit crop cultivation or no significant one on their 
territory. Other states indicated that small areas with illicit cultivation were addressed through regular law 
enforcement.  
256 States including Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America have provided assistance in Asia and Latin America.  
257 See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 8 sq., 13 sq. 
258 See Conciliation Resources (2004). The Role of the International Community in Colombia at: http://www.c-
r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/role-international-community.php 
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In general, the coca crop cultivating countries in the region, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 
should develop regional cooperation mechanisms that include the exchange of experience in 
the areas of alternative development and eradication, the sharing of intelligence on trafficking 
flows and the undertaking of joint operations259
 
. 
The former Colombian government defined an “international cooperation strategy of 
Colombia”, is giving priority to six thematic areas for action: (1) forestry; (2) reincorporation 
into civilian life; (3) consolidation of the social rule of law and human rights; (4) productive 
and alternative development; (5) regional programmes for development and peace; (6) forced 
displacement and humanitarian aid.260
 
  
A discussed before the United States cooperation with the Colombian government through 
Plan Colombia generated a strong reaction from the rest of the international community 
because of the weight of US military aid to Colombia, the Andean Region and the Caribbean.  
However, in 2008 the United States elaborated a proposal for consideration in the UNGASS 
review where it pointed out that significant progress has been made so far, but more 
importantly discussed important limitations and challenges. According to the United States 
the full implementation of the UNGASS Action Plan has been delayed because of 1) lack of 
political will and adequate national drug control legislation, 2) insufficient security and 
governance, 3) the enormous damaging effects of illicit drug production on the environment, 
4) increased aggressive efforts by drug trafficking organizations to maintain the illicit sector, 
5) continued global consumption, and 6) the lack of a coordinated approach to AD, including 
local government and the civil society. To that effect the provision of security and support in 
good governance to promote AD and the elimination of illicit drug crops is of central 
importance. In addition the development of a resource mobilization plan for eradication and 
AD is proposed.261
 
 
The EU still refuses to contribute to the military budget and instead is directing its support to 
the defence of human rights and international humanitarian law, and initiatives aimed at 
                                                 
259 UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. 29. 
260 See European Commission. Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/colombia/csp/07_13_en.pdf. P. 19. 
261 See UNODC. Open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the 
eradication of illicit crops and on alternative development. U.S. Proposal for Consideration in the UNGASS 
Review. 2-4 July 2008, Vienna. At: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND_UNGASS_EWG/CND_UNGASS_EWG_2-
4July08/UNODC_CND2008WG3_CRP2E.pdf  
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supporting the internally displaced and alternative development. Despite these evident 
differences in national strategies and objectives, the continuation of multilateral initiatives to 
fight the drugs problem is essential. 262  The differences between the European and U.S. 
American approach is also illustrated in a paper prepared by the EC, FAO, GTZ and UNODC 
for the CND 51st session. There it is pointed out that eradication should not be undertaken 
until households have viable and sustainable livelihoods. Further development assistance 
should not be conditional on reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation.263
 
 
Considered realistically such recommendations and guidelines are not realized in the field the 
way they are formulated by any development agency. One could say paper doesn’t blush, and 
in the end such guiding principles meet reality with all its challenges and limitations and have 
to do the best out of it. However, the current U.S. strategy264
 
 is inter alia because of its strong 
military and law enforcement involvement and measures such as “voluntary eradication” the 
most distant to these ideas. 
In the context of international development organizations and other forms of cooperation, 
donor states are urged to increase efforts to harmonize and manage international development 
assistance to the state cultivation illicit crops in order to support their effectiveness. 
Simultaneously and following the concept of shared responsibility, consumer states should 
support drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation and incorporate those strategies 
into AD programmes. Affected states on the other side together with international 
organizations should put more efforts into the sharing of AD results with the broader 
development community. In that sense best practise and lessons learned can be identified and 
shared, and failures evaluated and hopefully integrated into new initiatives.265
 
 
According to a paper prepared by the EC, the FAO, GTZ and UNODC for the CND 51st 
session development organizations need to consider how their programmes can address the 
cause of illicit crop cultivation given the clear overlap between the drug and development 
                                                 
262 See Conciliation Resources. 2004 at: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/role-international-
community.php 
263 See Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Complementary drug-related data and expertise to support the global 
assessment by Member States of the implementation of the declarations and measures adopted by the General 
Assembly at its twentieth special session. P. 7. 
264 Excluding USAID. 
265 See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 30 sq. 
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agendas. Such efforts are referred to as “mainstreaming counter narcotics into development 
programmes” and “undertaking development in a drugs environment.266
 
 
Without fail a significant role is and should be played by developing countries with ample 
experience in the design of alternative development strategies and the implementation of AD. 
Their task is to promote best practise and lessons learned in that area and try to apply them in 
accordance with the respective national particularities. 267  Besides all relevant institutions 
should share and disseminate their experience with AD and support the involvement of both 
local communities and academic and research institutions in that process 268 . In addition 
governments and relevant international and regional organizations should integrate AD into 
their broader development programmes in order to enhance long-term strategies for legitimate 
livelihoods269
3.5 The Role of IOs according to Neo-Institutionalism  
. 
According to Neoinstitutional Liberalism international institutions and international 
organizations such as the United Nations are gaining more and more importance in 
international politics because of the increasing complexity and interdependences in various 
political areas and issues. That is because international institutions can facilitate cooperation 
between national states in compliance with their common interests in situations and fields of 
conflict where individual interests are neither identical nor exclusive. International 
organizations are to ensure the individual compliance of states to decided actions or other 
forms of agreements. Available instruments are monitoring and enforcing measures for 
instance. Therefore international cooperation in accordance with mutual interests is often only 
possible within the framework of international institutions, so neoinstitutional theorists270. As 
international institutions permit the realization of individual states interests they are 
established or maintained by national states271
                                                 
266 Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Complementary drug-related data and expertise to support the global 
assessment by Member States of the implementation of the declarations and measures adopted by the General 
Assembly at its twentieth special session. P. 7.  
 and do not depend on a specific state in a 
267 UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. P.5sq. 
268 UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication 
of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 6. 
269 Ibid. P. 5. 
270 See Rittberger/Zangl. 2003. P. 41 according to Keohane, R. (1989). Neoliberal Institutionalism. A Perspective 
on World Politics. In: Keohane, R. (1989). International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International 
Relations Theory. Westview Press: Boulder CO. P. 1-20. 
271 Ibid. P. 41 according to Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. Princeton University Press: Princeton. P. 80. 
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hegemony position. Cooperation is consequently possible without hegemony. Thus the 
establishment and continuation of an IO is not a question of supply (of a hegemon), but of 
demand. Such demand is constituted by any problematic constellation of interests. 
Considering that, transnational problems and the resulting action taken by states can be 
improved or can result in better outcomes when mutual interests are formulated on agreed on 
through international organizations. However, the type of interest constellation is central for 
the likelihood of cooperation. Simplified: the more mutual interests prevail existing 
controversies the more international cooperation is likely to be agreed on.272
 
 
                                                 
272 Ibid. P. 40-43. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
3.6.1 Balancing Accounts 
Alternative development is “at best a more human way to not solve a problem273” as no 
significant measurable change has happened in the Latin American region or at the global 
level at large. Neither through eradication nor through AD or other efforts274
Unfortunately there is no clear connection between changes at national level and the 
respective policy interventions and consequently it is quite unsure if the intensification of 
current strategies would result in bigger outcomes to the global drug situation.
. Well that is true 
when we it comes to quantitative eradication and when we define the solving of a problem as 
getting rid of it within a short period of time. But yes, AD has measurably contributed to 
positive social change at the local level. In addition one or two decades in development terms 
are truly not much. More realistic time frames allowing for gradual reduction over a period of 
several years and greater compatibility with local rural development plans will be essential for 
future initiatives. 
275 In that sense 
AD should not focus primary on quantitative eradication of illicit crops, but should leave 
room for the beneficiaries to decide for themselves when they are willing and able to 
substitute in order to assure an acceptable and improved quality of life.276
A significant role is and should be played by developing countries with ample experience in 
the design of alternative development strategies and the implementation of AD. Their task is 
to promote best practise and lessons learned in that area and try to apply them in accordance 
with the respective national particularities.
 
277 Besides all relevant institutions should share 
and disseminate their experience with AD and support the involvement of both local 
communities and academic and research institutions in that process278
As pointed out in the final report
. 
279
                                                 
273 Jelsma. 2002. P.23. 
 of a global thematic evaluation of alternative development 
carried out by the United Nations in 2005, various forms of AD had been developed, ranging 
form an emphasis on security to poverty alleviation and development. It underlines that “AD 
274 Of course there were structural de-, and increases of coca cultivation, that are influenced by price trends, 
trafficking routes and geopolitical developments. 
275 Ibid. P. 14 
276 See Gebert/ Rerkasem. 2002. P. 14. 
277 UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. P.5sq. 
278 UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication 
of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 6. 
279 United Nations (2005). Alternative Development. A Global Thematic Evaluation. Final Synthesis Report. 
New York. 
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policies had been more efficient when all major stakeholders, including governments, donors, 
non-governmental organizations and beneficiaries had been involved in their formulation and 
when those policies allowed for decentralised decision-making, empowering local 
communities and were flexible enough to adapt to local contexts”280
However, larger parts of illicit crop growing farmers do not receive AD assistance and remain 
isolated from wider economic and social development programmes. It will be important to 
build the adequate setting in which this efforts take place as international cooperation and the 
participation of civil society and the private sector are required to be part of it. This is 
extremely difficult to ensure as AD programmes or better say investments in AD are made 
because of illicit crop cultivation causing damage to other parts of society of global extent and 
not because of traditional development intentions. 
. These elements have 
already been discussed above, are supported by the international community, but lack in 
efficient implementation. 
Anyhow, alternative development supports and even more important initiates development in 
rural areas where investment would not be made under normal circumstances because of the 
poor economic conditions and no change in life would ever happen to the local population. 
Even if alternative development programmes and initiatives did not manage to have to desire 
strong impact on the coca cultivation it has been making achievements so far. But it is also 
clear that in these rural regions where AD is implemented due to the scope of the coca 
cultivation very few or non development efforts had been made before, and that governments 
and the international community are only taking action because of the global drug problem.281 
“It is only a shame that peasants could not be helped unless they grow illegal crops”282
3.6.2 Integrating AD into Wider Development Efforts 
. 
As pointed out before alternative development is currently implemented largely in the context 
of individual rural development projects in isolated areas which do not provide adequate 
opportunities for AD to have an impact on drug control on a larger scale.283
                                                 
280 UN Economic and Social Council (2008). The World Drug Problem. Fifth Report of the Executive Director. 
Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Crops and on Alternative Development. at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V07/892/21/PDF/V0789221.pdf?OpenElement. P. 10 sq. according 
to United Nations. 2005. P. 11.  
 It was indicated 
by various sources that alternative development is more effective and more sustainable as part 
of a wider development scheme whose goal is to improve the livelihood of marginal rural 
281 See Thoumi. 2002. P. 11-21. 
282 Ibid. P.21. 
283 UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication 
of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 4.  
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populations284. It is important to recognize that alternative development for the most part is 
agriculture development. At the same time the international community needs to understand 
that drug control agencies don’t have the sufficient money, resources and ability to develop 
these areas where the crops grow. In addition most development agencies and programmes 
are not represented in coca growing areas.285
 
 
However, in the Andean region there is only few experience of integrating drugs as a cross 
cutting issue within national and regional development programmes and AD is still project 
oriented and has very limited outreach as only about 23% of farmers of illicit crops in the 
Andean region are currently reached 286 . In that concern Colombia has seen growing 
involvement of line ministries and provincial governments in development planning in areas 
affected by illicit crop cultivation.287 At large both national governments and multilateral 
development agencies, such as UNODC in the hereafter case study, should include counter 
narcotics issues into wider rural development initiatives and approaches in order to enhance 
long-term strategies for legitimate livelihoods288
 
. 
Hopefully strong support focused on traditional development elements will provide fruitful 
assistance to the overall strengthening of existing social and economic structures and also the 
governments’ capacities to enforce counter-drug laws and combat drug related crime. Also, 
the replacement of illicit coca cultivation will sooner or later happen when economic and 
social standards have been developed and provide the necessary environment for a legal 
economy. 
                                                 
284 UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 11 according to United Nations. 2005. P. vii.  
285 See interview with Mr. Jorge Eduardo Rios, SLU, VIC, 28 August 2008. 
286 See also: Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st Session (2008). Complementary drug-related data and 
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Session51/CND-UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP11.pdf. Only about 20% of households cultivating coca in the 
Andean countries have received direct assistance from AD projects. Unfortunately these communities are often 
neglected by the mainstream rural development effort despite their pro-poor mandates. 
287 Ibid. P. 4 sq.  
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eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 5. 
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4. Case Study on Two UNODC Projects in Colombia 
4.1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
International Organizations such as UNODC vary in their membership and size. Some are 
regional and some global, some narrowly focused and others quite broad.289
The following subchapters will present inter alia UNODC’s mandates and relevant 
conventions that build the organization’s foundation for their work at headquarters and in the 
field. Subsequent its work and role in alternative development will be illustrated before the 
organizations performance and relevance will be discussed. 
 Their range of 
services and functions are based on their mandates decided upon by their member states. 
These mandates facilitate the organization to take action, but also limits their range of 
possibilities regarding its engagements and interventions. 
4.1.1 Mandates and Conventions290
The UN established its Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in 1990 focusing on demand 
reduction and alternative development
 
291 . Because of required changes in leadership, 
management style and internal culture 292  the programme was combined with the Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Division in the UN Office at Vienna in 1997 and formed the 
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, which was finally renamed as the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2002293. The same year UNODC’s current 
Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa came into office. UNODC is the only UN agency to 
have two completely separate governing boards, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) 
and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ). The organization 
also must take account of decisions taken by the International Narcotics Control Board, which 
monitors the implementation of the United Nations drug control conventions. 294
                                                 
289 See Stein. 2008. P. 213, 216. 
 The 
organization’s work is guided by a broad range of international legally binding instruments 
and a set of United Nations standards and norms on crime prevention and criminal justice: 
290 The following information is, if not indicated otherwise, an adopted quotation from: UNODC Menu of 
Services. Technical assistance provided by UNODC. In: http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/Menu-
of-Services-EN-July08.pdf 
291 Jelsma. 2002. P. 15. 
292 Ibid. 25. 
293 See UNODC at: http://www.unvienna.org/unov/en/unodc.html.  
294 Government Office of Sweden (2008). Swedish Assessment of multilateral organizations. The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime. At: www.sweden.gov.se/mfa  
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 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)295
 
 
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)296
 
 
International Legal Framework against Terrorism297
 
 
 
United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
International Legal Framework on Drug Control298
There are three major international drug control treaties which are mutually supportive and 
complementary. These international conventions provide not only that states should make 
efforts towards the eradication of illicit cultivated drug crops, but also recognize that no such 
effort would be truly effective and sustainable without measures to provide alternative, 
legitimate livelihoods for the populations affected
 
299
- Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988)
. An important purpose of the first two 
treaties is to codify internationally applicable control measures in order to ensure the 
availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes, 
and to prevent their diversion into illicit channels. They also include general provisions on 
illicit trafficking and drug abuse. 
300
This Convention provides comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, including 
provisions against money laundering and the diversion of precursor chemicals. It provides for 
international cooperation through, for example, extradition of drug traffickers, controlled 
deliveries and transfer of proceedings. 
 
- Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)301
The Convention establishes an international control system for psychotropic substances. It 
responded to the diversification and expansion of the spectrum of drugs of abuse and 
introduced controls over a number of synthetic drugs according to their abuse potential on the 
one hand and their therapeutic value on the other. 
 
                                                 
295 Full version available under: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-
50026_E.pdf 
296 Full version available under: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf 
297 UN Security Council Resolution on counter-terrorism 1373 (2001). In: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement 
298 UNODC treaties: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html 
299 UNODC. Open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the 
eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. Discussion note by the International Narcotics 
Control Board. 18 June 2008. P. 3. At: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND_UNGASS_EWG/CND_UNGASS_EWG_2-
4July08/UNODC_CND2008WG3_CRP1E.pdf 
300 UN Convention against the Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988. In: 
http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/1988_convention_en.pdf 
301 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971. In: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf 
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- Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)302
This Convention aims at combating drug abuse by coordinated international action. There are 
two forms of intervention and control that work together. First, it seeks to limit the 
possession, use, trade, distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of drugs 
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Second, it combats drug trafficking through 
international cooperation to deter and discourage drug traffickers. 
 
Within a period of 15 years for opium and 25 years for coca, all illicit cultivation should have 
been stopped by 1979 and 1989 respectively.303
4.1.2 Organizational Structure and Financial Resources 
 Obviously these targets could not be met. 
 
Figure 8: UNODC Organizational Chart304
 
 
The organization is financed by voluntary contributions of governments, grouped into “major 
donors” and “emerging national donors”, UN Agencies, Inter-Governmental Organizations, 
International Financial Institutions and to a very small part private donors, including private 
sector entities and foundations. These contributions comprise two types: GP-general purpose 
funds and SP-Special purpose funds. First finance UNODC’s executive direction and 
                                                 
302 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. In: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf 
303 Jelsma. 2002. P. 17. 
304 UNODC Organizational Chart. In: http://www.unodc.org/images/about-
unodc/UNODC%20Organizational%20Chart%2029%20October%202008.jpg 
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management, while second finance the organization’s technical cooperation and other 
substantive activities at headquarters. Since 2006 the annual level of voluntary funding has 
more than doubled and amounted 258, 8 million US$ in 2008. Around 95% (245, 5 million 
US$) were special purpose funds, while only 5% (13, 3 million US$) were defined as general 
purpose funds. Around 74% of the funding is invested in drug programmes, and 26% in the 
crime fund.305
4.1.3 Services and Work in Alternative Development 
 
Overall technical assistance is provided in three areas: Rule of Law, Trend Analysis and 
Forensics, and Health and Development. Alternative Development constitutes one of three 
subareas in the field of Health and Development and services are supplied in the fields of 
Alternatives to Illicit Crop Cultivation, and Sustainable Livelihoods. The most significant 
services in respect to the present research are:306
- Technical assistance in agricultural and rural development (as well as off-farm 
employment) for sustainable livelihood opportunities in illicit crop cultivation areas. 
 
- Development of marketing strategies for products from alternative development 
programmes. 
 
As most major organizations or institutions work in compliance with medium or long term 
strategies international organizations elaborate such as they are essential for achieving shared 
objectives of their member states and maximizing available resources. In the case of UNODC 
it supports the organization in assisting their member states to control drugs, prevent crime 
and terrorism, and building security and justice for all. The UNODC Medium Term Strategy 
for 2008-2011307
                                                 
305 See UNODC Resources. At: 
 strategy sets out tangible goals within three main themes: 1) Rule of Law; 2) 
Policy and Trend Analysis; and 3) Human Security: Prevention, Treatment and Reintegration, 
and Alternative Development. AD is one of 14 result areas and subordinated to the third 
theme human security and consists of the following 3 results: 3.4.1. Enhanced capacity of 
Member States, upon request, to design and implement sustainable alternative development 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html.  
306 In order to promote and execute these services or rather alternatives to illicit crop cultivation UNODC 
disposes of a variety of tools. Inter alia: Report on Emerging Gender Strategies for Alternative Development, 
Regional Seminar on Alternative Development: Information Networking and Sharing Good Practices on Gender 
and Development; A Manual on Monitoring and Evaluation for Alternative Development Projects; Alternative 
Development in the Andean Region- The UNODC Experience 2007; Alternative Development: Sharing Good 
Practices, Facing Common Problems; and Report on Guidelines for Best Practices on Gender Mainstreaming in 
Alternative Development. 
307 UNODC Medium Term Strategy 2008-2011. In: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V07/806/72/PDF/V0780672.pdf?OpenElement 
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programmes, including, where appropriate, preventive alternative development programmes, 
within their broader development context, aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating the 
illicit cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis. 3.4.2. Raising awareness of and 
mainstreaming the issue of alternative development, including, where appropriate, preventive 
alternative development programmes, among international organizations, international 
financial institutions and development networks. 3.4.3. Increased partnerships between 
UNODC and relevant civil society entities and the private sector that promote Member States’ 
capacity for collaborative activities in alternative development, including, where 
appropriate, preventive alternative development.308
 
 
Over the past 25 years, UNODC has been the central UN organization providing multilateral 
AD assistance309
- Offering sustainable alternatives to illicit cultivation, including community initiatives 
and value-added gains; 
. The Sustainable Livelihoods Unit’s (SLU) role is to provide technical advise 
and training, best practice and guidelines, project quality control, the organization of expert 
groups and the establishment of collaboration with other development agencies. In this 
venture SLU pursues the following objectives: 
- Expanding and sustaining alternative development achievements through increased 
international involvement and support; 
- Promoting innovative approaches and sharing best practices; 
- Pursuing an integrated approach to drug and crime prevention; 
- Mainstreaming drug issues into development programmes. 
In the past the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit has implemented more than 120 technical 
cooperation projects 310
                                                 
308 Result area 3.4 Alternative Development. In: UNODC Medium Term Strategy for 2008-2011. In: 
. Positive development and results are the increased capacity of 
countries to elaborate national crop elimination or alternative development plans. In addition 
the scope of the illicit crop cultivation in Southeast Asia and in some countries in Latin 
America has been reduced. More detailed, around 160, 00 ha of land for agricultural livestock 
production was developed, UNODC worked with around 220 farmers’ organizations and 
assisted in the creation of 35 commercially viable businesses in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. 
UNODC also assisted in the reduction of farmers’ dependence on opium poppy in around 350 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/unodc-strategy.html. P.9. 
309 UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 13. 
310 Between 1979-2004. Further an investment of US$ 318 million had been made in alternative development 
between 1988-2004. 
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villages in Laos and Myanmar by improving food security, irrigation, clean water supplies, 
roads, health and education services.311
However, as illustrated in chapter 3.3 many factors hinder the sustainable elimination of illicit 
crop cultivation and the development of stable social and economic infrastructure. According 
to UNODC the speed of eradication and the provision of alternative development are not 
congruent and therefore insufficient. Further is the illicit cultivation often displaced and not 
efficiently eradicated and the existence of armed conflict and instability in illicit cultivation 
areas complicates a third party intervention and the implementation of alternative 
development projects massively.
 
312
4.1.4 Alternative Development “in the Field” 
 
UNODC has 25 offices covering over 150 countries around the world through its network of 
field, project and liaison offices313. UNODC claims to “work directly with governments and 
non-governmental organizations” as its “field staff aims at developing and implementing drug 
control and crime prevention programmes tailored to countries' particular needs” 314. As 
pointed out in subchapter 3.3.2, country focused strategies are one of the core elements in 
alternative development. Thus any AD strategy should be based on the understanding of the 
institutions and social structure of the respective country where it is applied315
Alternative development is the principal method for member states and UNODC to address 
illicit crop cultivation and currently, UNODC supports six countries
 and has to be 
as diverse as the communities they are assisting. Taking this aspect into account is a valuable 
aspiration which successful implementation is highly challenging. 
316
                                                 
311 UNODC. Division for Operations. Units Information at: 
 with AD. In the field, 
meaning the respective country of project implementation, UNODC seeks to work in 
partnership with the affected countries, other UN agencies, NGOs and the private sector. The 
focus is on helping small farmers with licit income generation activities to reduce their 
dependency on income from coca cultivation. Further activities are undertaken to support the 
health and education sector, to build basic infrastructure, and to support community 
development. Attention is also given to the economic and ecological dimension as 
environmental protection and the improvement of markets for AD products are indispensable 
www.unodc.org  
312 Ibid. 
313 Afghanistan, Baltic States, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, East Asia and Pacific, Egypt, Eastern Africa, 
India, Iran, Lao PDR, Mexico, Myanmar, New York, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, 
South Eastern Europe, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam. 
314 UNODC. Field Offices at: http://www.unvienna.org/unov/en/unodc.html  
315 See Thoumi. 2002. P. 6 sq. 
316 Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Peru. 
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elements in successful AD initiatives. Besides the Global Partnership on Alternative 
Development project was launched on 2007. Its objective is the strengthening of capacities of 
relevant line ministries and key national and international development actors in order to 
mainstream alternative development efforts into broader development plans and 
programmes.317
 
 
According to the above information provided by UNODC the whole package for successful 
AD seems to be there. As elaborated in chapter 3 on AD and later pointed out the concluding 
subchapter 3.6 alternative development is more effective and more sustainable as part of a 
wider development scheme whose goal is to improve the livelihood of marginal rural 
populations. According to the previously discussed literature should both national 
governments and multilateral development agencies include counter narcotics issues into 
wider rural development initiatives and approaches in order to enhance long-term strategies 
for legitimate livelihoods. Many important elements seem to be considered in UNODC’s 
overall programme on AD. Of course it is important to analyze and realize the necessities and 
elaborate the right concepts and initiatives. However, in the end effective implementation and 
final results in form of social change are what matters to the beneficiaries. Later on in this 
chapter two AD projects implemented by UNODC will be analyzed closer in order to assess 
the organizations competences and qualification in more detail. 
4.1.5 Cooperation and Role within the UN-System 
In the past UNODC has been the central UN organization providing multilateral AD 
assistance318. However, one organizations efforts are often not enough to support sustainable 
change and mutual efforts are needed. In that regard system-wide coherence within the UN 
system is needed to support national priorities through working together, levering more 
effectively its respective capacities and expertise319
                                                 
317 See UNODC. Alternative Development. Work in the Field. At: 
. Thus UNODC’s work should be carried 
out in close cooperation with other relevant United Nations organizations and programmes, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-
development/Work-in-the-field.html; and UNODC. Global Partnership on Alternative Development. At: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/GlobalpartnershiponAlternativeDevelopment.html  
318 States including Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America have provided assistance in Asia and Latin America.  
319 UN. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization. General Assembly Official Records. 
63rd Session. Supplement No.1. P. 16. 2008. At: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/1(SUPP)  
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such as WHO, UNDP or the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, in order to improve the 
organization’s overall performance 320
 
. 
Besides, important working arrangements between UNDP and UNODC are in place as the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) has the leadership role within the UN system for the 
coordination and funding of technical assistance programmes and projects to support and 
supplement the national efforts of partner countries to accelerate their economic and social 
development. The purpose of these arrangements is to set a framework for cooperation 
between the two organizations in the areas of administration of field personnel, field office 
administration and the financial and administrative support to projects. In that regard the 
representative of a UNODC field office, such as the field office in Colombia, has 
responsibility for all UNODC drug and crime control activities in the designated country and 
exercises management control over UNODC representation, policy, programme and projects, 
finances, staff and office administration. However, as mentioned above there are certain 
financial and administrative arrangements between UNDP and UNODC. So does the formal 
responsibility for committing and verifying expenditure against funds allotted or authorized 
for UNODC field office executed activities lie with UNDP. There are also some services 
provided by UNDP to UNODC field activities: the UNDP office is responsible for providing 
the necessary services related to the administration of the field office, UNODC field office 
executed projects are serviced by UNDP in accordance with UNDP procedures for the 
administrative budget, etc. Further the UNDP Administrator and the UNODC Executive 
Director consult each other periodically on the overall effectiveness of the working 
arrangements and discuss the quality of services provided by UNDP to the UNODC field 
office.321
 
 
Moreover the “Delivering as One” Initiative was launched in 2007 upon request of 
governments since the UN will be unable to deliver on its promises and maintain its 
legitimate position at the heard of the multilateral system without far-reaching reforms. Until 
now five One Country Programmes as pilots were established in order to overcome the 
fragmentation and deliver as one through a stronger commitment to working together.322
                                                 
320 See UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. P.8. 
 Such 
one UN programme is not yet in place in Colombia, but will hopefully be established in more 
321 See Working Arrangements Between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). P. 2-8, 11. 
322 See UN. Delivering as One. Report of the Secretary-General’s High –Level Panel. 2006.New York. P. 1 sq., 
12. At: http://www.un.org/events/panel/resources/pdfs/HLP-SWC-FinalReport.pdf 
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countries worldwide in order to make programme and project implementation easier and more 
efficient. In addition the respective counterparts, the public and private sector, and civil 
society will have one single person to talk to. This will most likely facilitate easier 
cooperation and collaboration. 
4.1.6 Evaluation and Monitoring 
Evaluation and monitoring mechanisms not only measure how well or bad an organization 
and its programmes and projects are doing, but more importantly support them to improve 
their performance and be more effective. The Independent Evaluation Unit is responsible for 
the planning, coordination, and execution of evaluations of UNODC programmes and 
projects. The Unit provides substantive guidance and support for all evaluation activities, 
independent accountability for resources entrusted to UNODC, and also advice to senior 
management on evaluation issues. Programme evaluations and other major evaluations aim to 
assess the overall impact and provide feedback and information to management through 
recommendations, lessons learned and best practices. Evaluation follows two main purposes: 
firstly, evaluation should assess the effectiveness of a project or programme in order to detect 
shortcomings or mistakes and to finally enable learning and improvement; secondly, it is a 
matter of accountability as evaluations demonstrate to donors and other stakeholders how 
resources are allocated and have been used and can provide them with evidence of success.323
 
 
In 2008 the Independent Evaluation Unit carried out a thematic evaluation of alternative 
development initiatives by UNODC. It noted that AD programmes needed to consider how 
projects could best be linked to national drugs and economic development policies and that 
such programmes should be part of national development programmes324. Further the report 
found that there was little evidence that eradication reduces illicit cultivation in sustainable 
ways. The main reasons are the flexibility or the need of cultivators to move to other areas, 
the evolvement of production technologies and the little or not existent decrease in total 
production. Moreover, it pointed out that reductions in illicit crop production were not the 
only indicator to measure success and that development indicators must be the basis to assess 
the impact and sustainability of AD initiatives.325
                                                 
323 See UNODC and evaluations at: 
 In that regard it should be pointed out that 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html.  
324 See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 11 according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(2005). Thematic Evaluation of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Alternative Development Initiatives. 
P. 33. At: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/2005-alternativedevelopment.pdf 
325 Ibid. P. 12 according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2005). Thematic Evaluation of United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Alternative Development Initiatives. P. X. 
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in the present discourse on sustainable alternative development several fractions argue that the 
level of illicit crop cultivation is not a reliable factor at all when it comes to assessing 1) the 
improvement of the quality of lives for the rural population in supply countries, 2) the 
decrease of drug related violence in trafficking countries, and 3) the negative consequences of 
drugs in consumer countries.326
 
 
The findings and requests issued by the Independent Evaluation Unit correspond with 
findings of the discussed literature in chapter 3 on alternative development. It is necessary 
that theory meets practise and that these requirements are considered in the project 
implementation in the field. 
4.1.7 External Assessment and Critics 
According to an assessment undertaken by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
UNODC’s internal effectiveness is assessed as simply not good. The report indicates that one 
of the major causes is bound up with its forms of governance. As pointed out at the beginning 
of this chapter UNODC is the only UN agency to have two separate governing board, which 
are each unwieldy and ineffective as policy-making bodies since they mainly engage in 
normative work and political negotiations when they meet. The report also highlights that 
another deficiency stems from the mix of UNODC funding as almost 90% of its budget 
consists of voluntary funds and only 10% comes from the regular UN budget. Consequently 
this presents challenges to the leadership of the organization327. The funding of UNODC is 
therefore deficient in both predictability and stability. Unfortunately the rapid growth of the 
organization’s budget in recent years has taken place while the resource level for 
administrative functions within, e.g. budget, human resource and evaluation, has remained 
unchanged and the support function then appears to be underfunded. The new UNODC mid-
term strategy328
                                                 
326 This was discussed earlier in chapter 3. 
, introduced in 2008, for the first time includes an integrated, results-oriented 
work plan containing both objectives and quantitative, monitorable performance indicators. 
The report finds that under the leadership of ED Costa UNODC has been successively 
revitalized, integrated and made more effective. In contrast the organization’s external 
effectiveness of project implementation is assessed as relatively good and UNODC’S 
substantive activities must be regarded as very professional. However, much of the good work 
done is not part of countries’ poverty reduction strategies or plans but takes place on a more 
327 This has in some degree been addressed in subchapter 4.1.2. 
328 The strategy is referred to in subchapter 4.1.3. 
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ad hoc basis, often in the form of projects. The new strategy has the potential to contribute to 
improvements, so the report.329 “To sum up, the process of change in UNODC is moving in 
the right direction at the same time as much still remains to be done to establish an 
organizational culture in which operational objectives are monitored and evaluated 
systematically. 330
 
” Some of these deficiencies and ongoing improvements in the 
organization’s internal and external effectiveness will be discussed relating to UNODC’s 
project implementation in Colombia subsequently. 
Critic on UNDCP’s/UNODC’s could be found in the academic discussion on alternative 
development. It is argued, that UNDCP/UNODC would “lack of self-criticism, and over-
optimistic view on AD projects’ capacity to establish a relationship of confidence with 
peasant federations (…) may be best classified as wishful thinking. But there is not doubt that 
it sees AD as a complementary element of forced eradication. (…) Beneficiaries of AD 
projects are still considered as potential guerrilleros or criminal elements that need to be re-
integrated in society.331
According to Mr. Javier Montano Duran, Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer in the 
Latin America and the Caribbean Unit of UNODC’ Division of Operations, generally, there 
are certain things that “can go wrong” within the implementation of a project. But every 
UNODC project over 500,000 USD is required to have an external evaluation, and those 
evaluations are publicized documents. These external evaluations illustrate problems and 
critic. However, this information is available but not advertised in the international 
community. UNODC reports generally show the present situation based on data. As data is 
never good or bad or right or wrong, it simply shows increase or decrease of certain social 
problems. For instance, in 2008 an increase of coca cultivation in Colombia was recorded, 
which of course was a big shock. Certainly the efforts of the Colombian government and 
illicit crop cultivation data is reported on the base of facts, and the language does not change 
depending on de- or increase, so Mr. Montano. In addition, reports concerning the managerial 
performance are elaborated. Further projects implemented by UNODC are audited by the 
OIOS, Office on Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations. This audit by the OIOS is 
responsible for the investigation of possible mismanagement or violations of the UN rules. 
Besides the independent evaluation unit (IEU) is responsible for evaluations on the outcome 
of the projects. Therefore it becomes evident: UNODC can follow all rules without having the 
  
                                                 
329 See Government Office of Sweden. 2008. 1 sqq. 
330 Ibid. P. 3. 
331 Oomen. 2002. P. 3. 
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desired impact, which will be reflected in the evaluation. On the other side there can be 
projects with excellent results, but certain UN rules or procedures were not respected, which 
would be highlighted and traced in the OIOS report. In case of defences, certain action would 
follow and sometimes sanctions are decided.332
Mr. Montano also pointed out, that the questioned “relationship of trust” is certainly 
established in Colombia as most of the alternative development projects implemented in 
Colombia are the response of requests from the ground and in collaboration with the 
beneficiaries. In alternative development, different types of intervention are possible, but it is 
essential, that they are owned by the local community as fail would be a very possible 
consequence if the peasant does not see the value of the project or activity and will not 
comply, or will start growing coca again. Consequently there are consultation meetings 
between UNODC and the target population in Colombia in order to get them engaged, and 
have their inputs for new project proposals, which are very comprehensive. 
 
333
 
 
Also, one has to keep in mind that official UN documents and publications are generally 
written in very diplomatic language and obviously point out global problems, needs and 
challenges, but not the own organizations boundedness or ignorance. However, this critic has 
its justification as evidence of failure is easily found across the field. 
4.2 Analysis of Two Projects 
4.2.1 Project Environment in Colombia 
Colombia was one of the three countries that emerged from the collapse of Gran Colombia in 
1930 (the others are Ecuador and Venezuela). A four-decade long conflict between 
government forces and anti-government insurgent groups, principally the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (funded by the drug trade)334, escalated during the 1990s. 
Since the insurgents lack the military or popular support necessary to overthrow the 
government Colombia is an electoral democracy that faces severe human rights violations, 
armed conflict and increased organized crime for decades and no solution to the armed 
conflict is likely in the near future335
                                                 
332 See interview with Montano Duran, Javier. Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer. Latin America and 
the Caribbean Unit. UNODC. VIC: 23 September 2009. 
. Fortunately violence has been decreasing in the last 
years, but insurgents continue attacks against civilians and large areas of the countryside are 
333 Ibid. 
334 Also see: National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P. 34. 
335 See Heinz. 2002. P. 10. 
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under guerrilla influence or are contested by security forces.336 Peace negotiations have been 
taking place with interruptions between the government and the leadership of guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups. The negotiations focused on:337
- The acknowledgement of fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law 
standards; 
 
- The rejection of new abductions and the release of those abducted; 
- An agreement on a political dialogue and an armistice; 
- On the transformations of the Guerrilla into a political party in the medium-term; and  
- An agreement on the basic contours of the necessary modifications of the Colombian 
society and politics after the end of the conflict. 
 
Despite the international community’s, especially the United State’s, praise for Colombia’s 
commitment to fighting production and trafficking of drugs in the past decade, including 
record aerial and manual eradication levels, impressive cocaine seizure numbers, interception 
of imported precursor chemicals, destruction of processing laboratories and action against 
drug traffickers and armed groups338, Colombia remains the world’s largest cocaine producer. 
Progress in Colombia has been made concerning the level or eradication. The Colombian 
government also continues to seize great amounts of its own cocaine, to intercept imports of 
precursor chemicals, to destroy drug labs and to face the corrupting power of the drug trade 
on the government.339
 
 
It is estimated that between 67,000 to 100,000 families are involved in the cultivation of 
coca340
                                                 
336 See CIA. The World Factbook. Colombia. In: 
. In 2006 the largest areas were in the following departments in the south and east of 
Colombia: Narinio (20% of the national total), Tumaco (9%), Meta and Guaviare (26%), 
Putumayo and Caquetá (22%). Most departments where coca corps have been cultivated for a 
long time can show decreases while in other regions with minor cultivations increases can be 
detected. In addition farmers broadly began to reduce their average cultivation area in order to 
prevent spraying and detection after vast eradication undertakings with U.S support and aerial 
spraying in the recent years. Unfortunately coca cultivating farmers have become more 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/countrytemplate_co.html  
337 If not indicated elsewise: Heinz. 2002. P. 12. 
338 International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.3 cit from UNODC. 2007. P.III. 
339 UNODC. 2007. P.III. 
340 According to an interview carried out by the Crisis Group in Bogota in 2007 some Colombian authorities 
believe as many as 100,000 families are involved while UNODC talked about 67,000 in their Colombian Coca 
Cultivation Survey 2007. 
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sophisticated in the recent years and could maintain their production levels while the average 
plot seize has been reduced by more than a half.341
 
 
Unfortunately the country’s traffickers have significantly evolved since the 1980s and today’s 
trafficking organizations are much smaller than the major Medellìn and Cali drug cartels in 
the 1990s but there are some 140 of them and the countries traffickers have significantly 
evolved since the 1980s. The dismembering of the large cartels led to a rise of individual 
groups and the rise of a new generation of low-profile trafficking organizations which are 
difficult to trace. 342  Important actors are the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and paramilitary successor organizations343, which continue to control 
much of the primary drug resources such as crops, processing facilities and regional 
trafficking routes, which they seek to safeguard against other illegal organizations. Of course 
FARC’s involvement varies from region to region, but it is present in about half of the 
countries 1,098 municipalities, including 128 with illicit crops344 and is dictating the terms 
for coca cultivation, and processing. Some of its fronts even control the smuggling of 
chemical precursors and the pure cocaine and consequently have established links to 
international organized crime345.346 The smaller National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla 
group has repeatedly denied drugs involvement, but the contrary has become increasingly 
apparent347. In fact it can be proved that FARC, to a lesser degree the ELN and also the 
successors of the former paramilitary AUC finance a large part of their effort with drug 
trafficking and strive to control drug corridors and also the local population in respective 
areas.348 In that regard the eradication of illicit crops is has become vital in cutting off sources 
of finance from the guerrillas and paramilitaries. This can be achieved through initiatives that 
combine crop eradication with alternative development. 349
                                                 
341 International Crisis Group. 2008a. P. 4, 9. 
 However, simple eradication 
without the sufficient provision of legitimate livelihoods can lead to a deterioration of the 
quality of life of the beneficiaries and has no chance to be sustainable. In addition the 
342 Ibid. P. 6 sqq. 
343 AUC: The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) had ceased to 
function when more than 31,000 former paramilitaries had demobilized in 2006. However simultaneously 
emerging criminal groups arose, whose members include some former paramilitaries. 
344 Ibid. P.8 cit from UNODC. 2007. P. 69. 
345 Ibid. P.9 cit from Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (2008). Tendencias y Resultados 2007. P. 12. 
346 Ibid. P.1, 6-9. 
347 See Embassy of Colombia. Plan Colombia; Also see: International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.9 cit from 
Internation Crisis Group (2007). Crisis Group Latin America Briefing no.16. Colombia. Moving forward with 
the ELN? P. 7 sq. 
348 See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P. 37. 
349 See Conciliation Resources. 2004. at: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/role-international-
community.php 
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guerrilla war has become a regional problem as neighbour governments are forced to guard 
their boundaries more actively since border trespassing and use of neighbouring countries as 
retreats for guerrilla groups and drug trade.350
Unfortunately the mentioned possibility of a deterioration of the humanitarian situation of 
peasants after the eradication of illicit crops is likely to occur as adequate social and economic 
structures are difficult to assure even if their provision is a central objective. 
 
Consequently focus of alternative development should be given to the strengthening of local 
organization of communities through capacity building, improved infrastructure, and 
productive activities. The role of technical cooperation is to 1) provide direct support for state 
institutions, NGOs and communities active in this environment, and 2) support internally 
displaced people and victims of violence, as well as re-integration of members of violent 
groups (guerrilla, etc.).351
4.2.2 UNODC Programme in Colombia 
  
Overall UNODC is supporting the Government’s efforts to assist farmers, who gave up coca 
cultivation, through AD in order to ensure sustainable legal income. Currently there are four 
major AD initiatives under implementation. 1) “Products of Peace”: in collaboration with the 
Colombian Government UNODC supports farmers’ associations engaged in AD products. A 
larger part is organic products, which have good opportunities in being profitable and 
competitive in domestic and international markets. 2) “Forest Management”: in coordination 
with the Social Action Plan of the Presidency of Colombia UNODC is implementing forest 
management, agro-forestry and food security activities. 3) “Forest Warden Families 
Programme”: UNODC is monitoring the achievements of the programme with respect to 
voluntary eradication, forest recovery and socio-economic development. Its main objective is 
the incorporation of farmer families into a process of voluntary eradication of illicit crops and 
the recovering of forest in ecologically and socially vulnerable areas. 4) Initiative with 
departmental government: in line with the national and departmental strategies on AD in 
order to strengthen the productive capacities of at least 200 families and community 
enterprises.352
 
 
                                                 
350 See Heinz. 2002. P. 11. 
351 Ibid. P. 19 according to Anderson, M. B. (1999). Do not harm. How Aid can support Peace- or War. Boulder: 
Co. 
352 See UNODC. Alternative Development. Colombia. At: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-
development/Colombiaprogramme.html  
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Certainly official information and planned initiatives (especially planned by headquarters) 
mostly seem feasible and show great efforts. However, reality often looks differently. That’s 
what we have learned throughout previous experiences in development. Therefore two AD 
projects implemented by UNODC in Colombia will be illustrated and analysed in the 
following subchapters. 
4.2.3 The Two Projects 
1. Project COL/J36 “Alternative Development in Antioquia Department”353
The project was launched in January 2007 and will be completed in December 2010 if no 
additional project revision will be submitted for approval at headquarters. It is one of 5 
currently
 
354 ongoing projects implemented in the thematic area “Sustainable Livelihoods”. 
The project is executed by UNODC with the Government of Antioquia as its counterpart. The 
total proposed budget amounts US$ 3,667,931. US$ 3,543,591 have been pledged by donor 
countries; US$ 2,707,144 have been collected as of 23 September 2009. Donor countries are: 
Austria, Colombia, France, Italy, and Switzerland.355
 
 
Project Environment in Antioquia:
                                                 
353 If not indicated differently, see: UNODC. Project Document. COLJ36 Alternative Development in Antioquia 
Department. At: UNODC Programme and Financial Information Management System. 
 From 2000-2005 the area of land employed for illicit crop 
cultivation in the department of Antioquia rapidly increased by 152%. Traditionally the 
municipalities of Anorí and Bricenio in the Antioquia department are coffee and cacao 
producers. However, agricultural production has not succeeded in achieving a higher 
development level, nor has added value created by the industrialization process. As such, the 
market for their products has not become more commercialized by external intermediaries. In 
some cases, due to the low prices of AD products or the problems in marketing, some farmers 
have been forced to cultivate illicit crops. It is evident that the interest in the 
commercialization of AD products, within national and international markets, has only been 
recently developed. Fortunately, and different from other countries in the region, Colombia 
can rely on a develop domestic market and with the possibilities of introducing marketing 
concepts such as ”solidarity markets”. COL/J36 is the first development project to receive 
financial contribution from a departmental government. In addition the departmental 
government has provided technical assistance, alongside the Secretary of Agriculture, IDEA, 
and advisors from UNODC, in the conceptual formulation of the project. The project will 
354 As of 23 Spetember 2009. 
355 Drugs and Crime Programmes-Technical Cooperation. Priority Funding Requirements. Project Number 
COLJ36. At: UNODC Programme and Financial Information management System. 
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attempt persuade farmers, currently involved in illicit crop cultivation, to grow alternative and 
economically viable crops such as cocoa and coffee. The project does not only have the direct 
support from the private sector for the commercialization of coffee and cocoa, but also has the 
backing of the National Federation of Coffee Growers (La Federación Nacional de Cafeteros). 
 
Main Objectives:
 
 In terms of strategy, the current AD project will enhance the capacity of the 
local government of Antioquia to design and implement a sound sustainable AD programme, 
aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating the illicit cultivation of coca crops. The 
project’s main objectives are 1) the strengthen social ties, productive capacities, and 
enterprises of at least 200 families in the communities of Anorí and Bricenio. 2) to promote a 
change towards agro-forestry production of coffee and cocoa as a mechanism to substitute 
illicit crop cultivation in accordance with the Departmental Strategy for Alternative 
Development promoted by the Government of Antioquia. 
2. Project COL/J31 “Strengthening alternative development productive projects within 
the framework of integrated rural programmes in Colombia”356
The project was launched in January 2007 and was meant to be completed in December 2008. 
However, some project segments related to marketing and agro-industrial strengthening will 
still be ongoing during the years 2009 and 2010
 
357
The total proposed budget amounted US$ 9,810,100. US$ 9,225,025 have been pledged by 
donor countries, while US$ 8,039,863 have been collected as of 23 September 2009. Donor 
countries are: Colombia, Italy, USAID and Inter-American Development Bank.
. The project is implemented in the 
thematic area “Sustainable Livelihoods”, and has a nationwide coverage. It is executed by 
UNODC with the Programa Presidencial contra Cultivos Ilícitos as its counterpart. For the 
first time ever, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) co-funded a UNODC project. 
These funds have been used to strengthen the commercialization component, thus helping 
farmers promote their AD products in national and international markets. 
358
 
 
Project Environment and Justification:
                                                 
356 If not indicated differently, see: UNODC. Project Document. COLJ31 Strengthening alternative development 
productive projects within the framework of integrated rural programmes in Colombia. At: UNODC Programme 
and Financial Information Management System. 
 Economic support and incentives are necessary to give 
farmers a sense of ownership in the Colombian government’s zero-coca and environmental 
357 UNODC. Drugs Programme. Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ31. 
01012008-31122008. P. 4. At: ProFi- Programme and Financial Information Management System. 
358 Ibid. 
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protection policies and also increase the chances for sustainable economic and social success 
of AD initiatives. For several years, UNODC has worked on the identification and promotion 
of legal and commercially viable alternatives to replace farmers’ dependence on coca crops. 
With exception of the region of Tumaco (Narinio), the project worked in 7 geographical areas 
with about 20,000 Forest Warden families (Guardabosques) that have decided to invest the 
finds received from the government in productive and commercially viable activities. About 
70% if the recipients of funds under the Forest Warden Families are women. 
 
Main Objectives:
4.2.4 Stakeholder Interests and Decision-Making Processes 
 Referring to the UNODC Strategy 2008-2011, the project falls under the 
result area of alternative development, aiming at increasing partnerships between UNODC 
and relevant civil society entities and the private sector. The objective of the project is to offer 
alternatives for an appropriate use of natural resources and establishment of productive 
projects aiming at an immediate positive impact on social and economic conditions of the 
beneficiary population. 
UNODC is cooperating with a wide range of actors, which all have different interests and act 
according to different procedures. As for donors the individual requirements and standards of 
often depend on their economic and political importance. Consequently most of the smaller 
countries are very easy to work with. For instance conduct some countries their 
correspondence in their official language, such as France, Belgium and Luxemburg359. Of 
course bigger donors dispose of bigger financial resources and consequently are able to play a 
bigger part. Such donors would be able to influence the future direction and focus of projects 
supported by them.360
 
 
The government of France is financially assisting the alternative development project 
COLJ36 implemented by UNODC in Colombia. French authorities did not get involved in the 
elaboration of project document COLJ36. Nevertheless there is contact to a certain extent 
between the UNODC Field Office in Colombia and the local French Embassy. France is a 
very stable financial supporter and is likely to fund project COLJ36 next year again. As for 
France a certain “French ownership” or “French branding” is important. For instance a senior 
                                                 
359 Luxemburg for instance in corresponding in German, the treaties are sent in French and answered by 
UNODC in English. 
360 See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 
2008. 
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project officer with French nationality, reports in French language, etc. Compared to other 
donors it is noticeable, that French is one of the bigger ones and also more demanding. 361
 
 
Austria is funding project COLJ36 in Colombia but did not get involved in the elaboration of 
project document COLJ36. However, there is contact and exchange of information between 
the UNODC Field Office in Colombia and the local French Embassy. Austria is seldom 
changing its focus areas and therefore a consistent donor for project COLJ36 and other 
projects supported by Austria. Decisions are taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its 
development policies, which is oriented regionally. Alternative development is of high 
importance within its cooperation with and financial support for UNODC. 362
 
 
The government of Switzerland, concretely the Ministry of Health, is a small donor, but has 
very exact ideas and rules of procedures. Switzerland wanted to support a project 
implemented in Colombia and had special criteria to its contributions. 363
 
 
The Italian government, precisely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Environment, is financially supporting project COLJ31 and COLJ36, and will contribute an 
additional US$ 1Mio to COLJ31 and COLJ36. The funds come from a special purpose fund 
for Latin America. The political interests behind this investment are not clear, but it is likely 
that the Italian background of UNODC’s permanent field representative in Colombia; Aldo 
Lale-Demoz, and his well established relationship with the embassy in Colombia is one 
reason. UNODC is both communicating with the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in 
Vienna and Ministries, which dispose of earmarked funds of certain development areas. That 
way UNODC sometimes gets information or negotiates with the Ministries in Rom without 
the Permanent Missions’ involvement. Even trips to certain donor countries are undertaken or 
the responsible Ministry personal is invited to Vienna, for example to the “Major Donor 
Meeting”, which takes place twice a year in order to strengthen existing cooperation. 364
 
 
While Italy is increasing its financial contributions to COLJ36 and COLJ31 Switzerland will 
decrease its donations and has not yet decided where to focus on. However, Switzerland is 
                                                 
361 See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. 
UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008 
362 Ibid. 
363 See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 
2008 
364 Ibid. 
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only supporting projects with human rights elements such as Criminal Justice Programmes 
while at the same time not giving assistance to Law Enforcement Projects. Besides, some 
countries, such as Germany prefer to support a certain component of a project due to special 
administrative procedures, which is of course additional work for UNODC. 365
 
 
Without any doubt, political events and government configuration influence the decision-
making of stakeholders. Also it depends on the respective political goals and programmes. A 
repetitive change of government and leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can result 
in a change of thematic or geographic priorities concerning the development policies. 366 
Nonetheless, most donors have certain thematic and geographical areas they are supporting. 
So far, Colombia has not been of big strategic interest to Italy and Switzerland. Financial 
contributions had been small so far. But with a pledge of US$ 1 Mio. it seems that a 
partnership with Colombia has become more important to the Italian government. Switzerland 
usually focuses on Criminal Justice programmes in the East. Italy on the other hand, had been 
given support to all kinds of geographical and thematical areas and is likely to focus on 
specific areas in the near future. Still, Italy has certain thematical preferences depending on 
geographical zones. For instance, alternative development in Latin America or Judicial 
Reform in Afghanistan.367 Of course donor priorities change and new areas come up while 
others diminish. Further: if a project it not within a donor’s target area, then it is almost 
impossible to get funded. Consequently UNODC has to adjust its projects to the donors’ 
wishes, and projects are elaborated, that are donor driven rather than country driven. Of 
course this is not always the case. However, the risk exists, that UNODC may focus on 
something not effective in order to capture some funding. After all it is difficult to engage 
donors. Concerning alternative development, UNODC seeks to design projects in regions of 
interest to its member states and donors in order to secure funding.368
 
 
The money invested by the United States of America in the Colombian project COLJ31 is 
given by USAID and funded locally in Bogota. USAID is financing projects independent 
from the US State Department in case projects fit its local objectives. Alternative 
development in Colombia is an important area for the USAID, which corresponds to its very 
                                                 
365 Ibid. 
366 See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. 
UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008 
367 See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 
2008 
368 See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership 
Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008 
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high contributions (up to US$ millions) to UNODC alternative development projects, such as 
COLJ31 and COLJ36, each year.369
 
 
Of course donors are bound to their pledges through financial agreements and almost entirely 
comply with. As for projects COLJ31 and COLJ36 there had been no problems. In general, 
only few times money had to be returned. For instance, when money was not spent because 
the project had never started. However, sometimes this money is contributed to other projects 
or programmes in addition to the considered financial assistance. The responsible UNODC 
personnel needs to be familiar with the donors interests, funding preferences and financial 
capacity including earmarked funds, in order to get these additional funds. Unfortunately 
UNODC does not dispose of special personnel assigned to research the mentioned interests or 
activities due to lack of resources. Yet Mrs. Martina Hanke, Expert in UNODC’s Co-finance 
and Partnership Section, undertakes a few trips to the Ministries of donor countries in order to 
strengthen existing and build new partnerships, meet various Ministry personal, present 
UNODC, as it is compared to other UN organizations rather small, and to introduce new hard-
, and soft pipeline projects. 370
 
 
The allocation of funds is widely decided by the respective Ministry. Only in some cases 
representatives, e.g. ambassadors, have the decision-making competences to decide upon the 
assurance of financial assistance. In the Colombian case there is a very close contact between 
UNODC and the donor countries which sometimes makes the decision-making process less 
complicated as local needs are recognized by both parties. The existence of various partners 
within the financial donator community allows more cooperation possibilities but increases 
the complexity and uncertainty of the whole structure. 371
 
 
Although UNODC field office in Colombia is in touch with the local embassies of Austria 
and France, decision about agreements, funding or other types of cooperation are taken 
centrally in Vienna and Paris. As for the representative of the PMs in Vienna it is extensive 
work to get decisions outside the determined agenda approved by the government. 372
 
 
                                                 
369 Ibid. 
370 See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 
2008 
371 Ibid. 
372 See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. 
UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008 
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Usually, the embassy in the project country is not allowed to sign agreements with the field 
representative373 and donor countries demand feedback to the Permanent Mission as they 
need to submit agreements and treaties centrally. Agencies such as USAID or Canadian SIDA 
have authority locally and their own local budget, which has been decided upon local 
priorities and the assessment of potential funding vehicles, etc. Further there is an important 
element that has changed in the decision-making process and the cooperation with donors 
since UNODC is extending its donor base. Before most assistance came directly from 
governments through the Vienna Permanent Missions. Now a number of funding sources are 
local because the field office representatives are mobilizing funding while keeping in touch 
with headquarters in Vienna. Additionally UNODC headquarters has to authorize the 
signature of agreements. Quite frequently questions about clauses in the agreement, format, or 
discrepancies in the agreements, such as inappropriate references to national law or auditing, 
etc. come up, which UNODC can not accept since it works under the UN rules and 
regulations. Consequently it is still important, that the approval and clearance process goes 
through headquarters in order to make sure that the agreement is in accordance with the 
required regulations.374
 
 
Concerning the projects’ effectiveness, immediate and stable results can not be identified, 
accept after a couple of years. Further there are a couple of reasons why objectives can not be 
achieved. For instance external factors, politics, natural disaster, etc. Therefore, if a donor 
decides not to financially assist a project any more it means that the donor has no funds for 
this particular thematic or geographic area. However, it wouldn’t mean, that the assistance is 
not needed any more. This is quite a problem for the people on the ground and the responsible 
UNODC field office. Such scenario took place about six years ago when donors shifted their 
funding from the Latin American region to Afghanistan and the surrounding region for 
political reasons. There was not doubt Latin America still needed assistance, but the donors 
invested financial resources in an other region.375
 
 
There are also certain demands expressed by donors regarding the supply with information 
such as project documents and revisions, time schedules, work plans and financial data. 
Financial statements, annual, and semi-annual reports are sent automatically each year. 
                                                 
373 For instance the Swiss development cooperation has the competence to do so. 
374 See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership 
Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008 
375 Ibid. 
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Sometimes special information about project activities sponsored by single donors is inquired. 
However, there had been no particularly extensive demands been expressed in the course of 
COLJ31 and COLJ36.376
 
 
As for France, few special demands are expressed within a very well organized organizational 
structure. Austria, in comparison, is more extensive to work with. Sometimes UNODC’s 
contact person to the Austrian Permanent Mission for funding obtains few decision-making 
competences, such as an intern, and change on a regular basis. That way UNODC’s contact 
person to the PMs is very inconsistent and knowledge management within the Austrian 
Permanent Mission is sometime rather poor. Unfortunately, this scares situation is already a 
long-term condition, so Ms. Arthur-Flatz, UNODC External Relations Officer. This results in 
additional administrative work for UNODC since project and donor information, as well as 
working procedures need to the communication reiteratively. 377
4.2.5 Intermediate Conflicts 
 
Conflicts between stakeholders implementing an alternative development project or 
programmes can arise as a consequence of differences of opinion on implementation, on 
certain program activities, on state repression, or on distribution of program benefits, etc. In 
addition differences in the assessment of the project progress or the distribution of benefits 
can emerge and need to be solved expeditiously in order not to threaten the overall project 
success or its continuation.378
 
 
As USAID, co-financing alternative development project COLJ31, works and decided at a 
local level, the US Permanent Mission in Vienna does not know what USAID’s plans in 
Colombia are. It even occurs that the mission is surprised to see new contributions from 
USAID, because they don’t know about this undertaking. USAID’s headquarters is in 
Washington, but its priorities are set locally and it has own regional or country offices with 
individual country programmes, targets, and priorities. Of course, there is obviously 
coordination between USAID and the US State Department of “somehow” going out as one. 
Consequently this had been a huge political controversy when about two years ago former US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested, that development assistance should possibly 
                                                 
376 See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 
2008 
377 See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. 
UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008 
378 Heinz. 2002. 17 sq. 
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follow political goals. This caused uproar within the development community, because the 
development community urges, that development should be for its own sake, not to realize 
political aims and decisions should be taken based on the situation of the people on the 
ground. However, there is often a coincidence of assistance between USAID and the US State 
Department, because they are in the same sphere of interests. As for Colombia, the country is 
important to the United States for a number of reasons and therefore supported by many US 
institutions. 379
 
 
Also, the involvement of other donors or their financial contributions can sometimes be of 
interest to a donor. Mostly contributors want to be informed about the money already pledged 
or allocated and by whom it is done so. This is not necessarily about “who” is involved, but 
about “will there be enough money to start the project”.380 Of course donors coordinate their 
funding with other donors, although, UNODC is not always informed about ongoing 
discussions between them. Sometimes one of the smaller countries wants to co-finance a 
project with one of the politically more important countries. This cooperation and financial 
contributions can be issued due to development efforts in a certain area or due to political 
reasons 381 . Most of the political constellations and cooperation are an outcome of the 
commissions, as the GRULAC block for Latin America, and its resolutions. These blocks 
discuss priorities and try either to fund themselves, or to act as a pressure group toward the 
group with financial power. Overall donors and member states rather agree to work together 
than to actually coordinate their actions. 382
 
 
As for Colombia UNODC and the counterparts in the government have the same goals. Of 
course the government of Colombia, that is financing its alternative development projects to a 
great part, wishes not to be told by other donors what to do in their own country. However, if 
                                                 
379 See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership 
Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008 
380 See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 
2008 
381 For instance did Japan and the US cooperate on a project in Myanmar: The US had political problems with 
Myanmar as 8 people were in US courts for crimes and it had to cut the funding. But the US had the political 
objective to change the drug situation. Hence it agreed with Japan to financially support a project in the region, 
Thailand, when Japan would fund the project that the US could no longer support in Myanmar. So basically the 
donors agreed, that they would split was they fund, because there were political problems. That means that the 
donors are mot trying to do their own political thing no matter what, but are trying to make sure, that project and 
assistance works. 
382 See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership 
Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008 
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common objectives exist, support and cooperation between the project counterparts can most 
of the time be relied on.383
4.2.6 Analysis of the Project Documents 
 
This chapter will illustrate and examine both the elaboration of the analyzed project 
documents, and the incorporation and consideration of essential components or approaches384
 
. 
As illustrated and discussed in chapter 3.3, certain factors and challenges need to be 
considered during the elaboration of projects or programmes and must be integrated in the 
official document in order to facilitate and enhance results-oriented implementation of 
strategies, programmes, and projects. Consequently the incorporation of specific elements 
depending on respective objectives of individual alternative development projects and 
programmes into their design is required to permit sustainable results and valuable assistance 
for the beneficiaries in the field. 
 
 According to the discussed literature, alternative development projects and programmes 
has to meet the country’s or region’s needs and take into account its environment. With 
regard to Project COLJ36 and OCLJ31 any development strategy must also take the 
continuation of the war as a starting point for any short to middle term perspective.385 In 
addition, as pointed out above, any anti-drug policy should be based on the understanding 
of the institutions and social structure of the respective country where it is applied386
 
. 
Since the departmental government in Colombia has provided technical assistance in the 
conceptual formulation of project COLJ36 alongside the Secretary of Agriculture, IDEA, and 
advisors from UNODC the involvement of local stakeholders can be verified. Complementary 
the projects follow national policies on crop substitution promoted by the Presidency 
Programme of Accion Social: Illicit Programme Against Crops. Further the planned 
promotion of a change towards agro-forestry production of coffee and cocoa as a mechanism 
to substitute illicit crop cultivation, which is part of the project’s main objective, is in 
accordance with the Departmental Strategy for Alternative Development promoted by the 
                                                 
383 Ibid. 
384 In case no further quotations are made the following information is based on project documents COLJ36 and 
COLJ31. 
385 Heinz. 2002. P. 19 according to Collier, P. (2000). Policy for Post-conflict Societies. Reducing the Risk of 
Renewed Conflict. 
386 See Thoumi. 2002. P. 6 sq. 
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Government of Antioquia itself. In addition a local office is operating in Medellin in order to 
support the local cooperation and project implementation. 
 
 However, not only cooperation with local authorities and institutions in the planning and 
later implementation of the project is central, but also the participation of the project 
target groups. That way later project goals can meet the beneficiaries’ interests and 
requirements. Therefore it is necessary to shift power and responsibilities from the 
implementing agency to the beneficiaries.387 Especially a broad participation of the local 
population, e.g. peasant federations, producers’ associations, or social organizations, need 
to be part of the design and implementation of projects.388 The beneficiaries should have 
choices and control during the substitution and development process and should be part of 
the decision-making processes that determine their future lives. In addition a relationship 
of trust should exist in any development process between the stimulating agents and the 
beneficiaries389
 
. 
It is indicated in project document COLJ36 that in terms of the UNODC Mid-term Strategy 
2008-2011 COLJ36 will enhance the capacity of the local government of Antioquia to design 
and implement a sound sustainable AD programme, aimed at preventing, reducing and 
eliminating the illicit cultivation of coca crops. This implies that power and responsibilities 
are shifted from the implementing agency UNODC to the local government. In addition the 
government of Antioquia is the project counterpart, which also demonstrates the strong 
involvement of local authorities. The National Federation of Coffee Growers, UMATA’s390
 
, 
Direction of Agriculture of the Government of Antioquia, and Direction of Political of the 
Government of Antioquia have also been playing an important role, so the document. 
As indicated in project document COLJ31, UNODC worked in 7 geographical areas with 
about 20,000 Forest Warden families (Guardabosques) that have decided to invest the funds 
received from the government in productive and commercially viable activities. This decision 
made by the project beneficiaries themselves assures their support for later project activities 
                                                 
387 See Gebert, R./Rerkasem, K. (2002). Community Empowerment in Alternative Development. Prerequisite for 
Success or Mutually Exclusive Concepts? Paper for the International Conference on The Role of Alternative 
Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation. 7-12 January 2002: Berlin, Chiang Mai. P. 1-6.  
388 Oomen. 2002. P. 2. 
389 See Jelsma. 2002. P. 19 cit from UNDCP (2000). Alternative Development in the Andean Area. The UNDCP 
Experience. United Nations: New York. 
390 UMATA- Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria. 
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regarding the development of forest management with active participation of community 
councils and communities. 
 
 The history of alternative development efforts in the past three decades has shown that 
illicit crop substitution can not be successful without concurrent development of the rural 
and community infrastructure. Consequently institutions and mechanisms to support 
community-based drug control need to be create or strengthened since weak institutional 
capacities, infrastructure and coordination between the public and private sector are 
considered both as cause and consequence of illicit cultivation.391
 
  
This is especially a problem in Colombia where in some regions very poor infrastructure 
exists.392
 
 Measures should be taken to support the stabilization of the social and political 
environment, e.g. strengthening social-, political institutions. Moreover the central state in 
Colombia has to be a core element in any AD strategy designed for Colombia. 
Project COLJ36’s main objectives include the strengthening of social ties, productive 
capacities, and enterprises of the beneficiaries. The specific objectives include the raise of 
both the capacity of self-management and of socio-economic development of the beneficiary 
families and producer associations, and also the technical capacity of the local organizations 
in the planning and regulation of forest and natural resources. However, no new construction 
of infra-structure is envisaged, since transformation of products will take place either at 
existing locations or will be contracted by the project. The first of two project objectives is the 
consolidation of the two processes of community organization and enterprise management of 
at least 200 families in the municipalities of Bricenio and Anori in the Department of 
Antioquia. In doing so 200 families that are currently involved in illicit crop cultivation are 
involved in the project and requested to sign an agreement. Further will base organizations 
that lead organizational processes oriented towards activities of legal crop production be 
consolidated, and the establishment of community associations for the production and 
marketing of honey will be fostered. As a result the organizational and entrepreneurial 
capacities of production organizations, but also the capacities of local institutions, will be 
strengthened in the municipalities of Bricenio and Anorí. Besides, project COLJ31 has 
incorporated mechanisms to strengthen social, environmental and institutional networks. 
                                                 
391 See Heinz. 2002. P.9 according to GTZ- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1998). 
Drugs and Development in Asia: Eschborn. P. 61,65. 
392 See Thoumi. 2002. P. 9 sqq. 
 93 
 
 I order to ensure the profitability and successful marketing of alternative development 
products agro-industrial development and product marketing mechanisms need to be part 
of the programme. Further the existence and further development of communal 
organizations are central to agro-industrial development. Unfortunately, such 
organizations are very poor developed in Colombia, and “producers in must build such 
organizations virtually from scratch”393 As regards the marketing matter it is essential to 
promote productive activities that are market-oriented, but take into account those 
products that are known to the local population and relate to their culture and experience. 
Simultaneously the capacity of the local, regional and national market should be 
strengthened before export-oriented initiatives can be considered.394
 
  
The Government of Colombia started an initiative to market AD products under the label 
“Products for Peace” which has increased the involvement of the private sector and could 
serve as a good example to be adopted in other countries.395 States not effected by illicit drug 
crop cultivation and the private sector can and should provide better access to markets for AD 
products396
 
. 
Project COLJ36’s main objective includes the promotion of a change towards agro-forestry 
production of coffee and cocoa as a mechanism to substitute illicit crop cultivation. One of the 
project’s specific objectives is the improvement of the efficiency of production systems 
(based on agro-forestry) and the production chain of timber yielding and non-timber yielding 
products. Within the project implementation supportive facilities for the handling of these 
productions systems are developed. In addition the traditional system of agro-forestry 
production, extraction and use of alimentation resources are planned to be optimized. 
Additionally food security activities are promoted. In specific production systems adjustments 
with emphasis on the production of coffee and cocoa should be established based on agro-
forestry. These are to complete the rural income for the families and enable the environmental 
sustainability of relevant production units. (300 hectares of cocoa and 100 hectares of coffee 
are to be established.) As a result the beneficiaries will have the capacity for sustainable 
production and enterprise management. Further will the organizational and entrepreneurial 
                                                 
393 Thoumi. 2002. P.11 cit from Lee/Clawson. 1993. P. 9. 
394 Oomen. 2002. P. 2. 
395 UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 21. 
396 Ibid. P. 30. 
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capacities of production organizations be strengthened in the municipalities of Bricenio and 
Anorí. Concerning the marketing component of project COLJ36 AD products are marketed in 
fair trade markets and supermarket chains in Colombia. 
 
Project COLJ36 does not only have the direct support from the private sector for the 
commercialization of coffee and cocoa, but also has the backing of the National Federation of 
Coffee Growers (La Federación Nacional de Cafeteros). For that reason the National 
Federation of Coffee Growers, UMATAs. Direction of Agriculture of the Government of 
Antioquia and Direction of Political of the Government of Antioquia are central actors. 
 
As indicated in project document COLJ31, UNODC has worked on the identification and 
promotion of legal and commercially viable alternatives to replace farmers’ dependence on 
coca crops for several years. The project’s main objective is to offer alternatives for an 
appropriate use of natural resources and the establishment of productive projects aiming at an 
immediate positive impact on social and economic conditions for the beneficiary population. 
The project promoted traditional alternatives, such as cocoa and coffee, as well as relatively 
new legal livelihoods, such as agro-forestry, ecotourism and fisheries. National markets for 
these products are mostly assured, considering the helpful and socially responsible 
engagement of major national supermarket chains in Colombia, as well as national federations 
and foundations that help farm enterprises to place their products in both national and export 
markets. The project supports the establishment of agreements with productive organizations 
for forestry and agro-forestry production and planning, focusing on environmental protection. 
Further it seeks to improve the marketing chain for forestry and agro-forestry products in the 
national market, food security through traditional production systems and the introduction of 
new agro-forestry practices, and capacities for fishery, ecotourism and the production of 
handicrafts with local natural resources. In addition COLJ31 seeks to contribute to the 
competitive ability of micro, small, and medium-seized rural producers and to implement a 
sustainable marketing model for various agro-industrial producers involved in AD. 
 
 The environmental dimension also needs to be considered. In this regard AD efforts 
should include environmental restoration components, and incorporate environmental 
 95 
sustainability and protection into their project activities aiming at developing economic 
and social infrastructure.397
 
 
Project COLJ36 incorporates production systems that are to offer rural income for families 
and enable environmental sustainability of relevant production units. Further they are to 
develop licit production activities, which emphasise not only on the quality of production, but 
also environmental conservation. 
 
Project COLJ31 has incorporated mechanisms to strengthen environmental networks and 
seeks operational synergies with local and departmental entities involved in the promotion of 
environmental protection initiatives. Focusing on environmental protection the project support 
the establishment of agreements with productive organizations for forestry and agro-forestry 
production and planning. 
 
 The application of a Harm Reduction Approach is rather new and needs to be promoted 
on an international level. Harm reduction can also be functional in the environmental 
dimension and the damages done by illicit cultivation. Moreover there are currently 
various ideas of linking harm reduction on the demand and the supply side. E.g. row 
materials from source countries could supply the heroin maintenance programmes in 
Europe, or risk-free coca products could be allowed to be exported to international 
markets.398
 
 
However, such approach is not incorporated in any of the analyzed project. 
 
 As repeatedly illustrated and discussed earlier in the present study monitoring and 
evaluations mechanisms need to be established in order to detect intended and unintended 
consequences of project activities399
                                                 
397 Ibid. P. 17 sq. according to United Nations (2005). Alternative Development. A Global Thematic Evaluation. 
Final Synthesis Report. New York. P. 7. Also see: UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group 
on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 4. 
, and an evaluation of the success or failure of AD 
projects is essential for the initial conditions and chance of success of later initiatives. The 
assessment should normally be based on data collected among their main target group: 
coca growing farmers. The increase, stabilization or decrease of life standards, having in 
398 See. Jelsma. 2002. P. 22- 25. 
399 See Heinz. 2002. P. 15. 
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mind, that an increase is the main reason for initiating the collaboration, should be 
identified.400
 
 
The new UNODC mid-term strategy401
 
, introduced in 2008, for the first time includes an 
integrated, results-oriented work plan containing both objectives and quantitative, 
monitorable performance indicators. Both project document COLJ36 and COLJ31 incorporate 
monitoring and evaluation components through the establishment of a system facilitating the 
monitoring, tracking, and evaluation of the projects. Project COLJ31 also includes an 
assessment with quantitative indicators, which should be obtained through verification of the 
production, productiveness, profitability and generation of income, marketing volumes, and 
product processing. The project document also indicated to monitor the impact of AD in 
terms of its acceptance by the communities and the improvement in terms of governance, 
participation local democracy and achievement of peace conditions. 
These monitoring and evaluation mechanisms seem very well designed and also strongly 
considering the beneficiaries dimension and not only quantitative coca reduction data. 
Unfortunately, actual data on the mentioned activities are not available yet and their 
realization can not be evaluated or judged so for.  
 
 Provision of Security for all Actors involved is also of extreme importance. Especially 
rural population and NGO staff, but also members of government authorities and 
international organizations are victims to threats made against them from drug trafficking 
and organized crime groups.402
 
 
No specific security measures could be found in project documents COLJ36 and COLJ31. 
However, as pointed out in chapter 3.3 UNODC staff is under the supervision of special 
security mechanisms implemented by the UN Department of Safety and Security403
 
. 
 Further it is of high importance to ensure sustainable financial support for the planned AD 
initiative or project. 
                                                 
400 See Oomen. 2002. 
401 The strategy is referred to in subchapter 4.1.3. 
402 See Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-
Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 
20th special Session of the General Assembly. P.10; and Heinz. 2002. P. 20 sq. 
403 For more information see: UN Department of Safety and Security at: https://dss.un.org/dssweb/  
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An assessment report by the Swedish government highlights that deficiency stems from the 
mix of UNODC funding as almost 90% of its budget consists of voluntary funds and only 
10% come from the regular UN budget. Consequently this presents challenges to the 
leadership of the organization. The funding of UNODC is therefore deficient in both 
predictability and stability.404
 
 
Financial contributions to project COLJ36 have been overall stable since the start of its 
implementation. The biggest donor country is the government of Colombia itself, which has 
become an important emerging national donor in the UNODC programme portfolio. Austria 
and Switzerland have been constant donors too, while Italy and France only pledged and 
allocated funds once in 2008.  
 
As regards project COLJ31 the Colombian government has also been the major donor and has 
consistently allocated financial contributions. Italy has been a significant donor, while the 
United States/USAID only contributed with a smaller amount. However, the project’s overall 
financial situation has been stable and sufficient because of the active donor role of the 
beneficiary country. 
 
 Within international development organizations, such as UNODC, donor states should 
increase efforts to harmonize and manage international development assistance in order to 
support the effectiveness. Simultaneously, following the concept of shared responsibility, 
consumer states should support drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation and 
incorporate those strategies into AD programmes.405
 
 
Project COLJ36 and COLJ31 do not include such initiatives. However, UNODC’s 
programme portfolio in has projects or initiatives in this area. 
 
 Last but not least, international and regional organizations should integrate AD into their 
broader development programmes in order to enhance long-term strategies for legitimate 
livelihoods406
                                                 
404 See Government Office of Sweden. 2008. 1. 
. 
405 See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 30 sq. 
406 See UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the 
eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 5. 
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According to the assessment report by the Swedish government much of the good work done 
is not part of countries’ poverty reduction strategies but takes place on a more ad hoc basis, 
often in the form of projects. The new UNODC strategy has the potential to contribute to 
improvements, so the report.407
4.2.7 Analysis of Project Elaboration, Implementation and Progress 
 However, a lot needs to be changed regarding the overall 
counter-drug strategies and the linkage to development aim.  
This chapter will analyze and illustrate the elaboration of the project documents and the 
hitherto project performance based on expert interviews, as well as reports and project 
progress reviews submitted to UNODC Headquarters by the Field Office in Colombia. 
 
PROJECT ELABORATION 
As pointed out above it has become evident that the core stakeholders in and beneficiaries of 
the project need to be not only considered but also included in the elaboration of a project, 
programme or initiative. That way special needs and requirements can be met in adequate 
ways. In addition common goals and shared responsibilities build the basis for possible 
mutual efforts, belief in project success, and trust between all actors concerned. 
 
COLJ36 is the first development project to receive financial assistance from a departmental 
government. As pointed out before, the departmental government has provided technical 
assistance, alongside the Secretary of Agriculture, IDEA, and advisors from UNODC, in the 
conceptual formulation of the project. 
 
During the elaboration of the project documents or project reviews some donors involve 
themselves in order to ensure the realization of certain objectives or goals. Donors can 
indicate whether they would financially support certain project components or single 
activities, make suggestions, or propose new elements or thematical directions. The 
government of Italy suggested to collaborate with UNODC on a portfolio overview of 
projects supported by Italy, but did not have the necessary temporal resources yet. However, 
as regards the Colombian portfolio it is likely that such undertaking will take place in 
Colombia between UNODC Field Representative Aldo Lale-Demoz and the local Italian 
Embassy. That way more detailed and up to date information can be presented within the 
                                                 
407 See Government Office of Sweden. 2008. 3. 
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context of an already well-established partnership. Consequently a well-designed and 
functioning coordination between UNODC headquarters and its field offices, as well as 
corporate identity and functioning in front of member states and donors is essential in order to 
anticipate uncertainty or misunderstandings. Within the elaborating of project documents or 
ideas it is required to formally get the approval by headquarters, and many member states 
demand a formal letter sent by headquarters. Nevertheless, the Field Office in Colombia, as 
other FOs, is elaborating agreements or project ideas in partnership with the local embassies, 
which makes it difficult for headquarters to exactly know what is happening in the field. 
Formally, the competencies are divided between HQ and FOs, but some overlap with can 
have both positive and negative effects. 408
 
 
UNODC is encouraging such a participatory approach of project development by all means 
because funding and transparency can be secured. Moreover, donors are able to deliver the 
envisioned assistance while giving attention to all stakeholders, the beneficiaries and the 
project environment and make sure that all are well represented. The ongoing discussion 
during the elaboration includes all counterparts, and take into account the actual situation and 
needs on the ground. Certain donors, such as Australia or the US, mostly only financially 
assist if they had been participating in the design of a project. Of course the political situation 
in a donor country or in the field is influencing the stakeholders’ decision to support strategies 
or activities. As a result they might change their opinion only in order to not support a certain 
political party, the government, or foreign actors, such as UNODC. That is way national 
politics matter a lot409. 410
 
 
Besides, some project documents are elaborated in partnership with the Permanent Missions 
to the United Nations in Vienna. In that case, concept notes are sent to the PMs in order to 
obtain their feedback, including the aspects they would finance and which not. Thereafter 
UNODC’s thematical units can start elaborating a project document in accordance with the 
donor’s priorities. That way funding of a project can a secured. Especially because UNODC’s 
mandate is concern of various government authorities such as the Ministry of Environment, 
                                                 
408 See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 
2008. 
409 For instance corruption: It is easy to criticize the corrupt politicians that are in power. However, when the 
own political party get into power it gets harder to actively support those elements. 
410 See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership 
Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008. 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Health, or 
National Development Agencies such as USAID. 411
 
 
 
FIELD OFFICE WORK AND MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES 
Field offices need to have sufficient capacity and transparency in order to secure checks and 
balances. Of course this requires the separating of responsibilities concerning the provision of 
oversight, which is costly since additional staff, project managers, project administrators are 
employed412. In particular field office personal has additional work when special requirements 
are issued by donors. So has USAID very strict reporting requirements which demand 
monthly project progress reports and quarterly financial reports. Consequently a strong field 
office administration is key. Efficient administration of files is required to make sure that 
background information and how the project is proceeding is administrated and can be 
presented easily to donors on a regular basis. There is also a review meeting, where the 
implementing agency within the government and donors meet with UNODC and synergies 
can be built and strengthened. According to Ms. Muki Daniel Jerneloev, External Relations 
Officer UNODC, the Colombia field office led by Mr. Aldo Lale-Demoz, has been 
performing well in such endeavours. The Colombian Field Office has a high percentage of 
national staff, which is working in the field with the beneficiaries. As a result there is a lot of 
activity generated, which requires to be discussed and reported. All this needs to be shared 
with the donors to create a cycle of accountability and transparency and show the 
effectiveness. 413
 
 
In addition UNODC is required to work in cooperation with a diverse set of stakeholders in 
order to endorse the efficiency of its programmes and projects. Especially in the field 
UNODC is trying to cooperate with as many other agencies and NGOs, especially NGOs and 
the civil society, as possible and not only within the UN system. The incorporation of local 
knowledge about the actual situation and needs is highly important. In addition UNODC has 
to work on a global level because of the “balloon effect”, meaning the movement of illicit 
                                                 
411 See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 
2008. 
412 This creates indirect costs, such as the mentioned administrative costs, office costs, the rent, infrastructure, 
etc., which  have to be recovered through the project support costs (PSC), which is then issued back as part of 
the budget of the field office. PSC is a fixed percentage of 13 percent. Unless a field office has very large 
portfolio with quite a lot of PSC returned to the office not enough money is generated financial support needs to 
come from Headquarters.  
413 See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership 
Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008. 
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crop cultivation to other areas within very short time, as organized crime will always be well 
funded and able to “export” such illicit cultivation. Of course UNODC is not able to be 
represented in every country since there are only about three offices in every region. 
However, NGOs are working locally and can play a central role because of their profound 
knowledge about the field. That’s why UNODC needs the support of NGOs, but also local 
political powers, and religious leaders (depending on the country) to help the organization 
meet common goals. Basically, UNODC works with NGOs for specific events and disposes 
of a field network as the field is normally already working with NGOs, except field offices, 
which cover a large number of countries. Also, more information on NGOs, which work on 
the right level and the right areas of UNODC’s mandate, is needed. Of course it can be 
problematic to contract local agencies or NGOs since UNODC has to protect its reputation 
and needs to be liable to its member states, but has to be accountable for its official partners. 
However, the UN can be co-implementing projects with an NGO 414 s. Two things are 
important in this regard: First, expertise of partners needs to be secured and capacities need to 
be built and shared with other countries if possible. Second, partner NGOs should be 
administrated in a public registry to ensure their accountability. Also, certain standards of 
credibility have to be met. To sum up: new partnerships, capacities and a roster of partner 
NGOs need to be developed. Further UNODC is cooperating with other UN organizations and 
agencies, and trying to take advantage of existing networks, not necessarily linked to 
alternative development, but to important stakeholders in the field in general.415
 
 
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND PROGRESS 
In the first two years of implementation, 2007 and 2008, project COLJ36 “Alternative 
Development in Antioquia Department” had been a key partner for local authorities in 
Antioquia and to a smaller extent in Cordoba, and had proven the advantages of UNODC 
intervention in the regions. During 2007-2008 a total of 750 peasant families and about 1780 
hectares of cocoa, coffee, sugar cane, rubber, and apiculture had been supported by the 
project416.417
                                                 
414 For instance, in the fight against corruption in West Africa UNODC has a very strong partnership with 
Transparency International. Both are raising funds and then together implementing projects with the respective 
government. 
 
415 See interview with Philip De Andres, Amado. Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer. Latin America 
and the Caribbean Unit. UNODC. VIC: 29 August 2008. 
416 Cocoa: 455 families- 1370ha; coffee: 160 families- 160 ha; sugar cane: 50 families- 150 ha; rubber: 35 
families- 100ha; and apiculture: 50 families- 1000 beehives. 
417 See UNODC Drugs Programme Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ36. 
01012007-31122007; and UNODC Drugs Programme Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. 
Project COLJ36. 01012008-31122008. At: ProFi- Programme and Financial Information Management System. 
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In respect to the social and organizational component of the project, meetings, workshops and 
discussions took place in each municipality in order to attract families to join the project by 
registering and signing agreements to eradicate illicit crops. The reached families (750) 
committed to abandon coca crops in the municipalities of Anori, Bricenio, Taraza, Ituango 
and Valdivia, and were benefited with training programmes including development of 
technical and managerial capacities. Further the project promoted the grouping of beneficiary 
families to strengthen existing organizations and created new ones. In this context, a coffee 
storage and marketing centre was opened in Bricenio and is properly operating. Another 
example is the establishment of ASOMUCAN ( Municipal Association of Cocoa Growers of 
Anori). In addition the project organized technical workshops for the organizations, 
established a commercialization fund for cocoa and coffee, advised on the creating of a brand, 
and undertook actions to market chocolate and cocoa derivates. Workshops cover a wide 
range of themes, e.g. clean production, leadership, and business management.418
 
 
The agro-forestall component supported low scale agriculture, and beneficiary families 
received seeds for cropping corn, beans and vegetables apart form traditional cocoa and 
coffee. For the needs of the population, the project was requested to reinforce activities 
related to food security to reach 700 families.419
 
 
Within the commercial and marketing component advances had been made to standardize 
production and achieve high quality of products. In the case of cocoa marketing funds were 
created, and seven cacao products now count with bar codes, which permit their distribution 
through the main supermarket chains in Colombia (Exito, Carrefour, Casino, and Cafam). The 
cacao products include milk chocolate bars, caramel-chocolate bars, and chocolate-coffee 
beans. During 2008, approximately 150,000 chocolate bars were produced, out of 10 tons of 
cacao by the beneficiary families. Previous to this the local government of Antioquia and 
UNODC had given around 800 million pesos to families in Anorí to cultivate around 150 
hectares with cacao based on a contract420
                                                 
418 Ibid. 
. For coffee, the project established a joint venture 
with the Colombian Coffee Federation to produce special quality coffee. Since March 2007 
“La Vega” Forest Warden Coffee had been sold throughout Colombia in Juan Valdez coffee 
shops and an additional Juan Valdez coffee store was to open in Popayán selling coffee 
419 Ibid. 
420 UNODC. Quarterly Report. July-September 2007. Country Office Colombia. P. 3.  
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products produced by Forest Warden Families of La Vega 421 . The Colombian Coffee 
Federation has participated in the project through the assignment of two coffee specialists 
who are collaboration full time with the project in the region Bricenio.422
 
 
In the context of monitoring and evaluation the project put in place a Monitoring and 
Evaluation System, that serves as a tool for decision making and coordination with the 
monitoring Programme of the Government of Antioquia, and Acción Social. The System 
collects information on the families involved and their productive and social characteristics. 
This has been accomplished together with an other alternative development project 
implemented by UNODC (COLJ86), and with the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, with 
which it had developed synergies for the provision and analysis of data, maps, and satellite 
information on the target areas. Complimentary a monitoring group from the Secretary of 
Agriculture undertook periodic missions to the field to verify project advances and 
recommend adjustments as needed.423
 
 
A major difficulty faced was and is the presence of outlaw groups in the area of project 
implementation, which has made difficult the full achievements of results. However, the joint 
work with local authorities has permitted to work in all planned project areas, and to involve 
an important number of families.424
 
 
In the context of project COLJ31, following “development of productive forestry” had been 
delivered so far: 61,598 hectares are under forest management plans for productive activities, 
administered by Community Councils in Colombia’s Pacific Region, and benefiting 577 
Afro- Colombian families directly. Through constant training on several topics, the 
beneficiaries are now aware of the economic and environmental advantages of sustainable use 
of natural resources based on management plans instead of disorganized exploitation. In 
addition, 100 hectares of forest have been planted with native and exotic species with 
excellent market perspectives, so the project progress report. Given the long term perspective 
of this particular activity, the project has made significant changes in the expectations of the 
families, who find in the licit economy real alternatives for a better and more sustainable 
                                                 
421 See UNODC. Quarterly Report. April-June 2007. Country Office Colombia. P. 5.  
422 UNODC Drugs Programme Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ36. 
01012007-31122007; and UNODC Drugs Programme Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. 
Project COLJ36. 01012008-31122008. 
423 Ibid.  
424 Ibid. 
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future. Skilled and non-skilled workers are involved in various stages of the cultivation, 
permitting to involve different population in the project.425
 
 
In the area “organizational strengthening” project COLJ31 has promoted and advised on the 
establishment of 40 associations and the legalization of another 35, through which productive 
activities related to the cropping and commercialization of the following products have been 
achieved: cocoa, coconut, coffee, palm oil, rubber, wood, rural tourism, handicrafts, and 
fishing. Serious security risks in the project regions (illegal armed groups) clearly affect 
families, who in some cases are reluctant or very slow or establish social bounds, thus 
delaying solidarity and team work. Sales of AD products by the beneficiaries continued to 
increase, reaching US$ 3, and 5 million during the period 2007-2008. 426
 
 
Within the element “agricultural diversification and food security” 3,100 hectares of cocoa, 
coffee and rubber have been planted, distributed in the project target municipalities. 
Productive forestry activities have been interspersed with crops such as coffee, cocoa, green 
banana, or plantain. An interesting innovation in 2008 was the testing of “young boding” for 
rubber. An important number of rubber plantations are run by internally displaced populations 
and demobilized persons, and contributing to the development of social structures for peace 
and security in Colombia, so the report. 427
 
 
As to the “gulf wardens” activities related to fishery, ecotourism and production of 
handicrafts using local natural resources were held. In the case of fishing, 111 families 
grouped under three community organizations in the Uraba Gulf region achieved sustainable 
licit income generation as a result of technical improvements for commercial fishery, 
construction of storage and refrigeration centres and local marketing outlets. In eco-tourism, 
116 families participated in training on hospitality disciplines, such as business management, 
customer services and maintenance of infrastructure. The families are currently grouped under 
three community organizations. In addition negotiations started with national and 
international tour operators to reach customers beyond the natural regional market. 428
                                                 
425 UNODC Drugs Programme. Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ31. 
01012007-31122007; and UNODC Drugs Programme. Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. 
Project COLJ31. 01012008-31122008. At: ProFi- Programme and Financial Information Management System. 
 
426 Ibid. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Ibid. 
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In the area “marketing and agro-industrial strengthening” eleven organizations were selected 
on the basis of rigorous technical, social, organizational and potential productivity criteria to 
benefit from future project-supported marketing promotions to reach national and 
international markets. Technical committees were established to monitor product quality, 
management, productivity, transformation and a wide range of assessments required to win 
and maintain future sales contracts. According to the specific characteristics of the 
organizations, the project produced manuals on security norms for production areas, critical 
production points, best manufacture practices, and environmental management plans. Further, 
workshops were undertaken to design good strategies to market AD products. Also, project 
personnel and experts from the government counterpart “Acción Social” participated at a 
SCAA fair in Minneapolis, USA, on coffee products and services. 429 In addition government 
officials, particularly from Acción Social, but also representatives of local Embassies and 
international development entities (USAID, Italy, Israel, Germany, Mexico) and the private 
sector regularly visit and monitor the project and participate in the inauguration of major 
works, such as eco-tourism lodges, or wood processing and transformation centres. 430
 
 
Unfortunately, problems related with public order and uncertain weather conditions affected 
the schedule of the activities. However, proper organization and reprogramming of the 
activities permitted to achieve results as planned. In most of the cases the beneficiary families 
and the number of productive subprojects were superior to the number initially planned. 431 
Concerning the continuation of project COLJ31, which originally was to be completed by 
December 2008, the project parties agreed to precede working solely on activities related to 
marketing and agro-industrial strengthening for 2009 and 2010. 432
4.3 Multilateral Cooperation in AD- UNODC’s Assets 
 
UNODC is not the only institution implementing alternative development projects. Especially 
the European Union has become a leading actor in development aid. As a high number of 
UNODC member states are also members of the European Union, and their financial 
resources for development aid are limited, it has become harder to engage donors. In addition 
states are implementing development project on bilateral basis. However, the UN disposes of 
a number of competences and long-time expertise, especially in alternative development and 
                                                 
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Ibid. 
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work in the field, which others lack of. For instance is the UN able to recruit expert and 
project officers worldwide, while bilateral cooperation only comprises national public service 
personal. In addition less “colonial aftertaste” is connected with the UN contrary to bilateral 
assistance by former colonial powers. 433
 
 
EuropeAID, the EU’s office for international development, is implementing alternative 
development projects in Colombia, as for example the „Peace laboratories“ mentioned in 
chapter 3.4.1. Unfortunately activities are undertaken without consultations between UNODC 
and the EU what results in overlapping efforts, which can also have different objectives, and 
lack cooperation. Sometimes UNODC gets sub-contracted by EuropeAID and is 
implementing projects on behalf of the European Union. The establishment of a stable 
strategic partnership is a central goal of course. In addition alternative development 
programmes are implemented by other UN organizations, such as the World Food 
Programme, World Bank, UNDP, UNODC, or UNIFEM. Due to the overlap of mandates UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon is strongly supporting the „One UN“ initiative. This new 
initiative can have positive impact on administrative costs, programme coordination and 
efficiency. Unfortunately, reform processes are always complex, and take their time, and no 
UN organization wants to release employees or loose on importance. 434
 
 
In the Andean region plenty of alternative development programmes or projects are 
implemented in cooperation with the United States, the European Union and the United 
Nations. The development and strengthening of national or local industries is a central 
element is these endeavours. According to Mr. Julio Mollinedo Claros, Second Secretary of 
the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in Vienna, AD projects and programmes 
implemented in the context of bilateral cooperation often reflects asymmetrical relationships, 
giving the donor country a dominant position, where individual local requirements are not 
met. The UN, however, can act as a neutral player within the international system and has the 
capacities to facilitate and support “responsabilidad compartida”, shared responsibility on a 
global level. One of the positive implications of the UN is that it is a very experienced and 
proficient organization, so Mr. Mollinedo, which is important since the beneficiaries of 
                                                 
433 See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. 
UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008. 
434 Ibid. 
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alternative development projects need to be trained and supported in order to understand 
professional cultivation and market requirements, including marketing.435
 
 
Moreover, the international community is of high importance when facing problems of 
translateral outreach. Therefore international institutions such as UNODC need to be 
strengthened and maintained. Of course individual interests of member states and national 
politics can often be interacting or result in conflicts. For example may countries concerned 
with an AD project have different opinions and precede different goals. Consequently, 
consensus is often not possible to be reached and common positions take their time to be 
identified and formulated. In addition countries usually have different ideas about the future 
of coca cultivation or coca substitution. For example forced and voluntary eradication and the 
use of aerial spraying are a highly controversial issue. 436
 
 
The UN has been putting strong efforts on strengthening its partnerships with regional 
organizations and on working more closely from the highest political level on down to the 
field. There is clear political recognition that regionalism as a component of multilateralism is 
necessary and more feasible. In addition civil society engagement with the work of the UN 
has increased and become more results-oriented. In that regard it has also become a well-
established practice for the General Assembly to conduct interactive hearings with 
representatives on NGOs, civil society and the private sector during all major UN 
conferences. Moreover the business community is an increasingly important partner in 
achieving UN goals, particularly those to sustainable development. In the past the UN has 
taken concrete steps to increase its relationship with the business sector. For instance had the 
“Partnership Assessment Tool” and the “Business Guide to Partnership with NGOs and the 
United Nations: Report 2007/2008 been elaborated and released recently.
Overall UN Endeavours For Efficient Programme Implementation 
437
According to the above illustrated statements of the report of the UN Secretary-General, 
important elements for efficient programme implementation have been strengthened and are 
highly supported. At leased on the paper. 
 
                                                 
435 See interview with Mr. Mollinedo Claros, Julio. Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation 
in Vienna. VIC: 30 September 2009. 
436 Ibid. 
437 See UN. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 2008. P. 25-28. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
5.1 IR Theory meets Alternative Development 
As discussed in the theoretical section and confirmed by the presented case study new threats 
to international security and human welfare maintain and strengthen international cooperation 
within international organizations since states pursue common interests concerning the 
provision of security to their citizens and are not able to realize them on their own. Besides 
international institutions possess the ability to facilitate cooperation and make it less likely 
that states mistrust or cheat on each other. Further they are to ensure individual compliance of 
states to decide actions or other forms of agreements. Available instruments are monitoring or 
enforcing measures. In addition IOs permit the realization of states’ interests while not 
depending on a specific state in a hegemony position. 
 
The most important factor for the establishment and maintenance of international 
organizations is the demand for a resolution of problematic constellations of interests. 
Considering that, transnational problems, such as the negative consequences of drug 
cultivation, trade and consumption, and action taken by states result in better outcomes within 
the framework of international organizations. However, as pointed out in chapter 3.4, the type 
of interest constellation is central for the likelihood of cooperation. In the field of alternative 
development mutual interests are prevailing existing controversies by far since mostly all 
stakeholders pursue the same objectives and are highly depending on each other. So does the 
coca cultivating population depend on technical and financial assistance, and expertise 
provided by the government, public institutions and donor countries, while at the same time 
donors and the local government depend on the participation and liability of the coca 
cultivating population in their efforts to substitute illicit crops. 
 
In IR theory Robert Keohane argues that common interests between states are the most 
important condition for cooperation since actors worry less about relative gains if they are not 
able to reach their objectives alone. That way states still act according to their self-interest 
while being engaged in joint actions and realizing mutual goals. 
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As for alternative development almost all member states of international organizations face 
problems originating either from drug cultivation, trafficking or consumption and are 
dedicated to eliminate the source, coca cultivation, through crop substitution and the 
establishment of socio-economic infrastructure, including marketing mechanisms. Thereby 
the theoretical mutual advantages are evident: Overall development, security, and provision of 
basic goods for former coca cultivating areas, more security for drug trafficking countries, and 
fewer problems connected to addiction and dealing in consumer countries, especially North 
America and Europe. 
 
In order to realize these common objectives diplomatic relations and communication are 
strengthened, knowledge and expertise exchanged, and technical and financial cooperation 
established. States and stakeholders also commit themselves to international treaties and 
interact in accordance with UN rules and procedures. Besides international organizations, 
especially within the UN family, are providing a degree of legitimacy and difficult changes 
“in the field” are often accepted and supported easier. 
 
Based on these findings, hypothesis 1 and 2 can be verified since national states are both 
willing to cooperate within the framework of international organization if the face problems 
of international interdependence and are not able to resolve it on their own, and also act 
according to their self-interests and in compliance with common objectives if they intend to 
secure the provision of security and welfare to their citizens’ within the framework of 
international organizations. 
5.2 The Past and Future of Alternative Development 
Unfortunately alternative development has only been of limited importance within global 
counter-drug strategies and programmes. As being stated before a long term reduction of the 
world’s supply of coca depends not on effective law enforcement, but also on the eradication 
of poverty, which makes rural population vulnerable to the temptation of growing lucrative 
illicit crops or even forces them to do so as it is the only possibility of income. However, AD 
investments in the course of Plan Colombia have been small and merely serve to justify 
“voluntary eradication”, where farmers have to eliminate all coca in return for financial 
compensation in order to avoid aerial spraying. The limited success of such undertakings is 
evident as the necessary settings for sustainable coca eliminating are not provided unless 
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infrastructural improvement is ensured. Consequently the issue of illicit crop cultivation is 
rooted in social and economic poverty, which need solutions people benefit from, not suffer. 
 
However, AD has measurably contributed to positive social change at the local level. 
Unfortunately, large parts of the coca cultivating population don’t receive alternative 
development assistance and remain isolated from wider economic and social development 
initiatives. For the future it will be essential to establish adequate setting in which this efforts 
take place since the participation of public and private actors, and the civil society is 
necessary. In addition developing countries with experience in the design of alternative 
development programmes or strategies should play a significant role. Their task is to promote 
best practise and lessons learned in that area and try to apply them in accordance with the 
respective national particularities. 
 
Overall, UNODC alternative development programme in Colombia, in particular the two 
analyzed projects COLJ31 and COLJ36 seem to be very comprehensive and well-designed. 
Six out of seven elements, identified and discussed in chapter 3.3, are very well incorporated 
in the projects’ objectives, activities and also seem to be implemented properly so far. As for 
element seven, the harm reduction approach, no activities are and can be included due to the 
illegal status of any coca crop cultivation in Colombia at present. 
I. Local/ Regional focused Strategies 
II. Participatory Approach and Trust between 
Beneficiaries and Implementing Agencies 
III. Rural and Community Development 
IV. Agro-Industrial Development and Product 
Marketing 
V. Strengthening the State 
VI. Environmental Protection 
VII. Harm Reduction Approach 
VIII. Monitoring and Evaluation 
Figure 9: Core Elements in Alternative Development 
 
Especially the partnership and collaboration between UNODC and the Colombian 
government, but also the projects’ beneficiaries seem to be very well established and strong. 
The reason might be Colombia’s political openness to foreign actors, such as the United 
States (Plan Colombia), or the United Nations. Unlike in Bolivia or Peru, coca cultivation in 
Colombia is not part of the country’s traditional agriculture, but was only started in the 1970s 
for economic reasons. In addition Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary groups finance 
themselves with illicit crop cultivation and trade, for which reason the government of 
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Colombia is particularly interested in the efficient and sustainable eradication of coca 
cultivation and also willing to work closely with the international community. 
 
Due to its long-term experience with alternative development and rather neutral role in the 
international system, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is a convenient partner of 
the Colombian government and public authorities. Of course UNODC can not be present and 
implement AD projects throughout all Colombia since some regions are not under control of 
the central government. However, UNODC is able to work with population in areas, where 
development organizations usually do not have access to and citizens are left aside. Sadly, 
people living in such marginal areas are not of interest to the central government or the 
international community until they are cultivating illicit crops. 
 
Unfortunately, due to the limited scope of the present study, it was not possible to assess the 
beneficiaries’ attitude and opinion about their experience with alternative development 
projects implemented by UNODC, and possible future endeavours and strategies at a local 
level. Surely more interests, problems concerning the implementation process and the 
sustainability of alternative development projects could have been identified. A perspective 
away from government interests and global drug caused problems would have offered 
different thoughts and inspiration. 
 
Again, hypothesis 3 and 4 can be validated since the establishment of a well-designed socio-
economic infrastructure in equal partnership with the project beneficiaries are essential for the 
projects’ effectiveness and sustainability if alternative development projects are implemented 
in an unsound socio-economic environment. Also, endeavours in the fight against drugs 
undertaken by the international community can only be effective if strong emphasis is put on 
alternative development and broader development efforts in illicit crop cultivating countries. 
 
Last but not least the “harm reduction approach” should be brought to attention once again. 
As explained before, the goal of coca eradication and counter-drug strategies should not be 
the quantitative elimination of coca cultivation, but the reduction of harm associated with it. 
New spaces of dialogue with the involved communities have to be opened in order to 
elaborate ways of gradual reduction of illicit cultivation accompanied with activities that 
reduce the harm of monodependence or of problems related to local abuse. According to Mr. 
Julio Mollinedo Claros, Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in 
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Vienna, the use of the coca plant for the production of legal products, and for the use of drugs 
in drug substitution programmes in consumer countries is a very good idea. Unfortunately, the 
coca leave is illegal and banned based on the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs from 
1961, whose content is neither questioned nor discussed at the moment. Consequently, the 
commercialization of the coca leave is prohibited on a global level any such undertakings are 
unfeasible at present. 
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7. Annex 
7.1 Questionnaires 
 
CPS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Q1 Do donors usually focus on specific target areas (thematically and geographically)? 
GENERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING FUNDING AND DONORS 
AQ1a Do donors usually support a certain project continuously? 
AQ1b Does donor X have such specific target zones? If yes, for what reasons? 
AQ1c Does donor X have any “restricted areas”, where he would not contribute financially 
to? (e.g. no crime projects) 
AQ1d How difficult is it to engage donors in new areas? 
 
Q2 Who is responsible for the selection of funding areas and the specific projects? 
AQ2a Who is involved in the decision-making process? 
 
Q3 Do donors coordinate their funding with other donors? 
AQ3a Is there any special collaboration between certain donors? 
 
Q4 Are donors legally bound to their pledges? 
AQ4a Do donors usually comply with their pledges? 
AQ4b What would be reasons not to comply with? 
 
Q5 What kind of information about the project is requested by the donors before the 
assurance of pledges? 
AQ5a Do donors request information about donor trends and other donors funding focus? 
AQ5b With what kind of information are donors provided automatically and on a regular 
basis? 
AQ5c How often do donors demand individual information? (report on activities funded by 
donor,..) 
AQ5d How can the impact and sustainability of the donors´ financial contribution be made 
visible to them? 
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AQ5e De donors request information about the project counterparts and partners? If yes, how 
does this influence their decision-making? 
 
Q6 Did donor x participate in the elaboration of/ comment on 
SPECIAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING COLJ36 AND COLJ31 
 the project idea,  project document,  budget, or 
 At other points of the project cycle, before sent to approval? 
 
Q7 As COLJ36 is a large project, had donor X any concern concerning its 
 efficiency,  impact,  or transparency? 
AQ7a Did donor X request any information about the project’s former activities, 
achievements or impact? 
AQ7b What were X’s concerns, if any? 
AQ7c Can donors fund particular project components? Is there/had there been interest in 
such funding? 
 
Q8 To what extent is donor X’s embassy in Colombia involved in the funding 
negotiations? 
AQ8a Does the local embassy collaborate with the Permanent Mission in Vienna? Do they 
have extra funds? 
 
Q9 Will donor X continue funding project COLJ36/COLJ31 in the year 2009? 
AQ9a What would be an important criteria for the assurance of new pledges? 
 
Q10 To what extent do national (in donor country X) events influence the funding focus? 
AQ10a To what extent do social problems influence the funding focus? 
AQ10b To what extent does the political leadership influence the focus? 
 
Q11 To what extent does Colombia’s political situation influence the donors’ funding 
focus/decision-making? 
 
Q12 To what extent do economic interests influence the donors’ funding focus/decision-
making? 
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Q13 Is alternative development an important thematic area in donor X’s funding portfolio? 
For what reason? 
 
Q14 Is IDB only a financial partner for component 5? 
SPECIAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING COLJ31 
 
Q15 How is USAID involved in COLJ31? 
AQ15a In the project document its involvement is described as technical and financial support. 
Please indicate any specific information about its involvement, if available. 
 
Q16 How is the working atmosphere between CPS and the donors/Permanent Missions? 
COLABORATION BETWEEN CPS AND DONORS 
AQ16a Are there any special requirements to take into account? 
AQ16b Did any kind of cooperation problems occur so far? 
AQ16c Did any kind of conflicts of interest occur so far? 
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SLU QUESTIONNAIRE 
AD aims at securing: food, environmental protection, public security/legal sector, and the 
strengthening new industries, such as fishery, ecotourism or handicrafts through the 
development of productive infrastructure, the creation of employment opportunities, and 
strengthening of national institutions responsible for AD. 
GENERAL QUESTIONS ON ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT (IN COLOMBIA) 
 
Q1 On which of the above mentioned elements does UNODC focus on? 
AQ1a Which is the most developed? Which is the most successful? Which needs to be 
strengthened? 
AQ1b Should UNODC focus on one specific element in order to gain particular expertise and 
to strengthen its position vis-à-vis other institutions implementing AD projects? 
 
Q2 How does UNODC fight against drug trafficking networks, which is important for the 
success of AD projects as it is essential for the pacification of the area? 
AQ2a Does project COLJ66 (LA to West Africa) support AD? 
AQ2b Is there such component in any AD project) Future plans? 
 
The “model” of AD should be adapted to the respective local context in order to identify the 
individual needs, and possible solutions. Projects and activities should be developed 
according to the beneficiaries’ needs. 
 
Q3 Are the project documents co-elaborated with local authorities? 
AQ3a How are local requirements identified and integrated? 
 
Q4 At what stage of development is UNODC’s AD programme currently? 
AQ4a Since when does UNODC implement AD projects in Colombia? 
AQ4b Are the AD projects successful so far? 
AQ4c Is there any kind of evaluation of the whole UNODC AD programme in Colombia? 
 What are the indicators of such study? 
 
Q5 Whar relevance does UNODC have in the field of AD in 
- the UN system (UNDP, World Bank,..) 
- the global system (EC, NGOs, national authorities,..) 
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Q6 What is UNODC’s integrated approach in Colombia? 
REFERRING TO THE NEW STUDY “AD EN EL AREA ANDINA” 
Q7 Why has coca not been cultivated in Venezuela or Brazil? 
Q8 Will there be an English version of the study? 
Q9 What’s UNODC’s general philosophy on AD? 
 
The project seeks to increase the production and productivity, social cohesion, food security, 
health, education and environmental protection. 
COLJ31 
Q10 Which actors were responsible for the design/elaboration of the project? 
AQ10a What responsibilities and competences do 
- UNODC HQ, UNODC COCOL, Donors, and Project Partners have? 
AQ10b What are their main interests or special demands? 
 
Q11 What role does USAID play in its provision of technical and financial assistance? 
 
Q12 Which actors were responsible for the design/elaboration of the project? 
COLJ36 
AQ12a What responsibilities and competences do 
- UNODC HQ, UNODC COCOL, Donors, and Project Partners have? 
AQ12b What are their main interests or special demands? 
 
COLJ36 has been the first project to receive financial contributions from a departmental 
government. The department of Antioquia and the Secretary of Agriculture, IDEA, assisted in 
the conceptual formulation of the project. 
 
Q13 How and to what extent were these actors involved? 
 128 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE MR. AMADO PHILIP DE ANDRES 
Q1 Do you think UNODC should focus on a special element of Alternative development 
in order to successfully position itself within the international community? 
AQ1a Would AD be more efficient if the different AD implementing agencies would focus 
on different elements and areas? 
 
Q2 What role can local authorities play in collaboration with UNODC? 
 
Q3 What role can NGOs play in alternative development, and in collaboration with 
UNODC? 
AQ3a Are local NGOs often project partner? 
 
Q4 What advantage do NGOs have? 
AQ4a What does UNODC lack that NGOs have? (structure, connections,..) 
 
Q5 Are there any possible problems concerning such collaboration? (The UN/UNODC 
needs to protect its reputation and liability to the member states,…) 
AQ5a Do member states support a strong partnership with NGOs? 
 
Q6 Is there any UN unit or agency, that is responsible for the collaboration with NGOs? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE MR. JAVIER MONTANO DURAN 
Q1 One criticism I found in publications on alternative development is, that official UN 
and UNODC publication would lack of self-criticism and are over-optimistic. Is this 
the case? If yes, why? 
 
Q2 A second criticism is about the capacity to establish a relationship of confidence with 
the beneficiaries. It states, that “such relationship is wishful thinking”. 
 How would you describe the present relationship between farmers and UNODC in 
Colombia? 
AQ2a Has the relationship changed and moved forward in the last years? 
AQ2b Are the beneficiaries now a real partner in the decision-making process and the design 
of a project? 
 
Q3 Are project evaluations available to the public? 
AQ3a Are project evaluation sent out to project donors and Permanent Missions, or do they 
have to request them? 
AQ3b Are they somehow available to them? 
 
Q4 Is failure during the project implementation also described in such evaluations or 
reports? 
AQ4 Is there management failure that led to inefficiency described? 
 
Q5 What is UNODC’s official position concerning voluntary eradication and forces 
eradication? 
 
Q6 Are there any project or future project plans where coca is still cultivated, while the 
basis for legal income is created? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE MOLLINEDO CLAROS 
Q1 What are the main intentions and interests of countries in the Andean region of 
implementing alternative development projects within the framework of an 
international organization? 
AQ1a What are the benefits and disadvantages of such cooperation? 
 
Q2 Do you think the UN is a neutral player within the international system? 
AQ2a What are the risks and difficulties in connection with the UN and its member states? 
AQ2b Is the complexity of the UN a serious disadvantage? 
 
Q3 What do you think are the donor countries’ motivations of investing in alternative 
development projects in the Andean region? 
 
Q4 Is the harm reduction approach of using the coca leave for the production of non-drug 
products a realistic and efficient alternative? 
AQ4a Could it be a possible approach in the future? 
 
Q5 How can new international cooperation in alternative development be established in 
order to pursue common interests of the international community? 
AQ5a How can problems of international concern be dealt with the best possible way? 
 
Q6 Given the current situation, is there any new requirement for future alternative 
development projects? 
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7.2 Transcript of Interviews 
 
Interview with Mrs. Martina Hanke, CPS, VIC, 07 August 2008 
H: Also wie gesagt, ich kann nur zu den Gebern etwas sagen, mit denen ich arbeite. Wir 
haben eine ganze Reihe von Gebern. Die haben natürlich unterschiedliche Interessen 
und unterschiedliche Vorgehensweisen, unterschiedliche Prozesse. Es ist ganz 
unterschiedlich, wie wir mit denen arbeiten. Aber ich kann nut über die sprechen, die 
ich betreue, das sind Italien und die Schweiz. 
N: Hängen die speziellen Ansprüche, die die Geber stellen, von der Größe, oder der 
wirtschaftlichen bzw. politische Bedeutung ab, oder kann man sagen, dass Land X von 
sich aus einfach mehr involviert ist, auch wenn es jetzt nicht den größten Eta hat, oder 
am meisten betroffen ist von diesem Problem. Oder kann man behaupten, dass Länder 
mit großer Bedeutung, die auch große Beiträge leisten, mehr Ansprüche stellen, und 
dass kleiner Geber unkomplizierter sind? 
H: Ja, wahrscheinlich kann man das so sagen. Aber die Schweiz bespielweise hat einen 
kleinen finanziellen Betrag, aber die haben ganz genaue Vorstellungen, was sie 
wollen. Die haben sich auch speziell Kolumbien ausgesucht und hatten auch ganz 
spezielle Kriterien im Sinn. Also ganz generell kann man das nicht sagen. Die Großen 
haben natürlich konkretere Vorstellungen und können durch ihr Finanzvolumen alleine 
schon ganz andere Ideen einbringen, sich einbringen. Die können sagen: “Wir hätten 
gerne, dass das Programm, das sie finanzieren in Richtung X geht und so weiter. 
Wobei Italien zum Beispiel, da kriegen wir jetzt auch noch ne Million für COLJ31 und 
COLJ36, eine halbe Million pro Projekt. Das kommt jetzt aus einem Sondertopf mit 
Mittels aus Lateinamerika. Ich weiß zwar nicht, welche politischen Interessen dahinter 
stecken, aber ich bin mir sicher, dass dieser Pledge etwas damit zu tun hat, dass Aldo, 
der Italiener ist, mit dem Italienischen Botschafter Vorort gesprochen hat. Welche 
politischen Interessen Italien damit vorfolgt weiß ich nicht genau. 
N: Unterstützen Italien und die Schweiz kontinuierlich bestimmte thematic areas, oder 
sich auf spezielle geographische Regionen beziehen? 
H: In der Regel kann man das so sagen. Die Geber haben ihre Regionen, in denen sie sich 
engagieren, über uns, UNODC. Man muss auch immer bedenken, dass die Geber auch 
immer ihre Bilateralen Programme haben, und dann haben sie Geld für Multilaterale 
Programme- das ist dann auch oft unterschiedlich. Das Geld was über uns als 
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multilaterale Organisation geht, da kann man in der Regel schon so grob festmachen, 
für welche Regionen und Gebiete sich die Geber besonders interessieren. 
N: Ist Kolumbien da ein großer Eta für die Schweiz und Italien? 
H:  Für die Schweiz nicht und für Italien bisher auch nicht. Aber mit der einen Million, 
die da jetzt kommt, dann schon.  
N: Für welche Regionen haben sich die Schweiz und , früher, Italien dann fokussiert? 
H: Die Schweiz zunehmend im Osten für Crime Programme. Die machen jetzt auch viele 
Criminal Justice Programme und sind dabei sich mit ihren Geldern zu spezialisieren? 
Italien hat traditionell mit der Gießkanne die ganze Welt bedient und sind dabei sich 
auch mehr zu fokussieren. Wobei Afghanistan wichtig ist für Italien, Afrika, 
Nordafrika, Asien eigentlich überhaupt nicht. Süd-Ost Europa natürlich, als Nachbarn 
und Lateinamerika. 
N:  Es sind auch manchmal ausständig die Funds/Pledges von Italien? 
H: Ja, das ist ein Ministerium. Wir bekommen von Italien Geld aus dem 
Außenministerium. Und dann eben einen Pledge vom Umweltministerium, und das ist 
ein bisschen schwierig. 
N: Verhandeln Sie, oder UNODC, direkt mit den Ministerien, oder läuft das alles über die 
Botschaft, dass der jeweilige Repräsentant mit seinem Ministerium Kontakt aufnimmt, 
oder gibt es da auch direkte Korrespondenz zischen Ihnen bzw. UNODC und dem 
jeweiligen Ministerium? 
H: Es gibt auch direkte Korrespondenz. Also der formale Weg ist immer über die 
Permanent Mission hier in Wien. Formell würde es so ausschauen: Wir, UNODC, 
schreiben einen Brief, in dem wir um Unterstützung bzw. Geld bitten. Dann schicken 
wir das an den Botschafter hier in Wien, der dann alles zum Ministerium weiterleitet. 
Oder umgekehrt: Ein Ministerium hat Gelder, die sie gerne in bestimmt Projekte 
investieren möchten. Dann schreiben sie an ihren Botschafter hier und der leitet das 
dann zu uns weiter. Es ist aus so, dass wir sehr gute Kontakte haben mit dem 
Ministerium selber und speziell mit einer Frau, die hab ich auch regelmäßig am 
Telefon. Wir sprechen viel und direkt und sie hilft mir auch, wenn sie sagt: „Ah, ich 
habe gehört, Kolumbien könnte Geld brauchen. Da könnte man mal einen Vorschlag 
machen“. Also sie informiert mich dann auch, ohne dass die Botschaft hier involviert 
ist. Oder wir waren auch mal da, in Rom. Und eigentlich war gedacht, dass wir jedes 
Jahr hinfahren, oder sie kommen her. Und die Dame war auch heuer hier, bei Major 
Donor Meeting. Also da besteht ein sehr enger und reger Kontakt, aber der formale 
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Weg geht über die Botschaft hier. Je nachdem, wie engagiert sie sind in den 
Botschaften und wie viel Zeit sie haben, involvieren sie sich selber, oder nicht. 
N: Im Fall Schweiz und Italien, ist die Permanent Mission gleichzustellen mit der 
Botschaft? 
H: Beide haben eine zusätzlich Permanent Mission, für die Beziehungen mit den 
Internationalen Organisationen. 
N: Dieses Major Donor Meeting ist jährlich? 
H: Zweimal im Jahr. 
N: Bestehen die Botschaften darauf, dass ihre Ansprechpartner die Landessprache, also in 
Ihrem Fall Italienisch und Deutsch, sprechen? 
H: Nein. Franzosen, Belgier und auch Luxemburg schreiben uns manchmal in 
Französisch, und erwarten, dass man sie versteht. Aber wir antworten natürlich auf 
Englisch. Oder meine Kommunikation mit Luxemburg beispielsweise ist Deutsch. 
Email, die wir austauschen sind auf Deutsch, die Agreements, die sie schicken sind 
Französisch und unsere Replay letter sind Englisch. Italien ist alles Englisch. 
N: Demnach gibt es keine besonderen Ansprüche. 
H: Nein, nein, nein. 
N: Bezüglich der Projekte: COL J36: Italien wird das in Zukunft ziemlich groß 
mitfinanzieren und auch die Schweiz. 
H: Zu der Schweiz kann ich noch nichts sagen. Es ist ein kleiner betrag, der heuer noch 
einmal reduziert wird. Und ich weiß nicht genau, wir haben noch gar nicht angefangen 
darüber zu sprechen, was sie eigentlich wollen. 
N: Geht es hierbei um Themen oder Regionen. Wo sie sagen, auf dem Gebiet, für dieses 
Land geben wir keine Gelder? Nicht nur aufgrund der Priorität, sondern auch aus 
politischen Gründen, dass gesagt wird: “Hier sind wir nicht tätig.“ Italien und die 
Schweiz gelten ja als neutral, gibt es da auch bestimmte Motive? 
H: Ja sicher. Also die Schweiz, zum Beispiel, die finanzieren nur Projekte, die einen 
Human- Rights Aspekt haben. Die finanzieren zum Beispiel diese ganze Criminal 
Justice Reform, weil sie eben diesen Menschenrechtsgedanken haben. Und das gleiche 
gilt auch für den roten Bereich: Also die Schweiz würde nicht ein Law Enforcement 
Projekt finanzieren. Andere Projekte, die einen humanitären Hintergrund haben, wie 
HIV/AIDS, werden auch von der Schweiz finanziert und sind typisch. Für Italien kann 
man das glaub ich so nicht so ausschließen. Die haben aber bestimmte thematische 
Bereiche, die sie sich auch aussuchen pro Region. Also zum Beispiel in Latein 
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Amerika ist es Alternative Development. In Afghanistan ist es Judicial Reform, Prison 
Reform. Für den Balkan ist es die Grenzsicherung. So haben sie für jede 
geographische Region ihre Schwerpunkte.  
N: Inwiefern kommt es vor, oder ist es ein Problem, wenn ein Projekt eine Komponente 
beinhaltet, die ein Thema anspricht, welches eines der Geberländer nicht finanzieren 
möchte? Gibt es da Möglichkeiten noch etwas zu ändern? Oder suchen sich die 
Geberländer dann eher ein anderes Projekt? 
H: Deutschland, zum Beispiel, suchen sich immer, wenn möglich, eine geschlossene 
Komponente in einem Projekt aus, weil die aufgrund von eigenen 
finanzadministrativen Gründen nachweisen müssen, wo ihr Geld genau hingeht. Die 
haben ganz unterschiedliche Vorgaben, d. h. die können jetzt nicht Geld in einen 
großen Topf schmeißen, und dann wird das irgendwann einmal ausgegeben. 
N: Ist das administrative aufwendigen, wenn eine bestimmt Komponente gefördert wird?  
H: Das kommt darauf an. Manchmal ist es kompliziert und dann müssen sie, wenn sie das 
Geld gerne hätte für die Aktivitäten, die Deutschland bereit wäre, zu finanzieren, noch 
etwas Ausarbeiten. Aber zum Beispiel ein Projekt in Guinea Bissau, das hatte 
verschiedene Objektives, verschiedene Targets, und da haben die Deutschen gesagt, 
wir würden gerne Objective 2 und Target 6 finanzieren. Das hat dann im 
Projektdokument auch angeführt werden müssen. Und das war relative einfach, weil es 
eine geschlossene Komponente war. Die Italiener machen das nicht und die Schweizer 
auch nicht.  
N: Wer trifft die Entscheidung, ob ein Projekt finanziert wird? Ist das der Repräsentativ 
hier, oder das zuständige Ministerium? Wenn UNODC, beispielsweise, ein Projekt, 
das einen hoher Shortfall hat an eine PM heranträgt, ist da immer Rücksprache 
notwendig? 
H: Es ist in der Regel das Ministerium. Es gibt einige Donor, die haben eine spezielles 
Decision making, da entscheidet der Repräsentativ Vorort. Beispielsweise, man muss 
auch unterschiedlichen Ministerien Geld und die arbeiten wieder unterschiedlich. Das 
Geld, was wir aus der Schweiz, aus dem Außenministerium bekommen, wird in Bern 
entschieden, so war das Kolumbien Geld auch in Bern entschieden. Aber die Schweiz 
hat auch eine Entwicklungshilfeorganisation, die Teil des Außenministeriums ist, aber 
ein sehr unabhängiger Teil. Und diese Entwicklungshilfeorganisation hat ihre 
Vertreter in verschiedenen Ländern oder als Teil der Botschaft und die können selber 
entscheiden.  
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N: Ist es nicht einfacher, wenn Entscheidungen Vorort getroffen werden können, weil der 
Kontakt verlässlicher ist und Entscheidungen schneller getroffen werden können, da 
weniger bürokratischer Aufwand bzw. Umweg damit verbunden ist? Denn, wenn ich 
weiß, dies Person hat Interesse daran, ich kann die Interessen leichter kennen.  
H: Also das kann ich mir vorstellen und die Frage besser beantworten, wenn ich 
Kolumbien als Beispiel hernehme: Es gibt ja auch Gebervertreter Vorort. Ich könnte 
mir vorstellen, dass dort ein engeren Kontakt ist, da beide am selber ort sind. Da ist 
auch die Entwicklung von gemeinsamen Projekten möglich. Und hier machen wir 
alles über die PM und die Ministerien.  
N: Werden Projektideen mit den PMs zusammen entwickelt?  
H: Das gibt es auch, dass wir Concept notes schicken, wo drinsteht, was wir gerne 
machen würden und von den Gebern feedback kommt. Was sie finanzieren bzw. nicht 
finanzieren würden. Dann können die Leute hier die Konzepte ausarbeiten. Und das 
macht auch Sinn, denn wenn man weiß: Aha, für dieses Projekt kann ich Geber so und 
so gewinnen, wenn ich diesen Schwerpunkt legen.“ Dann macht es mehr Sinn, dieses 
Projekt zu entwickeln, wenn ich weiß, dieses Geld kommt dann. Und wenn man ein 
Projekt entwickelt, ohne, dass man je mit einem Geber gesprochen hat, dann kommt 
nie einer und finanziert es. Da ist es dann schade um die investierte Zeit, und die 
Projekte. 
N: Ich bin auch schon auf Projekte gestoßen, die seit langen in Soft Pipeline sind, es 
vergeht Zeit und das Projekt muss dann erst recht überarbeitet werden, um Geber zu 
finden. 
 Finden Sie, es macht es kompliziert, dass es so viele Stellen von allein einem Geber 
gibt? Wie PM, Botschaft, Ministerien, Vertretung im Projektland,... So bestehen zwar 
mehr Kooperationsmöglichkeiten, aber auf der anderen Seite können an 
unterschiedlichen Stellen unterschiedliche Abkommen getroffen werden. Da können 
auch unterschiedliche Abkommen oder Verträge unterschrieben worden sein und 
keiner hat mehr gewusst, was jetzt korrekt bzw. gültig ist. 
H: Ja, das Fund raising ist kompliziert. Vor allen Dingen, weil das Mandat von UNODC 
zwischen viele Stühle fällt. Nicht so wie bei UNDP, die haben als Donor 
Entwicklungshilfeministerien/-abteilungen als Partner. Italien ist da noch relativ 
einfach: da gibt es das Außenministerium, das alle Gelder verwaltet, die in 
internationale Angelegenheiten investiert werden, und das Umweltministerium, das 
uns Kopfzerbrechen bereite . Aber in Deutschland haben wir das Außenministerium 
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als unseren Counterpart, dann haben wir das Entwicklungshilfeministerium, das 
Gesundheitsministerium, das Justizministerium, und das Kriminalamt, das ist Teil des 
Innerministeriums. Und von denen bekommen wir alle Geld. Das ist alleine schon das 
Spektrum in Deutschland. Und die muss ich alle im Auge behalten; das ist meine 
Funktion hier: dass ich die alle kenne, dass ich weiß, was sie für Interessen haben. Das 
ist mein Job hier, die Interessen zu kenne und dann auch schon richtig heranzutreten.  
 Das ist nur das, was sich hier abspielt. Und dann gibt´s natürlich noch Vorort. Aldo, in 
Kolumbien, hat natürlich auch seine Kontakte. Er spricht dort mit der Botschaft und 
die leitet das dann an uns weiter, oder auch nicht. Das ist ein komplexes System. 
N: Das Mandat von UNODC ist sehr komplex, da es sich nicht auf ein Gebiet beschränkt, 
wie andere UN Organisationen und somit diversere Counterparts hat. UNODC reicht 
von Umwelt und Gesundheit, bis hin zu Justiz und Kriminalität. 
 Inwiefern sind Donor trends oder die Aktivitäten anderer Donor interessant und 
wichtig für andere Geber. Inwiefern ist Zusammenarbeit gewünscht? Ist den Gebern 
egal, wer neben ihnen noch ein Projekt finanziert?  
H: Es gibt Geber, die wissen wollen, wie viel Geld schon im Topf ist, wer finanziert, wie 
viel noch fehlt, ob es schon Zusagen gibt von anderen Partnern? Zum Beispiel 
bekommen wir jetzt deutsches Geld für ne Konferenz, und nur wenn bestätigt wird, 
dass noch andere mit Sicherheit mitfinanzieren, dann bekommen wir auch das 
deutsche Geld.  
N: Das Heißt es geht mehr um die Sicherheit, dass das Geld sicher implementiert wird.  
H: Aber dass ein Land aus politischen Gründen ein Projekt nicht mitfinanziert, weil 
jemand Geber ist, der ihn nicht passt, kommt eher nicht vor. Es ist eher so, dass sich 
bestimmt Geberkonstellationen immer wieder finden, weil sie gemeinsame Interessen 
haben, regional zum Beispiel.  
N: Inwiefern sind die Donors an ihre Pledges gebunden?  
H: Pledges sind Dokumente internationalen Rechts.  
N: Wie kann man Geber, von denen noch Geld ausständig ist mahnen?  
H: Es ist in den Agreements festgelegt, wann gezahlt wird. Also das ist festgelegt und so 
weit ich weiß, gab es nur einen Fall, dass ein Geber, nachdem er gepledged hat, Geld 
zurückgezogen hat. Manchmal müssen wir Geld zurückgeben, denn die Pledges haben 
eine bestimmte Laufzeit. Und wenn wir nicht schaffen, das Geld auszugeben, dann 
fragen wir an, ob wir es umwidmen oder verlängern dürfen. In der Regel erlauben das 
die Geberländer, manchmal nicht. Jetzt mussten wir leider gerade Geld zurück geben.  
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N: Ist es dann so, dass dieses Geld dann zusätzlich im neuen Jahr gepledged wird, oder 
kommt es dann einfach zu einer Ersparnis um diesen Betrag? Falls 50,000 US$ 
zurückgegeben werden und 200,000 US$ im neuen Jahr investiert werden würden, ist 
es dann so, dass 250,000 US$ zur Verfügung stehen, oder werden die 50,000 US$ 
anderweitig investiert? 
H: Das ist unterschiedlich. 
N: Wie kann man die Geber dazu bewegen, das zurückgegebene Geld zusätzlich zu 
investieren? Was kann von Seiten CPS abgesehen von der Bereitstellung von 
Informationen getan werden, um die Geber positiv zu beeinflussen? 
H: Ja, da geht es darum, wie wir es machen, die Geber dazu zu bringen, in bestimmte 
Projekte zu investieren.  
N: Wie kann man bei Meetings höhere Unterstützungsbeträge erzielen? Was soll man 
nicht machen? Wie kann man Geber dazu bringen, mehr Mittel freizugeben? 
H: Man muss genau wissen, was die Interessen sind auf der anderen Seite und natürlich 
ist es auch wichtig zu wissen, was der finanzielle Spielraum ist. Italien beispielsweise: 
Wir bekommen einen Pledge mit der Bitte, eine Liste mit Projekten zu schicken, die 
wir gerne finanziert haben wollen. Dann geht meine Arbeit los, das schön zusammen 
zu stellen. Darauf sagen sie dann, das ja, das nein. So wissen wir bescheid. Andere 
Geber kommen einmal im Jahr und wir sollen ihnen vorschlagen, was wir mit dem 
Betrag machen wollen und dann beginnen wir zu verhandeln. Die andere Variante ist, 
Geber finanzieren Project by Project.  
 Wenn man beispielsweise weiß, dass Deutschland Geld hat für Afghanistan, das am 
Ende des Jahres ausläuft. Und es ist natürlich von Land zu Land unterschiedlich, was 
die für finanzadministrative Regelungen haben. Und dann versuch ich in Gesprächen 
herauszufinden, was Interessen bestehen. Wollen sie Drug Law Enforcement, oder 
Grenzschutz,...? Das weiß man natürlich auch aus Recherchen, in welchen Bereichen 
die Geber früher gepledged haben. Es geht also darum richtig auszuloten, was deren 
Interessen sind , was UNODC braucht und dann den richtigen Vorschlag zu machen. 
N: Gibt es jemanden, der zuständig ist, zu recherchieren, was die jeweiligen 
außenpolitischen bzw. Entwicklungspolitischen Interessen und Aktivität eines Landes 
sind? Dabei auch die Aktivitäten oder Kooperationen mit anderen Organisationen oder 
bilateral zu identifizieren, um informiert in ein Gespräch hineinzugehen. So könnte 
man an jemanden herantreten: “Wir haben gehört, dass sie auf diesem Gebiet tätig 
sind, wollen Sich nicht in diesem Projekt involvieren?“  
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H: Das wäre natürlich gut, wenn wir da Ressourcen hätten. Das ist aber nicht der Fall. 
Was ich machen, im Fall Deutschland, ich fahre mindestens einmal im Jahr hin und 
versuche möglichst viele Leute zu treffen. So im Außenministerium, im 
Entwicklungshilfeministerium,... Leute, die für Länder und Themen zuständig sind, in 
denen wir auch aktiv sind. Und auf diese Wiese können wir UNODC erst mal ins 
Blickfeld rücken und Kooperationen aufbauen bzw. stärken. UNODC ist ja eine kleine 
relativ neue UN Organisation. Weiters kann man das Portfolio, Projekte in Pipeline 
vorstellen und herausfinden, was die jeweiligen Ministerien machen. Was sie nicht 
machen, ist Das ist so meine Art von Recherche praktisch. 
N: Inwiefern arbeitet CPS mit den Liaison Offices in New York und Brüssel zusammen? 
Kommt es vor, das die mit möglichen Partnern und Gebern an HQ herantreten? 
H: Ja, also das Brüssel Büro gehört zu uns und der Piero, der dort sitzt, der ist sehr aktiv. 
Er baut dort Kontakte auf und versucht für uns Geld zu bekommen bzw. Projekte 
vorzustellen. Wir haben aber hier auch einen, der sozusagen die Brücke ist, zwischen 
den Field Offices und der EU, da die EU regional bzw. pro Land Vertretungen hat und 
die dort Vorort über die Verteilung der Gelder entscheiden. So beispielsweise in 
Südafrika. 
N: Es ist bei UN oder Entwicklungsprojekten generell das Wichtigste, dass diese 
implementiert werden und auch nachhaltig die soziale Realität positiv verändern. Und 
Geld ist dabei am Anfang der zentrale Faktor, um überhaupt beginnen zu können. 
Sollte momentan, das UNODC noch eine relativ neue und weniger bekannte 
Organisation ist, nicht viel mehr in Fund Raising investieren? 
H: Natürlich, da könnte man mehr machen, aber wir haben dafür kein Budget. 
 Das Geld für Projekte steigt ja massiv an. Das Problem, das wir haben, ist, dass unsere 
General Purpose Budget stagniert bzw. zurückgeht und davon unsere Gehälter und die 
Ausgaben für die Infrastruktur in HQ getätigt werden. So haben wir in unserer 
Abteilung kein Geld für Evaluation, Planning. Und es ist auch schwer, dafür Geld zu 
bekommen, da Geber aus guten Gründen bevorzugen, in Projekte zu investieren. 
H: Wichtig ist dabei, dass zwischen den Field Offices und HQ gut zusammengearbeitet 
wird und UNODC einheitlich gegenüber den Gebern auftritt, damit diese nicht mit 
unzähligen Anfragen überschwemmt werden. Die Koordination ist dabei ganz wichtig, 
damit nicht von allen Seiten gleichzeitig zum selben Thema gearbeitet wird und 
Unklarheiten entstehen. 
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N: Würde es ausreichen, dass ein Project Proposal vom FO an den Geber gesendet wird? 
Oder muss alles über HQ laufen?  
H: Viele Geber wollen einen Brief, der zentral von UNODC HQ kommt.  
N: Trotzdem kommt es vor, dass im Projektland direkt mit Partnern und Botschaften neue 
Agreements ausgehandelt werden, da dort mehr Informationen aus erster hand zur 
Verfügung stehen. 
H: Das eine schließt sich ja mit dem anderen nicht aus. Natürlich wissen wir jetzt nicht 
ganz genau, wie sich das Projekt und die Arbeit im FO Kolumbien entwickelt. Da 
weiß Aldo natürlich am besten Bescheid, oder Javier. Diese Art von Initiative 
unterschützen wir natürlich sehr. Aber am Ende müssen alle Dokumente als offizielles 
UN Dokument über HQ laufen.  
N: Wie ist der Aufgabenbereich rechtlich geregelt? 
H: Ja, natürlich. Manchmal überlappt sich das dann. Manchmal ist es auch gut so und 
manchmal ist es kontraproduktiv. Grundsätzlich bauen die Leute Vorort sehr gute 
Kontakte zu den Botschaften auf und zu den Diplomaten. Oft ist es so, dass die dort 
Geld zusagen, aber nichts zu entscheiden haben. Die Kollegen Vorort denken dann, 
dass Geld kommt, muss aber nicht der Fall sein, da die Botschaften ja kein Budget für 
Entwicklungsprojekte haben, sondern die Ministerien im Heimatland.  
N: Was ist in dem Fall, dass die PM in einem Meeting sagt, dass sie auf Themengebiet X 
nicht tätig sind, Sie von meinem Ministerium aber dann eine Zusage gekommen. Dann 
ist das eigentlich eine klare Sache. 
H: Ja, also der Repräsentant unterschreibt nur auf Weisung der Ministerien. Und dann 
kommt es noch einmal darauf an, von welchem Ministerium das Geld kommt. Im Fall 
Deutschland: Wenn das Geld vom Außenministerium kommt, unterschreibt der 
Repräsentant hier in der PM und beim Entwicklungshilfeministerium unterschreiben 
wir direkt mit dem Ministerium. 
N: Bezüglich der Projekte in Kolumbien. Aus welchem Ministerium kommt aus Geld? 
H: Das Geld von Italien kommt aus dem Ministerium for Foreign Affairs. Und von der 
Schweiz aus dem Department for Public Health.  
N: Welche Art von Informationen verlangen die Donors? Das Projektdokument, die 
Projektidee,..? 
H: Ja, genau. Die Projektbeschreibung, Zeitplan, Activities, finanzielle Daten. 
N: Was gibt es für spezielle Ansprüche? Im Fall Schweden war es jetzt so, dass diese 
einen Report der Project und Non-Project Activities für 2007 wollten, die von 
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Schweden finanziert wurden, und dabei wiederum nicht die genaue Aktivität, sondern 
den Impact und Outcome, um darauf basierend ihre zukünftigen Gelder abzuwägen. 
Das ist natürlich für UNODC ein entsprechenden zeitlicher Aufwand.  
 Was kann von Gebern verlangt werden, bevor oder nachdem ein Projekt finanziert 
wird, was für UNODC ein großer Aufwand ist? 
H: Schweden und Norwegen sind aufwendiger. Und jetzt gerade entscheiden sie sich, 
welche UN Agencies sie in den nächsten Jahren zu welchem Betrag fördern. Aber das 
ist schon die Ausnahme.  
 Automatisch gesendet werden die finazial statements einmal im Jahr. Von jedem 
Projekt an jeden Geber der daran beteiligt ist. Dann gibt´s noch die annual reports, die 
in Profi erhältlich sind, und die dort für die Geber zugänglich sind. Was aber nicht so 
gut funktionier. Deshalb sehe ich das als Grundleistung, diese Reports auszusenden. 
Wenn die semi-annual Reports gut sind, dann schicken wir die auch. 
N: Gibt es eine Auflistung, an welcher Stelle innerhalb des UN-Systems bezüglich 
Funding UNODC steht? Beispielsweise im Vergleich zu UNEP.  
H: Hab ich noch nicht gesehen und ich wüsste auch nicht, wen Sie da jetzt fragen 
könnten.  
N: Kommt es vor, dass Donors Projekte nicht weiter finanzieren möchten, das diese die 
vorgegebenen Ziele bzw. Objectives nicht erreicht haben oder ineffizient sind? 
 Kommt es vor, dass Donors sich aktiv einbringen, um die Realisierung der Ziele zu 
unterstützen, oder Vorschläge zu liefern, um neue Richtungen einzuschlagen? 
H: Also das gibt es im Vorfeld bei Diskussionen, in denen es um das Projekt geht, indem 
beispielsweise gesagt wird, dass man bestimmte Activities nicht finanzieren will, da 
diese nicht effizient seien. Während das Projekt läuft habe ich aber bei meinen 
Ländern nicht erlebt, dass jemand inhaltlich Vorschläge gemacht hat. Die Italiener, die 
sagen jedes Jahr, sie wollen mit uns einen Portfoilio Review machen, aber noch nie die 
Zeit fanden. Das heißt, sie wollten die Projekte, die sie finanzieren im Teil besprechen. 
Ich glaube, dass aber das das gar nicht hier passiert, weil die gar nicht nahe genug dran 
sind. Ich glaube eher, dass Aldo vielleicht Vorort in Kolumbien mit der Italienischen 
Botschaft die Projekte im Detail bespricht bzw. besprechen wird. Ich stelle mir vor, 
dass er so die Geber überzeugt, dass sie weiterhin die Projekte finanzieren sollen. Die 
Schweden versuchen ja gerade festzustellen, ob wir relevant sind, im Sinne von 
effektiv. D.h. es kommt schon vor, dass Geber sich aktiv einbringen, ist aber nicht 
immer der Fall. 
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N: Ok, das wären die vorläufigen Fragen. Hätten Sie vielleicht Zeit für ein weiteres 
Interview, nachdem ich weiterrecherchiert und die bisherigen Interviews transkriebiert 
habe?  
H: Wenn Sie noch konkrete Fragen haben, dann melden Sie sich einfach bei mir. 
N: Vielen Dank, das werde ich machen. 
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J: So, do donors usually focus on specific target areas, thematic or geographically?  
Interview with Mrs. Muki Daniel Jerneloev, CPS, VIC, 12 August 2008 
N: Yes, specifically the US, as a donor in Colombia, the Colombian projects J31 and J36. 
J: Ok, cause I have lots of donors. Ok, the US in Colombia. That’s USAID money 
probably and they fund locally, when they want to, when it fits with their local 
objectives. But there is other money in J31 and J36. I thought there is some of the 
other donors. But the J31 and J36 have no money of any of my donors at all, because 
its not US state department money.  
N: I thought you would be responsible for the US in general. 
J: Yes, but USAID works and decides at a local level, and the US mission here doesn’t 
know what USAID is up to. Because they are not informed, because there is a kind of 
wall and USAID keeps it that way. So sometimes the mission here would be surprised 
to see new contributions from USAID, because they don’t know about that.  
N: So USAID gets its instructions/ strategy from where? 
J: USAID is independent. Its headquarters in Washington, but its priorities are set 
locally. They have their own regional or country offices with their own country 
programmes, targets, and priorities. An dif you fit into their priorities, then they’ll 
work with you. But it’s not a given. There is obviously a coordination of somehow 
going out as one. But this has been a huge controversy politically because about two 
year ago Secretary of State Reece actually suggested that development assistance 
should possibly also follow political goals. And it caused an uproar, because the 
development community says that development is for its own sake, not to realize 
political aims. You know: Give more development assistance to your buddies. You 
should take your decisions based on the situation of the people on the ground. That’s a 
huge problem. So USAID is independent and it has its own objectives. Of course there 
is often a coincidence of assistance, because they are in the same sphere of interests. 
You know, Colombia is important to the United States for a number of reasons. The 
drug trade. So they are looking for foreign policy goals there, but they are also looking 
for development assistance, and they are interrelated of course, you know, the coca 
cultivation. 
 But your questions are more general concerning funding and donors. Do donors 
usually focus on specific target areas?  
 Donors focus on their own thematic areas and their own geographic priorities. And if 
we fall into these, then we get funding. For instance, if we look at alternative 
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development, in Colombia, and we are doing it in a region, where they want to work 
in, then they give us funding. And do they support projects continuously? Sometimes 
they do, but its also not a given. It depends on what the target of the project was and if 
they need further assistance. 
N: In general, does it also depend on how effective the project and its activities were. So 
donors would not only want the project progress report, but also solid achievements, in 
order to continue funding?  
J: Well, when you talk about alternative development you don’t see stable results, accept 
after a couple of years. And then there are a couple of reasons why things don’t work, 
thinking of external factors, politics, natural disaster, … And donors are not dumb, and 
have their own people on the ground. If donors don’t support a project any more, it can 
be, that they don’t fall into their priorities any more, so they wouldn’t have finds for 
that, but it wouldn’t mean, that the assistance is not needed any more. We had that, 
when Afghanistan blew up about six years ago, when donors shifted their funding 
from the Latin American region to Afghanistan and the surrounding region for 
political reasons. So this didn’t mean at all that assistance dried up. They needed 
money for an other region. 
N: Concerning the thematic areas. What, if you have a donor, and you know, that there 
would be resources available. Would it be possible to get them fund areas, where they 
usually don’t fund, but there is a funding need/requirement? I’m thinking of pipeline 
projects.  
J: You can always try. But it difficult unless you find an other funding source within the 
government. But you know, priorities change. So five years might pass by, and a new 
area is add, and you have projects there, then you get money. But if it’s not in 
somebody’s target area, then it’s not going to get funded.  
 So there is always the problem that we have, so we would adjust the project to our 
donors wishes, in order to get the money. And that are projects, that are donor driven 
rather than country driven. It’s not always that, but there is the risk, in order to capture 
some funding, some source, that’s not traditional, you are picking up the very edge of 
the mandate somewhere, and may focus on something, that’s not that effective. But 
it’s better than not getting it done at all, I guess. Personal opinion and it’s difficult to 
judge.  
N: How is it difficult to engage donors? 
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J: Yes, that is difficult again. Find another source within the donor. The is interesting, 
because a couple of years ago, I found out, just be accident with Colombia, that as part 
of the global peace and security fund, they actually had a section that dealt with small 
arms and mines. And because of we mailed around, I got contacted, and followed up, 
and now we are even discussing a second grant for Colombia, S60, which is basically 
a small arms project. And it is interesting, because Canada supports that, even though 
they have not ratified the firearms protocol themselves. But they don’t want anybody 
to talk about their own ratification of the protocol, but they are willing to put up 
foreign assistance to countries, that are recognized as having difficulties with firearms 
and illegal trafficking. So this is going to be the second grant UNODC is going to get 
from Canada. Which is quite interesting, because that was a completely new source.  
N: However, the donor still he to decide on their own to fund in that particular area? 
J: Well, they understood that that was in our areas and they asked and I immediately said 
“yes, there is a project”, and they said, “really, there is a project?” So this was a lucky 
coincidence, but it is not always the case, that we have projects in their area, especially 
because Canada is more focused on Latin America, as it is their backyard. If it had 
been in Africa or somewhere else, it might not have gotten funded. So this project was 
in both their thematic and geographic area, and we were fortunate. 
N: What would be very difficult or time consuming donor requests to get them fund 
projects? Like some kind of special reporting,…Would that be a lot of additional work 
for you? 
J: Well, not for me, but in the field. USAID has very strict reporting requirements which 
require, I am not so sure, monthly, but at least quarterly financial and project progress 
reports. Financial reports are quarterly, progress reports monthly, I am not sure. I 
never see any of those, this is entirely done at the local level. And that is one of the 
important things about building up a strong field office administration . That you do 
not just have somebody overseeing the whole project management, but the 
administration of files, to make sure that that background information and what’s 
happening in the project is administrated and can be presented easily to donors on a 
regular basis. And I don’t know hoe often, I mean, there are various mechanisms. 
There used to be review meeting, where the implementing agency within the 
government and often we could invite the donor, the representative, to join these 
meetings. Instead of that now, there are meetings, which more or less replicate that. So 
there are meetings, to show and discuss the progress, which means that we can catch 
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problems early. You can also catch scents and replicate them elsewhere and build 
synergies. Sp this is really important. And when an office has a number of projects, 
they have to work together, so you can maximize that effect. And I think the Colombia 
office so been quite good in doing that. All offices in Latin America, that deal with 
Alternative development, they have quite a lot of national staff , that are working in 
the field. So there is a lot of activity generated, that is a lot to discuss and report and a 
lot to make sure is right. So it’s quite important to have this project infrastructure. And 
then you have management at the field office, that capture that information and make 
sure it gets used. And then get it back to the donors to create a cycle of accountability 
and transparency and show the effectiveness. 
N: So this extra work is left to the field office, which of course could create time 
problems. 
J: Entirely to the field office. So, when I see a particularly wired agreement, I write to the 
Field Rep, and ask: ”Did you read this, are you sure, you can comply?” And them say, 
yes, of course. But then they are the ones, that have to comply. They set a financial 
statement, they get financial cleared, they send the reports, you know. Sometimes they 
send them to us and I send the reports as a headquarters source. I’m not this was, but 
this was USAID funding for J31. But the US money that comes to Latin America has a 
to be reported differently and it comes through me. So the field office would send me 
the report and I send it to Washington to get the dispositive of funding. So there is 
different kinds of reports. And one of the confusing things that is happening right now 
with the proliferating of funding and funding sources is a bit difficult to keep track of 
reports and of course if we run faults, like the UN faulted a USAID ideas in Africa 2 
years ago, then the funding was pulled. And it was on the pretext basically, well there 
were political and personal problems too, but whatever, but they actually caused, 
because we didn’t have the reports, we weren’t doing our reporting as required. So on 
a purely technical preach of the agreement, they could pull around one and half a 
million dollars. So that was a lesson. 
N: So they were only bound to their pledge if you would fulfil the reporting requirements. 
J: Yes, or this way: They had certain demand of discussion, but we had no leg to stand 
on, because we weren’t fulfilling our side of the bargain. 
N: And at this point, were the donor is pulling out money, who would be the responsible 
person to speak to them? The field rep or would this be happening here? 
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J: Initially it’s the rep, but if the relations break down, then we get involved. Like it this 
cause the US mission got involved. You know, there was even a mission from PDB, 
they went down to try to understand the situation and to intermediate in a way, 
because the relation between the rep and the US was critical. 
N: Where was that? 
J: That was in Kenya. The relations were broken down, so that was unfortunate. But 
that’s seldom and the most drastic thing that can occur, because we had funding 
pulled, although we never had to repay funding. 
J: Do donors coordinate funding with other donors? Yes, quite regularly. We don’t 
always know what’s going on. But sometimes we hear about discussions or we can 
assume that they are there. And if we in CPS push that open and can say: ”Hey, it’s 
one of your buddies over there that’s funding, why don’t you just fund with them?” So 
Nordics support projects other Nordics are supporting. Sometimes one of the smaller 
countries want to be with one of the bigger countries. So was of the EU emerging 
national donors wanted to be up there with the UK or US funding something. You 
know, strategically important countries. 
N: But how much do they cooperate? I mean, it’s restricted to financial aid, so there is no 
real cooperation or collaborate between them, is there? 
J: There can be. We are implementing the project, not them. But it can be, that when the 
project was being developed, we make sure donors like the project, and this can be one 
of the donor driven projects and the final product sometimes is that donors want to be 
part, because they want to see their objectives based on their analysis of the situation 
are in the project. And we make sure, that the field, that the counterparts are involved 
and are on the same wavelength. But it can be that the two partners say, I mean, I have 
an example here, the US and Australia are going to fund a computer based training 
(CBT) in East Timor shortly. And I heard about this, because it was communicated to 
by a gay out in the field, who had been discussing with both donors and both decided 
to do it in conjunction because neither had enough money to get the project start. You 
have the staff member, you have the activity,.. so the budget was going to be too high. 
And they figured if only one gives, it’s quite realistic that there is money shortage. So 
they both decided that this is a priority. That an example of when two donors jointly 
decide to fund a project and get it started. Then you have an other situation, where you 
have Japan and the US in the Union of Myanmar. Where the US has political problems 
with Myanmar, but it had a political objective that it wanted something to happen. So 
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it agreed with Japan, and Japan agreed to pick up on the funding project that the US 
can no longer fund in Myanmar. I’m not sure what in return Japan got for that, but 
they had an agreement, the two donors agreed basically. I thing in return the US would 
fund something in the region, in Thailand or X, that normally Japan funds. So 
basically the donors agreed, that they would split was they fund, because there were 
political problems. So you have various things and these are just a view things I know 
about. There are other projects were you have a number of donors that get together and 
decide who’s gonna do what? Who’s gonna be participating and who’s gonna be in the 
first round? Ok, and they say: ”Come on, let’s go.” Because all of this plays put of the 
commissions, and well, this kind of stuff, foreign politics and money, follows also the 
resolutions in the commissions. So you can more or less see through that, and I don’t 
follow closely enough, cause I don’t have time, which countries are gonna work 
together towards something and which are gonna be most amenable for them to say: 
“Ok, let’s gear our funding priorities towards the same thing. So instead focusing on 
10 projects, non of us can start, we are focusing on 3.” And then if this 3 things are 
going to be supported, they will start and really move ahead. You find that at major 
donors meetings when you get support for the independent evaluation unit, for 
instance with got funding from the UK and a view others, or SPU’s work, or some 
others, where they just basically say: “Ok, this is a thing for the change of the office. 
We have made this a stated priority and we want this to happen.” An other example, 
were you have donors on board, INCB is … the global Paris Pact, has a number of 
countries which have agreed because they have common ideas about opium in 
Afghanistan. So it’s not that they coordinate, but they agreed that they gonna try and 
be at the table. And that means having money. So there is a certain amount of donor 
coordination, that’s going on. And some of it is quite the general stuff, but then again 
this mirrors the commissions: you have the GRULAC block for Latin America, the 
WEOG West European and others group, the Africa group, or whatever. So you have 
political blocks, which also discuss priorities and then try either if they are in the 
position to fund themselves, like the WEOG group, then they fund, or if they are an 
other group, then they act as a pressure group toward the group with money. So, there 
you see a gross distinction between the G77 group and then major donors. And this 
division is very gross. But you see competing groups within member states, not just 
the donors, but the member states and who has what interest. And it’s quite interesting, 
and I’m personally not that involved and I see from great distance a view of this trends 
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and I thing it’s a very interesting one. It plays out those in funding and in 
prioritization, what kind of mandates were ordered and followed by the missions. 
N: Does is occur that a country doesn’t want to fund one project together with a certain 
other country or actor? 
J: I don’t think that’s happening. Because we don’t have that many donors, that would 
not want to be sitting at one table, in that sense. If anything, it would be on thematic 
area. This has played out in earlier time when you played out much more dissent and 
opposition and polarization on harm reduction. Where UN simply said: “Oh no, US is 
not gonna fund that!” And its not because the Netherlands or Australia is funding it. 
It’s because of harm reduction. So this becomes the distinguishing feature in the 
project and not the other donors, it’s the fact that it’s an thematic area/subject that they 
don’t support ideologically. So that plays out in a few other places too. You a Law 
Enforcement project vs. demand reduction project. You see certain donors on one side 
and certain donors and the other. So these are general relations that one can make.  
N: Are donors also actively involved in the elaboration of a project idea, document or 
revision of a project they are funding? So they could influence in which direction a 
project goes. How often is that?  
J: It happens and it’s quite regular. In particular in those projects that are funded by a 
single donor. I’m thinking of the US in Central Asia, where I see a lot of documents. 
Or the NATO countries, Russia countries that also fund a lot in Central Asia, where 
they are involved, because there are a lot of meetings happening at a local level. The 
embassy of the donor country would get involved. I can imagine that also in Latin 
America you can find that. 
N: Is that something UNODC would encourage? Or would it also create problems 
because it’s driven by one donor’s interests? 
J: We encourage it by all means. That’s a way of securing funding and being transparent 
and open and ensuring, that the donor knows what they are funding. However, it can 
not stand as a bilateral discussion. It has to include the counterparts and take into 
account the actual situation and needs on the ground. And that’s what I do find when 
I’m reading the documents from Central Asia: It’s basically discussions between the 
Washington office, the embassy, our office and the counterparts. I only see the traffic 
that goes between us, but it always mentions what the counterparts say and they are in 
meetings all the time and going to generalists or whatever that. Because these are 
really important projects which are central to the Law Enforcement efforts in Drug 
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Control. On other projects I see, that there is some, but this is something more the DO 
would know about. But I know that there is a lot of dialogue that goes on all the time 
and we have certain donors, let’s say Australia or the US, which will say in certain 
politics: “We will only fund things, in which we had been involved in developing. 
”They will only fund things in which they had been participating in. And if they are 
global, then it’s a global thing between our offices here in Vienna. If it’s at the field 
level, then it’s something where the field offices are involved and the counterparts are 
directly involved and we encourage it. This is when you talk about a participatory 
approach of project development. You know, you really have to see and identify who 
the actors are, who are the targets, who are the beneficiaries, who are the actors 
involved to deliver the envisioned assistance and you have to make sure that they are 
all represented. You know, even people you don’t agree with or people you don’t think 
are really that important, because they might make themselves important. And there is 
a process in these countries as well, where you find the allegiance has shift. And I 
found that when I was in the Caribbean in the field. Even a political party in 
opposition they supported us very much. And there were certain political things that 
happened, and when the ruling coalition wanted to do some changes that were in line 
with the things we wanted, the opposition suddenly changed their opinion and they 
became against it, just because the ruling coalition wanted it. So you find depending 
who you are talking to, they can change their mind, or when they get into power they 
change their mind. So national politics matters a lot. Or take corruption: It’s easy to 
criticize the corrupt politicians that are in power, and then when you get into power 
yourself, when it’s your turn, it gets harder to bring in those elements. 
J: So, next question: Are donors legally bound to their pledges? Yes. Do they usually 
comply? Yes. What would be a reason not to comply? What, with the pledge?  
 Well, if we don’t comply with our part. You know, when we didn’t do the reporting in 
Kenya with USAID. The only other situation is, when we had that political situation 
with Myanmar, but then the US mission basically phoned me and said, that they had 
problems with Myanmar, you know, 8 people were in US courts for crimes and that 
had to cut the funding. You know, “what would be the impact of this on your project, 
that we are funding?”, that asked. And I quickly checked and said well, that funds 
have already been allocated so it would cause a problem, because we wouldn’t be able 
to pay the money back, because we are already sending it, and it would create a 
shortfall for the project and that’s a problem. So we said: “Fine, we compromise. We 
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only take back, what you haven’t yet allocated. So you have a shortfall for the future, 
but are not taking away, what are you spending now. And that was kind of a nice 
negotiated thing. Well, it’s important because this shortfall. The reality is, you got to 
take it. So what you do is you try to minimize the cost and then you try to find other 
alternatives and in this case they found Japan, that could fund something, that they 
could not. So you do find, that donors are committed to your same goals. So they are 
not trying to cheat us. Basically they are trying to make sure, that things work. And 
when they can’t work for reasons beyond our control, then they try to work,… (phone) 
 Actually this is a problem, because since the direct approval system, there has been an 
abolition of project ideas. And that creates a view problems for CPS because at the 
field level donors are getting project ideas from reps, that may or may not expedely the 
day. And they also change from donor to donor to satisfy their requirements or focuses 
of one donor or the other. But they don’t have a legal status and then also in 
Headquarters we are not able to follow and create synergies, as we normally would 
and send it to our local counterparts here. So if the embassy in whatever country has 
gotten it from the rep as an idea, we would normally like to let the counterpart of that 
embassy let know here to say: “Hey, this is a priority. You might already have seen it. 
It’s coming from your field office, but this is a priority that you should look at and it 
exists. It has some kind of status.” And we can not do that any more. So it’s harder. 
It’s also harder for us to try and get to other donors. 
N: Is the embassy in the project country allowed to sign agreements with the filed rep? 
J: Well, not usually. It depends. Some of Martina’s donors could in some cases, the swiss 
development or German cooperation, or whatever. But many donors have feedback. 
Ok, there is sides. There would be the donors that have feedback from their embassies, 
but their embassies submit centrally to apause money that is decided centrally. That’s 
one group. And then you have the other group, like USAID or Canadian SIDA or 
Swedish SIDA to a point. Where they have authority locally, because they have their 
own budget, which has been decided from local priorities, local budgeting, local 
manpower, the assessment of potential funding vehicles, etc. Where they in a position 
to offer the negotiation of an agreement at a local level, because they have the money 
locally. So that’s a completely different thing. It really varies on what funding source 
you are looking at. 
N: Was it different before? Because you said, that it had been changed. 
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J: What has changed is that we are extending our donor base and we used to get most 
assistance from the governments directly. Which meant we came through the Vienna 
missions to capital. And now it’s a different funding source. Not all of them, but a 
number of the funding sources are local. And that’s why the reps in our field offices 
have to mobilize funding, but they also have to keep in touch with headquarters, 
because headquarters still has to authorize the signature of the agreement, having got 
clearance from finance and legal. Because there is often questions about clauses in the 
agreement, format,... Even though we have our own format approved by the controller, 
and he tells us to use it, we can’t get member states to use that format all the time. So 
they have their own type of agreements. And there are deviation/discrepancies in those 
agreements, there are sometimes inappropriate references to national law or auditing, 
which we can’t accept. And we have to work under the UN rules and regulations. And 
that is why it’s still important that there is that process that goes through headquarters. 
N: And I think it would also be difficult for the field office. I mean, if they had a new 
partner that assures funding. And then for some reason they don’t get the money 
because they didn’t fulfil some UN requirement. Could this also happen? 
J: Well, you can’t accept the agreement. We can’t sign the agreement. And when it gets 
signed you just pray that no problems will come up, because when it does come to that 
point, maybe the donor would say: “Well, we are negating on this agreement.” You 
asked about what could be a reason not to comply with it. Because if we don’t fulfil 
our end of the bargain. But if our end of the bargain meant breaking UN rules and 
regulations, we can’t fulfil it. So the way to get around that is to make sure that the 
agreement is something we can live with and that we don’t break the rules. Because 
then we get knocked from the auditor’s side. Why did we do this? The same thing is 
about ignoring PSC rates is the worst stuff to get the controller’s approval. So there 
has to be some kind of paper record that there has to be a deviation. 
N: What is PSC? 
J: Project Support Costs. It also matters because when finance issues allocations and they 
calculate the Project Support costs based on expenditures and then you have different 
donors with different rates and then they haven’t made provisions for that, then you 
actually end up with a tangled mess. In the financial side a well, it leads to other audit 
recommendations or observations of sloppiness. 
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 So you need a field office that has sufficient capacity and the transparency to have the 
checks and balances. You can’t have one person to certifying everything. You need to 
have the separating of responsibilities to provide the kind of oversight that you need. 
N: Which is also costly. 
J: Of course it’s costly because it’s also personal costs and most of the time that’s not 
paid from the project. Because this kind of core administrated stuff is something which 
is responsibility of the office to provide. Additional stuff, project managers, project 
administrators who do the routine work they can be funded by the project. But others, 
the core programme, that’s why there is a project support cost (PSC) to cover this 
indirect costs that you can’t necessarily capture in a project document and costs. There 
direct and indirect costs: direct costs are the driver, the manager, administrator of a 
project, the travel or communications budget of those people that work for or are 
involved in the project. But then you have the office itself. And the office itself: the 
rent, infrastructure,.. there is a certain amount of indirect costs that has to be recovered 
through the project support costs, which is then issued back as part of the budget of the 
field office. And it needs charging up because this field offices are not self efficient. 
PSC is a fixed percentage and even though it varies and depending on the 
circumstances its fixed at 13 percent. Unless you have a very hard portfolio with quite 
a lot of PSC returned you don’t actually generate enough money to pay for the office 
infrastructure and that’s one of the big issues in the field offices. 
 I have been in operations so I’m the wrong person to ask short questions about that 
stuff, but I should leave you to talk to the colleagues in DO about that kind of things. 
 So, how often do donors demand individual project information?  
 Well, it’s in the funding agreement and of course they have project progress reports 
that are supposed to be done regularly. But they can ask for ad hoc reports to be 
prepared as part of the agreement. 
 How can the impact and sustainability of the donor’s financial contributions can be 
made visible to them? Well, part of the report. Take them on the missions. You know, 
go with them to project sites visits. Involve them in those activities they can be 
involved. Invite them to workshops opening. 
N: Would UNODC have to invite them? 
J: Sure. 
N: And pay the travel costs? 
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J: No, local. These are local. If they want to come from somewhere else, then they can 
on their own costs. We even did that a long time ago in South East Asia, where we 
organized a field trip of the ambassadors from local missions. It was great because 
they really bought into it. And we were taking them somewhere else. A tour of four of 
the countries in South East Asia. And somebody went with them and then the reps 
were meeting them and stuff. And they paid their own costs. It was a trip of donors to 
go see the situation on the ground by their selves. It was quite useful. 
 Do donors request information about the project counter parts and partners? 
 Well yes, although in some cases they know themselves, because they are local. 
N: Do donors and other counterparts get involved in the elaboration of the project 
document (activities,..)? I’m thinking concretely of the Colombian project funded by 
USAID. 
J: If it’s US money, they don’t like it, that it’s the US running the project. And of course 
you have, where is Christian from?, a German CTA maybe, who is running things. 
And actually the counterparts in the government want the same thing. They just don’t 
like to be told to do it by the US. So you have common objectives, because you have 
to count on the cooperation with the counterparts. You can’t do it if the counterparts 
don’t agree. And it’s necessary that the counterparts would agree that the UN would 
do it. But it happens to be US funding. And for the US, they get the same advantage 
because it’s done and if they are funding. But it doesn’t matter, that they give credit in 
this thing, that they give credit from us. Well, at the end of the day everybody’s goals 
are met, which is important. And politically it was the better way to do it. 
N: Is alternative development an important area for the US/ USAID? Or is it? 
J: Yes it is, for USAID. For USAID alternative development is an important thing. They 
only fund from us or through us. And that can be sometimes millions a year. You 
know, it depends. They also fund projects in Peru. They just gave, I think it was, 3 
million to Peru. Bolivia had a huge contribution, almost 7 million, but unfortunately 
when the policy changes, they shifted back, what hadn’t been committed jet. So that 
created some difficulties because USAID funded. They had nothing against what we 
are doing, but politically they just couldn’t be seen any longer giving money to the 
government, like with Myanmar. And we are trying to find other donors, but it has 
been quite difficult. 
 An interesting thing. The Peru rep told me recently, because he had some terribly 
funding shortfalls in some of his alternative development projects, that there is less 
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and less interest from the external donors. So he is more turning to Peru as a funding 
source, as it is Colombia. And he said: “There are several project that need money.” 
And I said: ”Why isn’t the US still there? Aren’t they interested?” And he said: “Oh 
yes, absolutely, they are really interested.” But they had a bad experience with the 
implementation there locally. Cause that’s where the insurgence are and that was 
really a problem for them. So they really, really support what we are doing The field 
office Peru then said: “Ok, so why don’t you fund us to do it?” And in that case, what 
the Peru rep said, s that USAID is very involved in the implementation of its own 
projects. So, in other cases you could say: “Give the money to us, and we will 
implement it. In the USAID case, they can’t just release the money and have 
somebody else do it, because they are actually involved in the development of the 
implementation. So as a result, in one of the neediest areas, where there is the most 
risk of insurgency and of problems with government control, the US has paradoxically 
decided to not to invest any further. Now, I’m over simplifying. 
N: Thank you very much, that was extremely interesting and useful. 
J: Not a problem, good luck of your thesis. 
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Interview with Mrs. Claudia Arthur-Flatz, CPS, VIC 22 August 2008 
N: Ich beziehe mich speziell auf das Projekt COL J36. Hat einer der Donors an der 
Ausarbeitung der Projekt Idee oder des Projektdokumentes mitgearbeitet? 
A: Das läuft jetzt schon seit vielen Jahren und da kann ich Ihnen nicht sagen, ob da ein 
Donor mitgearbeitet hat. 
N: Und wie steht es mit den Revisions? 
A: Nein, eher nicht, da gibt es keine Unterstützung. 
N: Gibt es seitens der Donor spezielle Anforderungen die gestellt werde. Im Generellen, 
nicht nur hinsichtlich des Projektes. D. h. neben den Project Progress Reports, oder 
dem Projektdokument, noch speziell etwas zusätzlich möchte oder wissen möchte. 
Beispielsweise wer noch beteiligt ist. 
A: Also wer noch beteiligt ist, das sehen die Donors in Profi, das ist ja ein transparentes 
System. Das interessiert natürlich viele schon. Wer beteiligt sich noch? Wer gibt wie 
viel Geld? Aber sonstige Informationen werden eigentlich nicht verlangt, nein. 
N: Das heißt es ist relativ unproblematisch. So soll eh sein. 
 Wissen Sie, ob die Botschaft in Kolumbien Vorort involviert ist, denn bei Italien ist 
das sehr stark der Fall? Dass beispielsweise agreements ausgemacht werden, oder 
finanzielle Leistungen zugesagt werden. 
A: Sprechen Sie noch immer das gleiche Projekt an? 
N: Ja genau, das in Kolumbien. 
A: Es gibt sicher Kontakte zwischen unserem field office und der österreichischen und 
französischen Botschaft. Aber in beiden Fällen wird beides über Paris und Wien 
abgewickelt. 
N: Wissen Sie wo Österreich und Frankreich im Jahr 2008 wieder mitfinanzieren werden? 
A: Ja, das eigentlich relativ stabile Partner, die machen eigentlich immer das, was sie im 
Jahr davor gemacht haben. Da ändert sich sehr wenig in den Fokibereichen. 
N: Sind diese Fokibereiche geographisch, oder thematisch ausgerichtet? 
A: Bei Österreich läuft das immer in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Außenministerium und 
der Entwicklungspolitik, die regional ausgerichtet ist. Für Österreich ist Alternative 
development ein großes Thema und gehört zu den Hauptförderungsgebieten bei 
UNODC. Frankreich macht das ähnlich, nut dass bei Frankreich wichtig ist, dass auch 
eine französische Ownership im Projekt ist. Dass es vielleicht einen Projektleiter gibt, 
oder dass ein Bericht in französischer Sprache publiziert wird. Das „Frankreich 
branding“ ist denen sozusagen sehr wichtig. 
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N: Finden Sie, dass man in der Zusammenarbeit mit den beiden Ländern merkt, dass 
Frankreich ein größeres und sozusagen politisch und wirtschaftlich mächtigeres Land 
ist als Österreich? 
A: Ja, schon. 
N: Könnte man sagen, dass kleiner Staaten unproblematischer sind? 
A: Also problematischer kann ich nicht sagen. Frankreich ist beispielsweise sehr gut 
organisiert. Es ist eines meiner Länder, mit dem ich am liebsten zusammen arbeite, 
denn die sind sehr genau und sehr numerisch, und sehr berechenbar für uns. Die sind 
nicht so wankelmütig. Weil zum Beispiel Österreich, das ist ein bisschen schwieriger, 
die haben auch immer, muss ich sagen, eher jemanden in der Mission hier, die auf 
einem niedrigen Level sind. Also Praktikanten, die dauernd wechseln. Da ändern sich 
meine Ansprechpartner oft, so muss ich immer wieder alles erklären. Also das ist 
schon eher, wenn ich sagen darf, nicht so professionell wird das angegangen, und 
daher auch nicht so ernsthaft, wie das Frankreich macht, wo alles auf höherer Ebene 
angegangen wird (erster Sekretär, ...). 
N: Ist bei Österreich die Situation momentan so, dass das auf diese Weise angegangen 
wird? 
A: Nein, das war eigentlich schon immer so, dass nicht jemand von höherer Ebene als 
Ansprechpartner gilt, sondern es sind eigentlich immer die Praktikanten. Und da 
kommt oft immer wieder ein Kuddel-Muddel raus, weil die die Nummern 
verwechseln. Und das ist für mich natürlich ein größerer administrativer Aufwand, 
weil ich immer wieder alles erklären muss, weshalb etwas so gemacht wird, oder so 
ist. Währendessen bei Frankreich, da habe ich drei-vier Jahre die gleiche Person. Und 
diese Person hat auch Entscheidungskompetenz. Die kann sagen: „So wird’s gemacht, 
oder so nicht!“. Aber wenn ich mit einem Praktikanten zu tun habe, der kann mir 
überhaupt nichts sagen. 
N: Inwiefern beeinflussen politische Vorkommnisse die Entscheidung, welche Projekte 
oder thematische Bereiche unterstützt werden? Ich glaub vor drei Jahren, als die 
beiden Österreicher in Bolivien umgekommen sind, hat dann Österreich beschlossen, 
im nächsten Jahr ein Anti-Crime Projekt zu finanzieren? Oder wie könnte man sich 
das erklären? 
A: Das hängt immer mit politischen Programmen zusammen. Und da wir jetzt alle zwei 
Jahre eine neue Regierung haben, ist das auch wieder mühsam. Denn dann kommt 
immer eine Änderung des Programms und vielleicht des Außenministers, oder gar eine 
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anders zusammengesetzte Regierung, und dann können auch andere Bereiche oder 
Länder zu Prioritäten und schließlich finanziert werden. Zudem kommt, dass wenn 
immer neue Wahlen sind, dann ist alles auf Hold und Entscheidungen werden 
verzögert. Und das ist auch nicht so einfach. 
N: Wissen Sie, weshalb Alternative Development für Österreich interessant ist? 
A: Also ich glaube, das kann man so nicht sagen. Das ist einfach ein Säule von UNODC. 
Ich mein, was soll man denn sonst tun, wenn man die Drogen nicht mehr anbauen 
soll? Was soll denn der Bauer tun? Also ich denke, das ich wirklich eine der 
wichtigsten Säulen in unserer Arbeit, das Alternative Development weiterhin 
finanzieren und implementieren. 
N: Ist die Zusammenarbeit mit den Gebern, jetzt nicht nur auf Sie bezogen, sondern auf 
das Konstrukt UNODC und die PMs eher reibungslos, oder schwierig? 
A: Sehr reibungslos, sehr angenehm. Also wir verbinden das mit den Franzosen immer 
mit einem schönen Mittagessen. Das ist eigentlich immer sehr angenehm. Ich habe da 
noch nie Meinungsdiskrepanzen gehabt, was jetzt finanziert werden soll oder nicht. 
Alles immer im Einklang, Vielleicht liegt’s auch an mir. Ich bin ein sehr geduldiger 
Mensch. 
N: Welche Vorteile bezüglich der Effizienz und der Realisierung der Interessen bringt es 
für die Geberländer, dass das Alternative Development Projekt von UNODC 
implementiert wird und dass die das nicht bilateral machen. So wie USAID, hat auch 
eigenständige Projekte. 
A: Ja, das ist eben eines unserer großen Probleme. Da immer mehr unserer 
Mitgliedsstaaten in der EU sind, bestehen bereits große Zahlungen an die EU. Die EU 
macht Entwicklungsprojekte und dann müssen die Staaten auch noch an die UN 
zahlen. Und einige wollten das bilateral machen. Und Vorteile, wenn es die UN 
macht: Ich denke mir, das weder USAID, noch die EU, die Expertise, die wir 
einkaufen können haben. Denn die UN kann global Leute anwerben. Während 
bilateral, sind das halt immer die fünf gleichen Maxeln aus irgendeinem 
Außenministerium, die das halt machen. Aber ich glaube, die UN hat einfach die viel 
bessere Expertise und auch viel mehr Erfahrung im Feld. Weiters kommt dazu, dass, 
nehmen wir als Beispiel Peru: Wenn wir jetzt sagen, es waren die Spanier dort. Das 
hat dann gleich wieder etwas von dem Kolonialen Touch und die UN ist neutraler. 
N: Wahrscheinlich auch mit wenigern Anforderungen verbunden, da die UN Entwicklung 
und nicht, beispielsweise, wirtschaftliches Wachstum als Ziel hat. Bei bilateraler 
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Kooperation zwischen zwei Staaten kann das dann oft im Gegenleistungen verbunden 
sein. Und der Koloniale Nebengeschmack fällt weg. 
N: Kam es schon einmal vor, dass Frankreich oder Österreich aus einem Projekt 
ausgestiegen sind? Oder dass sie gepledged haben, oder von Seiten UNODC Teile des 
agreements nicht eingehalten wurden? Oder, dass das Projekt ineffizient war und sich 
die Länder für das nächste Jahr ein neues suchen wollten? 
A: Das ist eigentlich nicht der Fall. Das war vielleicht mit Frankreich einmal der Fall. Da 
haben sie drei Jahre ein Projekt unterstützt und das ist dann einfach nicht mehr auf der 
Liste gewesen, aber das war nicht Alternative Development. Allerdings war das nicht 
ineffizient, da war dann einfach weniger Geld da und man hat sich auf die 
Schwerpunkte konzentrieren müssen. Aber den Fall, den sie da ansprechen, den hat es 
noch nie gegeben. 
N: Wie würden Sie vorgehen, wenn sie ein Projekt finanzieren wollen, das nicht 
unbedingt den Schwerpunkten des Geberlandes entspricht, aber es wichtig wäre, das 
dieses Projekt zusätzliche Geber findet, um mit der Implementierung zu beginnen? 
A: Ja, das kommt immer wieder vor. Das ist halt dann Überzeugungsarbeit. Es gibt 
beispielsweise Projekte, wo Straßenkinder in eine Art betreutes Wohnen kommen und 
dort auch Bildung bekommen. Und das ist immer schwach finanziert, aber da finde ich 
dann doch immer wieder Geldgeber, wenn es diesen sozialen Aspekt hat, besonders 
mit Kindern. Aber da muss man halt dann bitten und betteln und auch wirklich 
überzeugend sein. 
N: Ist es für den Repräsentanten bürokratisch auch aufwendiger, etwas außerhalb seiner 
Agenda durchzusetzen? 
A: Sicherlich. Meine jeweiligen Counterparts in den PM verstehen das schon eher. Wo es 
dann schwieriger ist, ist in den Ministerien. Weil die sehen dann nur die Zahlen und da 
ist es dann schwierig diese Brücke zu schlagen.  
N: Inwiefern koordinieren die Donors ihr Funding mit anderen Geberländern? 
A: Die Skandinavischen Länder koordinieren sich immer. Und die EU Mitgliedsstaaten 
schauen, dass sie immer in eine Richtung gehen. 
N: Welche thematischen Gebiete von EuropeAID überschneiden sich mit denen von 
UNODC? In den Gebieten, wo EuropeAID eigenständig Projekte entwickelt und auch 
implementiert und Experten in das jeweilige Land schicken. 
A: Ja, das ist wieder so ein Beispiel, wo die EU eine Feldmission, oder ein Feldbüro 
eröffnet und oft duplizieren sich dann die Aufgaben mit unseren. Das ist dann nicht 
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der Idealfall. Aber manchmal werden wir dann von EuropeAID subkontraktiert, um 
dann die Idee von EuropeAID Vorort auszuführen. Also diese beiden Fälle gibt es: 
Entweder wie sind beide dort und machen beide etwas ähnliches. Oder EuropeAID ist 
dort, hat das Geld und sagt: „UNODC macht das hier für uns.“ 
N: Das heißt, es wäre für uns besser, etwas eigenständig durchzuführen, aber es ist 
dennoch gut, weil so die finanziellen Mittel bereit stehen, um Projekte durchzuführen. 
A: Ja, EuropeAID hat nicht diese Personalstärke im Feld. Darum tun die uns unter 
Vertrag nehmen. 
N: Wie denken sie, dass sich das in Zukunft entwickeln wird? Kann das in Zukunft eine 
stärkere Partnerschaft werden? 
A: Es ist das Ziel, dass man eine strategische Partnerschaft mit EuropeAID entwickelt. 
Besonders mit dem Regionalziel Ostafrika. Das ist gerade im Entstehen, aber das ist 
ein sehr langer und schwieriger politischer Prozess. 
N: Es ist ja auch nicht Sinn der Sache, dass es dann zehn Unterschiedliche Akteure gibt in 
einem Land, die alle das Selbe machen und schon fast konkurrenzartig interagieren. 
A: Ja, Alternative Development wird ja von vielen UN Organisationen ausgeführt: World 
Food Programme, World Bank, UNDP, UNODC, UNIFEM, die machen irgendein AD 
speziell mit Frauen. Also das ist bereits Tatsache, dass bereits die Mandate der 
verschiedenen UN Organisationen in einander verschmelzen. Und darum sagt ja jetzt 
der UN Generalsekretär Ban Ki Moon: „One UN.“ 
N: Dieser Mechanismus wird aber bei UNODC noch nicht so realisiert. UNAIDS, oder 
UNHABITAT habe ich als Projektpartner gesehen, aber ansonsten noch ganz wenig, 
obwohl es sicherlich einfacher und effizienter wäre. 
A: Allerdings hat das auch Auswirkungen auf den Personalaufwand. 
Betriebswirtschaftlich positiv, dass vielleicht weniger Leute das gleiche 
Projektvolumen betreuen können. Aber keine UN Organisation hat Lust, seine eigenen 
Leute „wegzurationalisieren“. Vor allem auch, weil keine Organisation Terrain 
aufgeben und seine Leute abziehen möchte. 
N: Naja, ich denke es können ja, beispielsweise UNODC und UNAIDS in Brasil, noch 
immer getrennt sein, aber sie können ja im selben Gebäudekomplex sein und 
koordiniert arbeiten. 
A: Ja, dieser Prozess ist aber sehr langwierig und schwierig. Keine Reform geht ohne 
Köpfe rollen, oder? 
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N: Inwiefern kann UNODC Interessenskonflikt zwischen den unterschiedlichen Akteuren 
bei der Projektausführung verhindern, oder dazu beitragen, sie zu überwinden? 
Beispielsweise zwischen den Geberländern. 
A: Also bei meinen beiden Geberländern in Kolumbien, Österreich und Frankreich, ist 
das eigentlich noch nie passiert. Da habe ich keine Erfahrungswerte. 
 
Ein weiteres Problem bezüglich der Geberländer ist auch, dass zwar die Gelder für die 
Projekte ansteigen, aber die Gelder für unsere Infrastruktur zurückgehen. So haben 
manche Mitglieder, die normalerweise stabil zum GP beitragen und somit die 
Infrastruktur (Office costs, personal costs,...) finanziere, im heurigen Jahr kein GP 
überwiesen. 
N: Würde man dann die Geber zum Kaffee einladen, um das Problem zu besprechen. 
A: Zum Kaffe einladen wäre vielleicht nicht adäquat. Aber man kann einen Brief 
schreiben, und eine Delegation hierher einladen und dieses heurige nicht überwiesen 
des GP (general purpose) Geldes zu besprechen, um das vielleicht heuer unter dem 
Jahr noch zu bekommen. 
N: Das entscheidet aber auch nicht der Repräsentant, so dass es sich denkt: „Heuer 
behalten wir uns das Geld und investieren es in etwas anderes.“ 
A Nein, aber er ist hier die höchste Instanz, die unsere Interessen im Mitgliedstaat 
vertritt. Und wen ich an jemanden vorbei gehe, und mich selber sozusagen auf 
„Goldsuche“ begeben, das ist ganz delikat. Ich war lange im Außenministerium. Das 
ist einfach Protokollarisch nicht richtig. 
N: Und wie schaut das aus, was ist der Grund, dass das GP heuer von Österreich nicht 
bezahlt wurde? 
A: Ja, das kommt wahrscheinlich dann später im Jahr. Da war gerade kein Geld da. Da 
muss man sich halt darauf verlassen, dass die das bis Jahresende erledigen. Wenn es 
dann bis Ende des Jahres noch nicht gezahlt ist, dann muss halt Costa, oder auf D2 
Ebene, eine Einladung schreiben und eine Delegation einladen. 
N: Zahlen eigentlich alle Mitgliedsstatten GP? 
A: Nein, Großbritannien zahlt beispielsweise kein GP. Manche zahlen im einen Jahr 
schon, im anderen Jahr dann wieder nicht.  
N: Naja, aber wenn meine Gelder begrenzt sind, dann würde ich auch eher in Projekte 
investieren, und so direkt der Zielgruppe helfen. 
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A. Das ist falsch, denn sie können keine Projekte laufen haben, wenn hier die 
Infrastruktur nicht bezahlt ist. Wenn wir hier unseren Strom nicht zahlen können, 
unsere Gehälter, die Reinigung, die Renovierung des Gebäudes, dann können wir auch 
keine Projekte mehr haben. Denn das ist der Herzschlag. Das ist eben der falsche 
Gedanke: „Ich investiere lieber in ein Projekt. “Dann gibt’s nur noch Projektpersonal. 
Und Projektpersonal, vor allem im Feld, die haben ein ganz anderes Personalprofil, als 
Leute, die hier sitzen. 
N: Danke vielmals für das Interview. 
A: Ja, kein Problem. Viel Glück. 
 162 
 
Interview with Mr. Jorge Eduardo Rios, SLU, VIC, 28 August 2008 
N: Is alternative development a question of development or anti- crime? And is it in 
UNODC’s mandate? 
R: I deal with that question all the time, because alternative development is drug control. 
But it is development. The same thing that UNDP does in the cost areas of Peru. So 
the question I always get, including the donors is: If it’s a development issue, why is, 
that UNODC is involved in alternative development? 
N: I see it more as fighting drugs and the whole drug cycle and here the drug cultivation. 
And that’s the most important point, because if there are no drugs, people don’t 
consume them and there is no trafficking. And this is just made more efficient through 
development. Development is the basement to make it really happen, to make it 
sustainable and efficient. Because in the document it’s not about making them grow 
coffee instead for just one year. Because later, if they don’t make good money, they’ll 
grow coca again. Or because it’s the environment that makes them to. So to my point, 
the development of social and economic infrastructure is just the insurance to make it 
sustainable. It’s not very difficult to say: “Look people, that’s illegal. We support you 
financially and you go grow something else.” That could be done easily, but an 
economy should be established, that will increase and flourish the social background 
in order to make people want to be in the legal sector and secure education for their 
children and not to live in a dangerous or violent environment. Cause of course you 
are always a target for whoever you are sending your drugs if you want to get out of it.  
An other argument not to make it a development issue is that you would need good 
expertise to organized crime or drug syndicate. You have to know what they are doing 
and what are there goals in order to be preventive there and this is central to make it 
work. And I think UNDP doesn’t have the experts that know about the organized 
crime that’s behind the drug cultivation. 
R: I think you got there a very interesting point. And that is, that approach has to be 
comprehensive. The reason that UNDP doesn’t do Alternative Development in the 
jungle of Peru and only do it in the cost of Peru, is that they don’t wanna get involved 
in organized crime, they don’t wanna get involved in the guerrilla or in terrorism. You 
know, I think it is important that we understand, that alternative development for the 
most part in these areas is agriculture development. You not gonna grape a coca 
farmer and make him a physician. So, we recognize it’s development. We recognize 
that we are not a development agency. But we also recognize, that we have a very 
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important role to play in so far as having the international community understand that 
drug control agencies don’t have the sufficient money, resources and ability to develop 
a lot of these areas where the crops grow. One is because UNDP doesn’t go there. And 
UNDP has so much money and so much big programmes, that if we all worked 
together, we could labage only. The World Bank doesn’t go in these areas. So for the 
most part we are left to us and the Peruvian government, and this small government 
entities to be responsible for this. So I think we have to come to understand that we 
have a very important role to play. So do the member states. And our role is to ensure 
that the broader development community, all the financial institutions, understand that 
they need to look at Alternative Development not only as a drug issue, but as a 
development issue. And at the same time you also need to have governments, you 
have to fight corruption, you need to have demand reduction programmes. And it is 
within that framework, where UNODC really moves forward the issue with AD. 
Alternative development in Afghanistan in a classic example of the biggest Problem in 
the world. All the donors are there, we are there. But we have the smallest programme 
in all Afghanistan. Why? Because all this donors understand that this is a development 
issue. I hope you see the point. It’s not only development, but development is critical. 
And there is a thing we are doing with Cesar, did you meet Cesar? 
N: Well, I only worked with him for three weeks, because he was on mission, when I 
arrived and then he left for Canada. 
R: We are working on the issue of security in development and development in security. 
UNODC tells the banks, the donors, the development people that unless you start 
developing these areas there will be no security. For the people there lack of water, 
lack of food. 
N: Do you think that there is some kind of competition going on between World Bank, 
UNDP, or UNDC in that area? 
R: There is no competition. What there is, is a lack of understanding on the part of the 
developing agencies. And to understand, that this is development. Just because you are 
eliminating coca or marijuana and putting in coffee, it’s almost the same as to change 
banana field into a nut field. With the exception that you don’t have organized crime. 
Of course there are differences and that’s were the problem arises now. UNODC is 
best placed to serve as a catalyst. For example to go to the World Bank and say: 
“World Bank, can you discuss with Bolivia the poverty reduction paper/ strategy.” 
You know, between the government and the World Bank. “Discuss the role of coca on 
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the economy.” That’s the role we play. And then World Bank says: “Bolivia has to tell 
us, that they want to prioritize that.” But they should understand, that coca is such a 
big part of the economy, that unless you don’t address development in general and not 
just development where there is no coca, the problem is never gonna got better. That’s 
where the reluctance lies. And our role is, well there is two things: One we have been 
seen as an easy way out to give money to do development. You know, “Let’s give the 
UN money to do development.” And what has happened is that the lack of focus on 
the broader development has basically caused what you see today. The balloon effect. 
You eradicate in San Jose, it will show up in Tujuan. You eradicate in Tujuan, it will 
show up in an other region. 
N: As Peru had been the biggest coca cultivator in the region. It decreased, but Colombia 
increased dramatically. 
 I have one question though. Why isn’t there any coca cultivation in Venezuela or 
Brazil? Because it’s not that farmers are all wealthy there. An why did Colombia start 
to cultivate coca only in the late 1980s, and not earlier? 
R: Because there really is very little amount of traditional coca. Jet they are the biggest 
coca producers. The question that you asked is interesting. I have been asking the 
Americans. If the border of Columbia has so much coca, why has the border of 
Ecuador none? In some parts a river is the border between Colombia and Ecuador. 
And in some parts the river is only a few meters, so you could swim or take a little 
boat. There is no reason why the coca should stop at the river. 
N: But I’m sure there are people interested in cultivating in this areas. 
R: Of course there are. They have many small fields in Ecuador. And the Americans say 
it’s isolated. 
 The other question people ask is: Why isn’t there coca production in Africa? They 
have the same climate basically. I mean you can find high tropical valleys where you 
can grow that stuff. So why haven’t the traffickers moved to Rwanda or elsewhere? 
There is a lot of discussion on this. 
N: Lately there has a lot of drug trafficking been going through West Africa. So as the 
traffickers and the crime networks are already established in the area, it could be 
cultivated there. 
R: Could be.  
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The government of Venezuela has ask us to help them do a survey on the coca 
cultivation there. I flew with the Venezuelans over the mountains there and have great 
pictures of coca cultivation. But the amount we don’t know. 
 What else do you want to know? 
N: First of all to identify the specific needs and characteristics of alternative development 
projects? So what would have any organization have to keep in mind to make the 
project efficient and sustainable? And also in reference to Colombia. 
R: Well, Colombia is a special case. They have so much money. It’s a special case. 
 Have you read the documents that we wrote for the CND on AD? You should read 
these, and the report from the extra group meeting that we had last month here in 
Vienna on AD for the UNGASS. I think it’s important that you get these documents. 
Cause there you will understand how do member states view UNODC’s role in 
alternative development. You will find them on the web page of the CND. Then you 
go to the conference room papers. There is one on AD that we wrote with the EC, FPO 
and the Germans. It’s based on 4 huge meeting we had. I think that will give you an 
idea of how the member states see it, and it will give you an idea also on where is it, 
where we can play a role? Because now the member state see, that it is development 
and they try to get the bans involved. So they are asking us to help them show the drug 
programmes to the banks under the issue of poverty, food security,…  
 And I think one of the reasons why they do wanna work with us is that in the end we 
have about 20 years of experience in the illicit crop growing areas. And we have a 
certain level, you know, we have the blue fag, that helps also to be seen neutral. 
 So, if you are not gonna find the documents today, just give me a call, I think they are 
critical. If you need any more help you can write me or call, seriously. 
N: One more question concerning the Colombian projects. Where any of the donors or of 
the project partners involved in the elaboration of the project document? Because 
that’s how you can focus on the specific local needs. Because many projects are 
designed in Vienna.  
R: I know what you mean. I would bet, knowing Aldo and the way he works, that these 
projects include many elements. 
N: Do you know if there is such thing as a requirement to include beneficiaries in the 
elaboration? 
R: Sure, it’s a basic guideline that we use at least. I mean, the alternative development 
world has progressed. Slowly, but has. We now understand, that we have to come up 
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with products that are market driven. Because otherwise some person here in Vienna, 
that designs the project will say: “Ok, let’s do an AD project in Colombia. Let’s have 
the farmers in San Jose grow Egyptian tomatoes instead of coca. Let’s give money for 
that. ”And this kind of development is top down, and doesn’t work. And now we 
think: “What does the market want?” Theresa wants blue tomatoes. And then you have 
to go see, if they are able to do that in Colombia. So we moved into the elements: 
market driven products and possibilities in the field. So you also have to ask them, 
what their interest in growing is. So what you wanna grow? Sometimes they suggest 
something, but it’s not possible, because it needs to be sustainable and has a market. 
And then you have the donors, that have, let’s say, half a million dollars and want to 
do a certain thing with it. That’s the opposite side. So you take the money, go to 
Colombia and say: “Theresa, grow tomatoes because I have the money.” 
N: Do you think the AD projects implemented by UNODC are more efficient then 
projects by the Colombian government on its own, USAID, or any other single acting 
organization, such as a small NGO? Because they have some qualities, that UNODC 
doesn’t have, so I think it’s good that they are all there. 
R: Sure, sure. 
N: So what does UNODC lack? Because the project organization might be more 
complicated thinking of all the bureaucracy. 
R: I think we also moved forward and had to recognize that we have to recognize the 
expertise of other institutions. We have the money and we go out doing some projects. 
But we had to learn that you just can’t go out and train the (former) coca growing 
farmers on soil analysis. Well, you can do it, but let’s find a NGO, a group, or 
whoever, that we can contract to do it. That’s the better way to do it. That’s the better 
way to do it. There is a lot of this, but there is also a lot a jalousies and competition, 
because money for AD is limited. In the past it wasn’t. There was so much money. 
And now it’s limited. I think UNODC recognizes the importance of working with 
others: Civil society and private enterprise/ the market. 
N: Is it difficult to get the private sector engaged? 
R: It depends on how you get it engaged. 
N: Because drugs and crime is not the most popular sector to support. Usually you give 
money, or cooperate when it concerns children, education and related fields. 
R: Well, we have to move forward and need to get the private sector seriously engaged. 
Not only in building schools, but also in helping open markets. Buying products and 
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ensuring fair prices for the products. I mean, there is different phases of social 
responsibility and corporate responsibility in private business. Because you have 
businesses where thy only want to make money and you have businesses where there 
is some money that they want to donate. Probably to do something nice for the 
community. So there is different ways how business looks at that as well, and they are 
hard to engage. It takes a long time. And you are also dealing with the providers, that 
farmers, who are not always the most responsible. 
N: Well, because they are not used to be in an economy that builds on treaties. 
R: There is a good example from the past. There is a special grain, Quinua, in Bolivia, it’s 
a small Indian weed, that they sell in Bolivia and Peru in the high lands. And very rich 
in proteins. And the Americans, Kellogg’s, was looking to buy this grain. So they went 
to Bolivia, because they knew that this grain was originally from this area and they 
wanted to start sourcing it from Bolivia for some of their products, such as Muesli,… 
The Bolivians tried and tried, but they just couldn’t produce enough for Kellogg’s. 
Because they made a mistake. They had said: “Sure, we can sell you 40 tonnes a 
week.” Just in order to get to project. And then they signed the project and the first 
delivery showed up, but the second delivery never showed up because the farmers 
could not assure the quantity or quality. Because in order to meet to demand, they 
started not to care, if there were little sticks in it or other things. But Kellogg’s was 
looking for quality control, because of course they have to because of all the sanitary 
regulations. So in the end they grow it all in California and in Colorado. It’s tough. 
Economies of scale.  
N: But this problem is again a development issue. It the development of their economy to 
meet the requirements of the global market. 
R: It’s an development issue. I mean, we say, that not all illicit crops are due to poverty. 
That’s true. There are a lot of wealthy people that are growing coca. But there is also 
the other side. There a lot of poor farmers, that have no alternative. They want to be 
legal, but they don’t have the right conditions, they don’t have the roads, they don’t 
have the market, they don’t have the technical assistance, they don’t have the 
irrigation. So it’s defiantly tough. 
 In case you have any other question, just contact me. 
N: I will, thank you very much. 
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Interview with Mr. Amado Philip De Andres, LACU, VIC, 29 August 2008 
N: Do you think, that within the international community in the field of alternative 
development, UNODC should focus on some kind of element of alternative 
development in order to position itself? Because UNODC sees, because of its 
mandate, AD more from the drug reduction side, and not just as an development issue.  
 So, for example UNDP is also doing AD in Peru, but only in the cost area and not in 
the jungle, where it is more dangerous. Would it be a realistic and efficient alternative 
that the different AD implementing agencies focus on different areas? 
 It’s also that UNODC is a very small organization with limited financial possibilities. 
A: You mean to create a niche for us. Well, we have to work in the field with all the 
actors concerned. And you are right that the situations are very different. But we have 
to be clear, AD and drugs were hand in hand in the 1980s. Now its drugs and crime 
and alternative development, which means that, in the Andean region, UNODC can 
position itself depending on what kind of development they want to generate as an 
alternative to the coca cultivation. You see the case for example with the opium poppy 
in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. It’s basically on the flat lands, where UNODC 
has a niche. But, what we know is, that if we do alternative development … new 
opportunities will arrive for criminal organizations to grow coca or other illicit crops. 
So in the end, we have to try cooperate with as many other agencies and NGOs, 
especially NGOs and the civil society, as possible and not only within the UN system. 
We have to work on a global level, because of the “balloon effect”. Because if we do 
AD only in a certain region, the cultivation will just move within a very short time and 
organized crime will always be well funded to be able to export that. For example, 
today it’s almost impossible to trace coca cultivated in Venezuela and exported from 
Venezuela through West Africa to the European Union. So, more has to be done in the 
link between fighting drugs and fighting crime because it is one criminal axe. 
N: What role could NGOs play in this combat? What advantage do they have? What does 
UNODC lack and they have? Concerning structure,…. 
A: The problem that we have is that we can not be everywhere. We can not have a 
representation or even a project office in every country. Because we only have about 
to or three offices in every region. But the NGOs are there. They know the field, they 
know also how population links, so that they are really grass root actors. So we need 
NGOs. But we also need the political power and even the religious leaders, depending 
on the country (Africa, parts of Asia), to help us send the message of where we want to 
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go. Alternative development does not become an excuse to say: “Well, we need 
something alternative, or we will cultivate that and have then money.” So UNODC has 
to position itself also with NGOs and also with networks of UN agencies. UNDP, for 
example, has a very good network in specific countries. Not in AD, but we can use the 
network to be able to link with the society and to reach out to do AD through them. 
It’s the only way. 
N: Couldn’t it also be problematic to contract a local agency or NGO? Because UNODC 
or the UN in general has a certain reputation and liability to the member states, and if 
there is an official partner, UNODC has to account for it in the case something 
happened, in the case they are inefficient or corrupt. It could be that they just don’t 
really know how to do it. And the UN wouldn’t really know what happened, because it 
wasn’t their staff. 
A: Yes, there are three things: One is, we have to ensure expertise, but how do we do 
that? We have a NGO and we have AD expertise and we link them for those regions 
which are clean. And we can build capacities. The second pillar is that, NGO should 
be in a roster, a public registry, because otherwise they are not accountable to 
anybody. Especially local, very local NGOs. We have to collaborate with NGO that 
are credible. Certain standards of credibility have to be met. So we have to develop the 
partnerships and roster of NGOs we have already worked to build a certain capacity, 
that was mentioned in the first pillar, and even share this capacity with other countries 
if possible. 
N: Is there any UN unit or agency, that is responsible for the collaboration with NGOs? 
Or is this something, that is part an organized within UNODC?  
A: Basically we work with NGOs for specific events. But we have the field network, 
cause the field is normally already working with NGOs, except field offices which 
cover a large number of countries. And we need to get more information on NGOs. 
But not only on NGOs, on NGOs which work on the right level and the right areas of 
UNODC’s mandate. You can have a very good NGO working on anti-human 
trafficking. And we can develop alternative mandates of NGOs if they are good.  
N: Do you think member states do support a strong partnership with NGOs? Or do they 
only want the UN to be in the field implementing projects financed by them? Could 
this be an issue?  
A: No, it’s not an issue. I think, sometimes we have many possibilities. The UN can also 
be co-implementing even with an NGO. In the fight against corruption in West Africa 
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we have a very strong partnership with Transparency International. There we are both 
getting funds and then together we implement a project with the government. So it’s 
three actors involved: the government, a NGO and a UN organization. I think it’s 
possible, even if there is a little problem, which is that donors and member states see 
that NGOs are not accountable to anybody. They are not accountable to the 
government or anybody.  
N: Which can also be an advantage, because you are not bound to what a certain political 
party wants or whatever. 
A: Yea, of course it’s good vis a vis the goal, but it’s not so good vis a vis accountability 
and credibility. So, by working with the UN there is a certain additional value to them, 
by implementing specific tasks for which they are good. And we don’t have the 
capacities because we don’t have the manpower. That’s why NGOs are very, very 
good many times. 
N: That’s all. Thank you very much. 
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Interview with Mr. Javier Montano Duran, VIC, 23 September 2009 
N: I would like to ask you about certain critics I found in publications for conferences on 
alternative development. First, that official publications would lack of self-criticism 
and would be over-optimistic. Is it really the case and why? 
M: Generally I think there are things that go wrong sometimes in the project. But every 
UNODC project over 500,000 USD is required to have an external evaluation, and 
those evaluations are also publicized documents. The external evaluations illustrate 
problems and critic, but this information is not advertised in the international 
community. However, it is available to them. Reports generally show the present 
situation based on data. Data is never good or bad or right or wrong. It is simply as it 
is. Consequently you see increase or decrease of certain social problems, which is a 
step forward or a step back. So in 2008 there had been an increase of coca cultivation 
in Colombia, which was a big shock. And this year the Colombian government 
increased its eradication programme. Certainly it’s the efforts of the Colombian 
government that is reported on the base of facts, and the language does not change 
depending on de- or increase. 
N: Are the evaluations send out to the Permanent Missions and project donors 
automatically, or do they have to request them? 
M: They are publicized documents and, e.g., the donors and PMs438
N: Is there also failure in the project implementation described? Or some kind of 
management failure that led to inefficiency? 
 have access to the 
documents online. 
M: There are some reports. For example, the projects in UNODC are audited by the OIOS 
of the United Nations. On the other side the independent evaluation unit does 
evaluations on the outcome of the project. The audit (OIOS) is an audit branch to see if 
there has been mismanagement or the violation of the UN rules, while implementing a 
project. Which are different things. One can follow all the rules without having the 
desired impact, which will be reflected in the evaluation. There could also a project 
with excellent results, but the certain UN rules or procedures were not respected, and 
this would be highlighted in the OIOS report. Certain action would follow and 
sometimes sanctions are decided, if abnormalities are reported (being it from the 
human resources factor or from misuse of property,..). 
                                                 
438 PM- Permanent Mission 
 172 
N: Are these documents available for the permanent missions? 
M: I think the recommendations is also available for the PMs and for donor countries. 
N: The next issue I’d like to discuss is the capacity to establish a relationship of 
confidence with the peasant federations, the target groups/ farmers. I found a critic that 
referred to it as “wishful thinking”. How would you describe the present relationship 
between farmers and UNODC in Colombia? Do you think the relation has changed 
and moved up to being a real partner in the decision-making process and the design of 
a project? Also compared to 5 to 10 years ago. 
M: I think such relationship and collaboration is certainly established. Most of the 
alternative development projects implemented in Colombia are the response of 
requests from the ground. 
N: But is this requested by the Colombian government or by the communities? Because 
the government might have different plans about its territory or the coca cultivation 
than the individual farmers. 
M: There are different in the work of UNODC. If we talk about the AD439
N: Do you think in UNODC in Colombia is already providing that? 
 programmes, 
we can have a model type of intervention, but this intervention needs to be owned by 
the community. Otherwise it would fail, as the peasant might not see the value of the 
project or activity and will not comply, eradicate the coca cultivation or will start 
growing coca afterwards. Consequently there are consultation meetings with the target 
population in order to get them engaged, and have their inputs for new project 
proposals. And today’s proposals are very comprehensive. Before there used to be 
only crop substitution, while now the whole economic chain is taken into account in 
order to secure the commercialization of the products. So now it’s a central factor to 
ensure an alternative source of income. 
M: Yes, I think certainly it is. There the “products for peace”, strategic alliances with 
supermarkets (Carrefour,..). 
N: One more question. What is UNODC’s official statement or attitude concerning 
voluntary eradication? Because of course this type of eradication is not really forced, 
but you are not really giving people an option as aerial spraying would be the 
consequence of neglected cooperation. This is something that is very criticized as it is 
not really building trust. 
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M: I can not commend on behalf of UNODC on that aspect. So you can only quote me as 
Javier Montano, but not as official UN staff. My comments will only be from my 
personal point of view.  
 In Colombia the coca crop is by law an illegal crop. There the government has a 
authority to go and eliminate all coca cultivation by using various instruments. If the 
law is broken, the government has the power to intervene. So it is because of the 
sovereignty of the state, as they decided to interdict coca corps. However, Colombia 
has three different types of eradication: 1) aerial spraying, 2) manual eradication, and 
3) voluntary eradication. From these three different types the last one is the most 
effective and sustainable one. As the peasants are entering an elimination process 
where alternatives for income generation are provided. And this is where UNODC is 
working. UNODC only works in voluntary eradication, where peasants eliminate their 
own crop and start cultivation new one(s). 
 Of course aerial spraying is the most controversial method and often accused of being 
dangerous to human health. There are also other parameters I am not aware of. 
N: Is there no project where the coca crop is still planted, while the base for legal income 
is created. 
M: No, because coca cultivation is illegal in Colombia. There are different programmes of 
course, but UNODC get not involved in rural development. There certain rural 
regions, that are focus of migration are developed in order to avoid new coca 
cultivation. 
N: Thank you very much for your time. 
M: No problem, anytime again. 
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Interview with Mr. Julio Mollinedo Claros, Second Secretary of the Bolivia 
Mission to the United Nation in Vienna, 30 September 2009 
N: What is the motivation of Bolivia, or any other country in the region, of implementing 
an alternative development project within the framework of an international 
organization, such as UNODC? What are the benefits and disadvantages or limitations 
that result from such cooperation? 
M: In the case of Bolivia there are a lot of programmes or projects implemented in 
cooperation with the United Stated, the European Union and the United Nations. So 
we try to cultivate licit products, such as coffee or bananas, but there is no market to 
sell them. Consequently without the development of the national or local industry is 
central to the substitution of illicit crops. 
Definitely all programmes run by the United States did not work, because they had a 
very dominant position in, where individual requirements were not met. This is a 
central disadvantage. 
In addition we need sustainable programmes in the country. And additional the target 
area needs to be developed at the same time. 
N: Do you think that the UN is a neutral player within the international system? 
M: Yes, and it is very important to have the support of the other member states. This is 
“responsabilidad compartida”. There need to be a mutual efforts. 
N: What problems can appear because of the high complexity of the UN and the actors 
involved? 
M: The positive implication of the UN is that it is a very experienced and proficient 
organization. And the beneficiaries of alternative development project need to be 
trained and supported in order to understand professional cultivation and market 
requirements, including marketing. 
N: What do you think are the donor countries interest in investing in alternative 
development projects? 
M: Recently, donor countries have been investing in demand reduction projects to a great 
part. They realize the social problem connected to illicit cultivation as the final 
consumption is largely happening in Europe and the United States, and Canada. 
Alternative development projects are now less supported by developed countries, and 
new resources are needed. 
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N: What to do you think about the harm reduction approach to use the coca plant for the 
production of legal products? And also the use of drugs in drug substitution 
programmes in consumer countries. Do you think this could be a possible alternative? 
M: This is a very good idea. But, unfortunately, the coca leave is illegal and banned based 
on the Convention from 1961. And this is binding for all countries and I think they try 
not to discuss this matter at the moment. Because of the convention the import or 
export of the coca leave is illegal. Consequently until the coca leave is made legal, 
such undertaking is very difficult or even impossible. 
N: How can new international cooperation in alternative development be established or 
strengthened in order to pursue common interests of the international community? 
How do you think problems of international concern can be dealt which to best 
possible way? 
M: The international community is of high importance when facing such problems, and 
international institutions need to be maintained. But individual interests and politics 
can often be a problem. Of example, in a big AD programme the different countries 
may have different opinions and sometimes no consensus can be found. Consensus is 
often not possible, but common positions can be found, but it takes a lot of time. 
Concerning possible ways of non-drug products of coca leaves many states seem not 
to understand the difference between coca crop and cocaine, and strictly disapprove 
any commercialization of the coca leave. Which would be illegal anyway. 
Usually countries have different ideas about the future of coca cultivation or coca 
substitution. For example forced and voluntary eradication and the use of aerial 
spraying is very controversial. 
N: Is there any new and central requirement or element for future alternative development 
projects? 
M: For the future for alternative development projects it is important to find new financial 
resources for cooperation, were the beneficiary country can decide upon what it needs. 
This will be very important. 
N: Hot could non-drug coca products be marketed? 
M: This is very complicated and not possible right now. The border is the convention 
from 1961. 
N:  Thank you very much. 
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